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Abstract
n
This thesis examines the function of art in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Its primary con­
cern is with Nietzsche’s turn to art as the means to counter what he terms meta­
physics. Metaphysics is a metonym for the system of beliefs sustaining our culture 
whereby human judgements about the world are perceived as uncovering an objec­
tive truth antecedent to those judgements, with an implicit faith in the possibility of 
exhausting the totality of these antecedant truths.
This thesis consequently has two principal strands. The first is to analyse |
Nietzsche’s criticism of metaphysics. The second is to explore the way in which, 
using a specific understanding of art, Nietzsche attempts to reconcile extreme seep- |
ticism towards all forms of human knowledge with a continued belief in their ne- %
cessity. The thesis argues that Nietzsche lays an importance on art as providing an 
aesthetic education to replace the misguided theoretical orientation of metaphysics.
Nietzsche criticises metaphysics for its inability to recognise that its 
interpretations are mere interpretations, that logic and the rational serve as means to A
make the world meaningful from the human perspective. My thesis explores how 
he sees art, and in particular the tragic, as constituting a mode of world 
interpretation which declares its status as such. I argue that for Nietzsche this is 
crucial inasmuch as a failure to recognise the contingency of our interpretations 
results in a refusal to give value in any interpretations. For Nietzsche the advent of 
the Modern age heralds the danger of such refusal, and hence I argue that his turn 
to art is a réponse to the specifically Modern temptation to descend into mere 
cynical Nihilism.
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A Note on Editions
Vlll
The edition of Nietzsche’s work I have used in this study has been the Kritische 
Studienausgabe published by Walter de Gruyter and the Deutscher Taschen- 
buchverlag in 1980, The edition is itself based on the Kritische Gesamtausgabe 
edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, which latter has become accepted 
as the standard modem edition. I have assiduously avoided referring to English 
translations, for a number of reasons. First, for the sake of consistency I found it 
preferable to refer to one single edition rather than to the various translations of Ni­
etzsche published works, not to mention the plethora of collections of his NachlaB 
notes. The most notable of these latter is of course The Will to Power , which Karl 
Schlechta had already declared suspect on account of the editorial methods used in 
its production.
As regards the NachlaB notes the situation is complicated by the fact that 
there are also various other collections, such as Die Unschuld des Werdens [The 
Innocence of Becoming] or Das Philosophenbuch [The Book of the Philosopher] 
(the latter being popular in France) both unavailable in English in any case, not to 
mention the vast numbers of aphorisms published only in the current standard edi­
tion. Hence to avoid referring to an overly large number of editions in both English 
and German, I found it preferable to refer to one single German edition which con­
tains all the material present in those other editions. Hence much of the material I 
refer to will be familiar to those acquainted with The Will to Power while much 
will also be based on aphorisms often neglected.
I have also preferred to refer to the German edition since in many cases the 
various translations lack unity amongst themselves in the translation of terms which 
remain constant in Nietzsche’s writing, and in some cases are actually misleading. 
Though I would not venture to claim that my own modest attempts represent the 
highest achievement in the art of translation, it was frequently more useful to pro­
duce my own rendering of the German.
ii
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Introduction
The title of this thesis is ‘Dialectics of Contingency: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of 
Art.’ As such, it is intended to thematise a certain tension within the work of 
Nietzsche, a tension with which Nietzsche is constantly occupied and which, one 
might argue, is a lasting legacy of his work. I am referring to the problem of 
reconciling a radical scepticism regarding the meahingfulness of the world with the 
continued necessity of believing in the possibility of its having meaning. In short,
Nietzsche is concerned with the question of how the radical sceptic might avoid 
becoming a Nihilist, and how one might combine acknowledgement of the 
contingency of all values with a continued belief in their necessity. It is this 
problem which this thesis will be argue as being central to Nietzsche’s thought, a 
preoccupation which only achieves some form of satisfactory answer through art.
Before I develop this point further, though, I should like to point out a 
paradox to the title of my thesis. Namely, the existence of a tension between 
Nietzsche, or rather between much that his thinking is currently taken to signify, |
and the demands of dialectical rigour. Since the seminal interpretation of his 
thought by Gilles Deleuze in 19621 it has become an orthodoxy that the work of 
Nietzsche represents the supreme moment in counter-Hegelian thought. Though 
there have been a few dissenting voices,^ most current commentators on Nietzsche 4
follow Deleuze’s reading, seeing him as the essential thinker of difference, an 
interpretation that explicitly opposes the totalising tendency of the dialectic, which 
will always seek to negate, to reduce the other, where the process of Aufhebung %
will only preserve the other by simultaneously cancelling it out. In the hands of 
Deleuze, even will to power becomes a means to the affirmation of difference, of 
plurality, despite the many passages where Nietzsche writes of will to power 
overcoming, or simply negating, opposition.
Not content with Nietzsche’s explicit expressions of mistrust with regard to 
the system building of Hegel, subsequent commentators such as Tracy Strong have '4
understood the anti-Hegelianism of Nietzsche’s thought to inhabit his writing at a 
more fundamental level. Strong sees Nietzsche’s use of genealogy, for example, ^
as being specifically shaped to undermine the structure of dialectic. Rather than 
gathering up, genealogy seeks to take apart, to lay bare the working of signs and 
their history, in order to dismantle the cultural constmcts of contemporary society.
Strong notes that ‘In a genealogical understanding, there is almost no automatic 
logic to the evolution of a set of events, certainly no Aufhebung A
1 " " ' ...
Notwithstanding the merit of such inteipretations I shall nevertheless be 
claiming, however, that Nietzsche’s relation to Hegel is considerably more complex 
than one of mere rejection or overcoming. The tension between Hegel and 
Nietzsche, and those between contingency and necessity, are, I would claim, 
inscribed everywhere within the corpus of Nietzsche’s work, and I shall work 
through these tensions as they appear with the aim of analysing the manner in 
which art becomes the means to release them, to effect a provisional reconciliation 
(I add the word ‘provisional’ to articulate the difference between what I read as 
occurring in the text of Nietzsche and what I perceive to be the specific operation of 
Hegel’s dialectic, where each successive Aufhebung points towards that final 
moment of absolute determination).
Nietzsche’s philosophy in many senses represents the first real deconstruc­
tion of what has gone before. By this I mean that his work contains both a sceptical 
de-struction of metaphysics and a post-metaphysical con-structive moment. The 
sceptical moment is familiar to his readers, and it is his polemics against 
contemporary society, his relentless tirades against Christianity and Plato, and his 
ridicule of Kant, the ‘great Chinaman of Konigsberg’, which constitute his identity 
in the eyes of most. I am arguing, however, that this scepticism is but a mere 
negative moment which itself is to be preserved in order then to be superseded once 
more. Nietzsche’s construction of a post-metaphysical thinking is not executed by a 
complete departure from the tradition, but is rather undertaken by pushing through 
to their limits the implications in the thought of Kant, Descartes, Hegel and so 
forth. At this point we see again the strong affinity between Nietzsche and Hegel, 
and between Hegel and Derrida, whose term ‘deconstruction’ I have used to best 
describe Nietzsche’s stance toward metaphysics. When Hegel discusses the double 
sense of the term ‘Aufheben’, as both a process of preservation and negation, 
concluding that ‘what is sublated [das Aufgehobene] is at the same time preserved; 
it has lost only its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated,’^  he is giving 
expression to a process bearing profound similarity to that of deconstructive 
interpretative practice and the play of différance, as Derrida himself admits.^ We 
see evidence of this Hegelian dual relation to the tradition in the ambivalent attitude 
Nietzsche harbours towards Kant, Hegel, and more significantly, Socrates, as 
Alexander Nehemas suggests.^
On the basis of this simultaneous negation and appropriation of metaphysics 
I would therefore characterise Nietzsche’s post-philosophy as an attitude of irony, 
not in the sense of a wilful playing with forms, though this may be in many cases 
what he is aiming to accomplish, but rather in the sense of maintaining a pathos of 
distance. Distance towards one’s own values and those of one’s culture, knowing
I1
them to be purely interpretative stances towards the world, lacking resilience when 
put under scrutiny, while simultaneously adhering to them as if they had something 
more than a purely contingent worth, and I shall examine this pathos of distance in 
Nietzsche in my opening chapters.
This is the basic framework I employ in my exposition of Nietzsche, and as 
such it constitutes the main core of my first two chapters. In Chapter one I offer an 
articulation of the above problem as it relates to Nietzsche’s critique of knowledge 
and truth, and to his awareness of the significance of metaphor and interpretation 
for any process of con-structive thinking. In particular I shall be outlining the 
relation between the dialectic and the notion of interpretation, a term which 
Nietzsche turns to in order to resist the metaphysical delusions of knowledge.
In Chapter two I discuss these issues as they relate to Nietzsche’s critique 
of subjectivity. I argue in like manner to Chapter one that Nietzsche is concerned 
not with the mere destruction of a key metaphysical concept, namely the subject, 
but rather its transformation in order to twist free of the limited metaphysical 
understanding of selfhood. Decentering is not dissolution. The claim is crucial 
inasmuch as I shall assert that Nietzsche’s writings on art are incomprehensible if 
we see him as proclaiming the death of the subject tout court, most particularly 
because of Nietzsche’s emphasis on the artist as the key to overcoming ?
metaphysical culture and its attendant Nihilism.
Having laid out the basic parameters of my discussion of Nietzsche, I turn 
to the specific theme of art, to the manner in which this tension in Nietzsche’s work 
is fully worked out and resolved by the model of the artist and the artistic creation 
of meaning. In one sense, writing a full-length study of Nietzsche’s philosophy of 
art is an impossible task. Nietzsche does not have a unified philosophy of art or 
aesthetic theory in the same way that one might take to be the case for Hegel,
Schiller, Schopenhauer. Instead, Nietzsche’s œuvre presents us with scattered 
writings frequently lacking any apparent unifying theme. Moreover we come up 
against the fact that his only substantial treatment of the subject belongs to his early 
years, after which Nietzsche’s thought underwent considerable changes as he left 
the shadow of Schopenhauer, changes which lend it a frequently fragmentary and 
disjointed character. I have nevertheless attempted to overcome this problem by 
discerning themes in his writing on art which recur, which are both closely con­
nected and also serve to provide some means of releasing the wider tension which I 
have outlined above.
In Chapter three I offer an interpretation of The Birth o f Tragedy. I attempt 
to understand that work, and most particularly the much analysed function of the 
Apollinian and the Dionysian, by emphasising its Hegelian structure and its
1
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considerable indebtedness to theories of the sublime. Just as the sublime presents 
an existential challenge, namely coming to terms with the finitude and contingency M
of human existence, so tragedy presents the annihilation of the stable symbolic Ï
world (i.e. the death of the hero) as a challenge to one’s ability to construct an v
interpretative schema one knows to be contingent, and ephemeral. As such the 
dialectic of Dionysus and Apollo prefigures the key motifs already discussed M
above. Not merely a therapeutic device to ‘hide’ the nausea of Becoming as one 
recent commentator has suggested^, tragedy becorries, in my reading, a challenge to 
live with Becoming.
In Chapters four to seven I examine the ways in which the dialectic of the 
contingent and the necessary, Dionysus and Apollo is recast in the light of the 
developments Nietzsche’s thought undergoes from the mid-1870’s onwards. I am |
thus arguing that although one can discern a very real transformation in Nietzsche’s 
thinking, the sense of rupture which many prefer to see actually conceals certain 
continuities in his work. In particular The Birth o f Tragedy , although labouring 
under the influence of Romanticism and Idealism, presents ideas which persist, 
albeit in altered form, throughout Nietzsche’s career. In many respects one could 
read Nietzsche as engaged in the uncompleted project of constantly recasting the 
ideas at work in The Birth o f Tragedy in the light of his more general 
development.
In Chapter four I discuss why Nietzsche comes to reject the 
Schopenhauerian (and Wagnerian) context which gave rise to The Birth o f 
Tragedy, More specifically I shall look at his critique of the notion of transcendence 
which plays a large part in the thought of Wagner and Schopenhauer, a notion 
which always threatens to govern the argument of The Birth o f Tragedy . Having 
outlined Nietzsche’s rejection of the metaphysical inclinations of his early mentors I 
shall go on to a wider discussion of his rejection of the notion of transcendence, a 
notion bound to the dualistic thinking of metaphysics. In keeping with his critique 
of the metaphysical yearning for the beyond, I shall argue that Nietzsche employs a 
number of themes in order to establish a counter-philosophy of ‘immanence’, 
themes which ultimately centre around art.
In Chapter five I look at the temporal aspect of Nietzsche’s ‘immanentism’, 
discussing his critique of metaphysical (Aristotelian) time. Here I shall not only 
discuss his ‘thought of thoughts’, namely Eternal Recurrence, but also analyse his 
early work on the problem of history in the second of the Untimely Meditations . It 
has recently been claimed^ that the second Untimely Meditation diverges from 
Nietzsche’s later work on time inasmuch as it sees history as a problem to be 
overcome, in contrast to the later writings which represent an affirmation of the
temporal flux of Becoming to the detriment of any stable, and petrified, régime of 
pure Being. My own interpretation rather views the two periods as united by a 
common concern to think through the problem of the relation of permanence and ^
historicity in a manner parallel to Nietzsche’s wider concern with the relation of 
contingency and necessity.
As in the case of these latter, more general problems, I shall argue that in 
Nietzsche we are dealing neither with a pure rejection of the metaphysical notion of 
Being, nor with a simple, unqualified embracing of the idea that everything exists 
(inasmuch as the notion of existing has any real role to play here) as a Heraclitean 
flux. Nietzsche is too subtle a thinker to imagine that the mere introduction of the #
word ‘Becoming’ (which in any case cannot help but reify the idea in any case) will %
suffice to overcome the metaphysical fixation with stability, as if one could ignore j
the reasons for this fixation. Consequently I am not claiming that Nietzsche is 
putting forward a description of originary time in place of the derived time of meta- |
physics (in the Heideggerian manner), since he would claim that the character of 
any such time is a matter of interpretation. Rather, I would argue, he is putting for­
ward the thought of Eternal Recurrence as a normative idea, constitutive of a post­
metaphysical thinking, one which holds the tension between Being and Becoming, |
repetition, permanence and decay, in check.
I conclude this chapter with a consideration of the way in which art ;|
constitutes the practice which best embodies this new temporal orientation.
Nietzsche is unfortunately never explicit on the relation of art and time, and this 
chapter is one which requires considerable imagination, tempered with due caution 
and care, in order to construct such a relation from the fragments of Nietzsche’s 
work. The move is not, however, an illegitimate one, since strong links can be 
made between art and the temporal structure of the interpretative dialectic as I ar- |
ticulate it in the first chapter, a link embodied in Nietzsche’s adoption of Dionysian f
Classicism as an aesthetic norm. Dionysian Classicism serves for Nietzsche as the 
mark of ‘authentic’ artistic praxis, one which preserves a sensitivity for the monu­
mental in history, and so brings us back to the key concern of history, temporality 
and Eternal Recurrence. We see in Dionysian Classicism an exemplification of an 
interpretative and representational practice embodying Eternal Recurrence, pre­
serving both history and the ahistorical, the contingent and the necessary through 
its representational mode.
In Chapter six I examine the function of his use of physiological metaphors 
as a second strategic device in his critique of (metaphysical) notions of 
transcendence, and his turn towards immanentism. I shall be claiming that his use 
of biological vocabulary does not signify a brief interest in the ‘positivist’ sciences.
.-I
but rather constitutes part of this reaction to some of the dangers in his earlier work, 
a reaction which remains a central part of his thinking into his final work. The 
body, in Nietzsche, thus serves as a bridge between his critique of metaphysics, for 
which embodiment exceeds the confines of rational discourse, and the aesthetic turn 
in his own thinking.
In this chapter I also discuss Nietzsche’s application of physiology to the I
question of art and in particular shall be examining his claim that ‘all art is applied 
physiology’. I examine the role this vocabulary pïays in his mature writing on art.
This includes analysing the way in which Nietzsche uses the physiology of art as a 
means of distancing his later writings on art from the Idealist connotations of The 
Birth o f Tragedy and also as a tool for undertaking a critique of the formalist 
aesthetics of I’art pour Tart, a way of thinking which can be traced back to a partial f
reading of Kant’s Critique o f Judgement and in particular of his remarks 
concerning disinterestedness. |
In Chapter seven I continue my exploration of Nietzsche’s critical stance 
towards the aesthetic tradition from Kant onwards by looking at his critique of two 
related notions which, like the formalism of I’art pour I’art, stem from one-sided 
readings of Kant. The first is the idea, first fully developed by the Romantics and |
subsequently perpetuated by Hegel and Schopenhauer, amongst others, that art f
constitutes a sensuous representation of the truth. The second notion is the idea that 
the key to aesthetic theory lies in the analysis of the experience of the spectator. I 
shall be showing how Nietzsche strives both to set art apart from truth and also to |
stress the importance of the aesthetics of the artist. Both these themes serve to direct 
the discussion of art away from the metaphysical fixation with truth and towards 
the notion of art as interpretation, through linking artistic creativity to interpretative 
will to power. This last exploration is crucial since for Nietzsche it is the artistic 
transformative interpretative praxis which is to serve as the model for a more |
general interpretative practice.
In the final chapter I gather up the arguments of the previous chapters in 
order to provide a more general articulation of the problems with which this thesis 
has been concerned. The unifying theme is the claim that Nietzsche uses the 
discussion of art and artists to imagine how a post-metaphysical world might be, -iji.e. how it might confront the loss of the metaphysical world view without falling |
into the abyss of reactive Nihilism. Art and the artist’s interpretation of the world 
serve as a model for this post-metaphysical culture inasmuch as they combine both 4
the sense of radical contingency (i.e. concern only with appearance, with 
immanence) and necessity (i.e. the Classical work as providing an enduring 
presence) demanded of such a culture. Nietzsche’s ideal, however, also relies on
-- ■ • ■  ' ' ' ■ '.--A__
nthe assumption that only a certain type of praxis deserves the appellation of art. I 
shall consequently be examining further the criteria of ‘authentic’ art, as Nietzsche 
understands it, contrasting it with those art forms which the later Nietzsche held to 
be unaesthetic, such as popular theatre, Wagner, Realism and so forth. This 
comparison will also go on to consider the relation between the aesthetic practice 
Nietzsche envisages and the contemporary aesthetic of the Post-modem.
There is one final problem, however, one which needs to be explored in 
order to validate the entire project of this thesis. It involves establishing some set of 
characteristics which mark off artistic interpretation from that of, say the sciences or 
philosophy. Nietzsche’s assertion that there is only interpretation, not knowledge, 
coupled with his early critiques of language, has made us think twice about the 
distinctions previously drawn between the discourses of science and literature. If 
scientific research is just a matter of interpretation, its discourse turns out to differ j
little from that of the arts. Nietzsche’s arguments in this regard have had an 
explosive effect on contemporary philosophy and literary criticism, with 
deconstruction as a method (inasmuch as one can reify its practice in this way) 
devoted to reading the texts of philosophy against themselves precisely through the 
analysis of figurai language in those texts, and the process whereby figurality 
undermines the claims apparently being made by the surface conceptual discourse 
of texts. If we consent to this mode of thinking, to the claim that the discourse of 
philosophy and the sciences and that of the arts should be elided, the purpose of 
this thesis is going to be put into doubt. By agreeing that scientific and artistic |
interpretations do not differ in kind , it will be difficult to justify a thesis which i
examines the privileged claims made on behalf of artistic praxis. Moreover if 
Nietzsche himself lies at the origin of the deconstmction of the distinction, we have 
a doubly difficult task. In this work, however, I shall be suggesting ways in which 
it might still be meaningful to distinguish between the two modes of interpretation; I 
shall also be suggesting ways in which this distinction can be made on the basis of 
Nietzsche’s own writing. To elaborate further, however, would at this point pre­
empt the argument of the thesis, and hence I here make way for the main text.
1
N otes;
 ^ Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy , trans. H. Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press,
1983). ;
 ^Cf. Daniel Breazeale, The Hegel - Nietzsche Problem’, Nietzsche Studien 4 (1975). Breazeale’s 
argument not only suggests ways in which Nietzsche’s thought still bears the traces of Hegel’s, .X
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but also points out the extent to which Deleuze’s portrait of the latter thinker amounts to an 
insensitive caricature.
 ^Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration , (Los Angeles: University 
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Contingency and Dialectics, Interpretation and Truth
Nietzsche’s scepticism differs from that of David Hume. This is not meant merely 
to point out that they were different writers, concerned with varying issues, united 
only by a common mistrust of the pretensions of human knowledge and science. I 
am not concerned with the divergences between the details of their projects as much 
as with the fundamentally different bases from which they launch their sceptical 
attacks on knowledge. Hume, despite his sceptical regard towards the rational, 
remains firmly within the circumscribed boundaries of metaphysical discourse. His 
mistrust of, say, causality, stems from the suspicion that it constitutes a 
misrepresentation of what really is the case. Bound to the Empirical tradition from 
Bacon onwards, his contention is that since our knowledge of the world is derived #
from the mere succession of sense stimuli from without, all attempts to organise 
those stimuli into a meaningful whole are mere acts of synthesis, telling us nothing 
about the reality underlying those stimuli, unable even to predict whether those 
stimuli will be the same tomorrow.
Nietzsche’s scepticism is of a different order, less overturning the discourse . |
of metaphysics than displacing it, bringing into question what kind of activity 
philosophy actually is. For his critique of metaphysics is not carried out in the name 
of some higher truth. What fuels his critique is the approach to philosophy which 
views it as a discursive practice and his conviction that its status as such has been 
misrecognised. Although his writings concern themselves with philosophy, the 
history of philosophy and the philosophy of science, it is as a philologist that he 
interprets the work of philosophers, and as a cultural critic that he judges their M
worth.
I shall develop this point further, but for the moment it is important to see 
why it is important to make a claim such as this. If we assume Nietzsche is just 
‘writing philosophy’ when he discusses Kant, Plato, Schopenhauer and so forth, : |
we will frequently be disappointed by the result, judged by the canonical standards 
of philosophical argument. His so-called ‘revaluation of all values’ will look like a 
tired repetition of overly familiar Humean and Kantian themes. The suspicion that 
Nietzsche may well be doing little else than repeating, or stating more baldly, 
conclusions implicit in Kant and Hume is aggravated by the fact that Nietzsche him­
self, most especially in his posthumous notes, displays a somewhat vulgarised un­
derstanding of Kant, and more generally of the history of metaphysics, giving the 
frequent impression that he is attacking a straw man.
A brief example will illustrate the point in hand. In a note from 1885-6, he 
formulates the following criticism of Kant: ‘A “thing-in-itself ’ just as absurd as a |
A
-  ■ " -  "  "  ' ' -  " .........  - XX-.
i11
“sense-in-itself a “meaning-in-itselfThere is no ‘state-of-affairs-in-itself, but 5
rather a sense must first be added, so that there can be a state-of-affairs’4 Most 
revealing and interesting about this fragment, and there are numerous others which 
argue in a like fashion, is Nietzsche's implicit assumption that Kant, the obvious 
target, unequivocally maintained the existence of ‘things’-in-themselves,
‘meanings’-in-themselves and so forth. Now although Kant may well have per­
sonally been reluctant to admit as much, a merely cursory reading of the Critique of 
Pure Reason will establish that his critical project must implicitly be in agreement %
with Nietzsche on precisely this issue dealt with in the latter’s note quoted above.^
The core of the Critical Project consists in an overturning of the Empiricist 
understanding of knowledge, replacing it instead with the model of knowing as 
making. The knowing subject is an active world-maker in Kant, determining a 
priori what can be considered as an external stimulus, a thing, a meaning, and so 
forth. While one might accuse Kant of not having thought the problem through to 
its proper conclusion, it is evident that his ‘Copemican revolution’ of necessity has 
to rule out talk of pre-existing ‘things’ waiting to have qualities predicated of them, 
or pre-existent ‘meanings’ waiting to be determined.
If we subscribe to such an interpretation of Nietzsche’s work, we will be 
forced to conclude that his critique of metaphysics is not very original, and express 
incomprehension at the importance currently accorded to a thinker who on this 
account hardly deserves high praise. However, if we interpret him in this manner 
we are displaying a lack of sensitivity to two salient aspects, one biographical and 
the other textual. Regarding the former it is important to remember that Nietzsche’s i
chosen profession, albeit short, was as a classical philologist. Although he 
inveigled against the ponderous, myopic practices of ‘Altertumswissenschaft’ of I
the late nineteenth century, I would nevertheless argue that Nietzsche’s training to 
understand literary texts in a certain way was one which dominated his If
understanding of texts in general, and more specifically those of the philosophers.
The second aspect to Nietzsche which one must take into account is the fact «
that his early work is always concerned with culture and language, whether it is the 
problem of language in the highly theoretical essay of 1873 entitled ‘On Truth and 
Falsehood in their Extra-moral Sense’ or the relation of language and music in 
tragedy and Wagnerian opera. As such I would argue that these two factors, t
Nietzsche’s philological training and his concern with language provide the basis 
for the greater part of his subsequent working over of the problems of metaphysics.
Of course these claims are not particularly original, since his thematisation of 
philosophical language has become a pivot organising many Nietzsche 
interpretations of the early 70’s, such as those of Kofman, Pautrat or Derrida,
1
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which in differing ways examine Nietzsche’s use of metaphor in his 
‘deconstmction’ of metaphysics.^
However, while I would affirm the importance of such a ‘turn’ in the 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s work, it is nonetheless arguable that Nietzsche’s 
concern does not rest with the problem of language, but rather sees language as a 
first step, a weapon in the battle to bring the cultural institution of metaphysics into 
question by undermining its discourse. It is to this process that I now turn.
Metaphors and Truth
Nietzsche’s concern with philosophy can be traced back to his essay ‘On Tmth and 
Lie’ which unravels the intertwinement of truth and language, metaphor and 
concept. The view he is seeking to criticise by his insights is the correspondence 
theory of truth, where tmth becomes the adaequatio intellectus et re i.
Countering the correspondence theory of truth, Nietzsche makes three 
claims, of which the first serves as the basis for the other two. The first claim 
Nietzsche makes is that tmth is a function of language, not vice versa. The notion 
that language is a more or less adequate expression of the truth is one which has a 
venerable history, whether it be the Platonic notion of rational dialogue as a 
prolegomenon to the revealed truth of the Forms, or the tradition from Aristotle to 
Descartes, Locke, and the Port-Royale Logic , which sees words as a medium for 
the communication of subjective ideas, themselves non-linguistic mental events. As 
Baker and Hacker have pointed out^ it is an idea which ironically still pervades the 
work of the grandfather of post-stmcturalism, Ferdinand de Saussure, who in his 
Cours de Linguistique Générale speaks of the conversion of mental ideas into 
language.
Nietzsche turns this relation about, imagining a primal scene, whereby a 
form of social contract was enacted to enable the survival of the human species. 
With this originary ‘contrat sociale’ there occurs ‘something which looks like the 
first steps towards the accomplishment of that enigmatic drive for truth. Namely, 
the fixing of what is to count as “truth”, i.e. a universally valid and binding 
designation for things is invented, and this legislation of language produces the first 
laws of truth, too: for there arises for the first time the contrast between tmth and 
lie: the liar uses the valid designations, words, in order to make the unreal to seem 
real . . .  he misuses the firm conventions through the wilful confusion or even 
inversion of names’ (KSA 1 pp. 877-8).
Although Nietzsche’s description of language as a process of naming comes 
close to the so-called Augustinian theory of language which Wittgenstein, amongst 
others, has been keen to discredit, his argument that truth is a matter of linguistic
M
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convention surely has a great deal of force behind it. For if we assume any 
proposition about the world, ourselves or anything else to be of the form ‘p is ^ ’ 
we can surely only judge its truth content if we know what it means to say that p is 
q . This is not to produce an argument in support of the notion of truth-conditional 
semantics, since the relation between truth and meaning does not hold the other 
way, i.e. it is perfectly possible to understand the meaning of a sentence without 
being able to judge the conditions under which it might be tme, indeed for some 
sentences the notion of attempting to find a truth condition would be absurd. 
However it is to assert that truth is a function of semantics, and more specifically 
grammar. As Josef Simon notes, ‘A sentence which intends to be tme . . . must 
first have been constructed as a meaningful sentence according to the rules of a 
language . . . Seen in this way, the sentence which is possibly true is a special 
type [Spezialfall] of meaningful sentence of a specific language of a particular life 
co n tex t.I t is an argument Nietzsche holds on to throughout his career speaking in 
a note from the NachlaB of 1887 of ‘the evaluation “I believe that such and such is 
the case” as the essence of “truth” ’ (KSA 12: 9 [38] p. 352).
Following Nietzsche’s argument we can conclude that the true proposition 
is merely a particular kind of meaningful sentence: truth is always already preceded 
by meaning and by grammar. It is a conviction which forms a central weapon, 
some might contend the central weapon, in Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, 
and it is one which he keeps throughout his career as a thinker. In Beyond Good 
and E vil, for example, he poses the rhetorical question ‘Might not the philosopher 
be able to raise himself above the belief in grammar ?’ (KSA 5 p. 54), having 
already claimed earlier that ‘The miraculous family resemblance of all Indian, Greek 
and German philosophising can be explained easily enough. Precisely where there 
is a relatedness of language it is unavoidable that . . . from the beginning 
everything lies ready for an identical development and succession of philosophical 
systems, just the path appears closed off to certain other possibilities of world- 
interpretation’ (ibid. p. 34). As is well known, and as I shall be examining in detail 
in the next chapter, one of the consequences of this determination of truth by 
grammar is the philosophical belief in the subject, itself a parallel to the 
grammatically determined belief in God. As Nietzsche exclaims in Twilight o f the 
Idols ‘I fear we shall never be rid of God, because we still believe in grammar . . 
. ’ (KSA 6 p. 78).
Nietzsche’s claim that language precedes truth, and ultimately that language 
precedes thought, is not startlingly original in itself. The linguistic turn in 
philosophy can be traced back to pre-Romantic thinkers such as Hamann and von 
Humboldt, together with Romantics such as Schleiermacher. The latter thinker in 
particular, is the first to move away from the notion of the subject as a transcendent
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thinking being, supplanting this with the idea of language as the ground of thought. 
He notes, for example that ‘There are no thoughts without speech’, adding that 
‘one cannot think without words.’^  However, Nietzsche differs from these earlier 
thinkers in his other claims which follow on from his initial premise about the 
mediating function of language. I am referring, of course, to his claims regarding 
the radical metaphoricity of language.
If we return to his essay of 1873, we see Nietzsche asserting language to be 
radically metaphorical in two distinct ways. The first argument is that language and 
that which it denotes are fundamentally heterogeneous. Nietzsche asks ‘What is a 
word ? The representation of a neural stimulus by sound* (KSA 1 p. 878), then 
later adds ‘A neural stimulus first translated into an image ! first metaphor. The 
image then transformed again into a sound ! Second metaphor. And each time a 
complete leap from one sphere to another completely different and new* (ibid. p. 
879). Explicitly countering the Aristotelian notion of words as an expression of 
mental events, he writes ‘there is no causality, no correctness, no expression, at 
most rather an aesthetic relation, I mean a suggestive carrying over, a stuttering 
translation into a completely foreign language* (ibid. p. 884).
Nietzsche*s reference to neural stimuli could be seen as a gesture towards 
Empiricism, yet this would be to miss the nature of his claim. Empiricism can still 
be seen as holding fast to the notion of causality. The stimulus causes a certain 
response, and language is a description of this external world. Hence Locke’s 
insistence on plain language as a means to achieve an adequate such description. In 
contrast, however, Nietzsche is implicitly criticising this Empiricist view in his 
claim that the relation of word and world is one of fundamental difference in kind. 
No description can ever hope to represent the world adequately since the very idea 
of a description is misled. What masquerades as a description turns out to be an 
extended metaphor, sundered from the world by an enormous gulf. Nietzsche 
employs a striking image to give force to the heterogeneity of the two: A painter 
whose hands are missing and who wanted to express the image hovering before 
him by singing, will always betray more through this exchange of spheres, than the 
empirical world will ever betray of the essence of things* (ibid.).
In essence Nietzsche’s view seems close to Kant, as I have already 
suggested, though he is seeking to push through to their furthest limits certain 
conclusions implicit in Kant’s thought. Nietzsche has no time for Kant’s 
‘categories’ of understanding, and he has doubled the sense of alienation from the 
‘world’ by including not only an empirical world, which through human sensibility 
necessarily mediates the known world, but also by taking into account the 
constitutive role of language in forming the empirical world. Moreover there is an 
additional sense in which language mediates the empirical world and severs us from
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it, and here we come to Nietzsche’s second claim as to the metaphorical nature of 
language and truth.
The second process of métaphorisation occurs when language leads to the 
construction of concepts. Nietzsche writes, ‘Let us think of the formation of 
concepts: every word immediately becomes a concept by virtue of the fact that it is 
to serve as a reminder not only of the unique, completely individualised primal 
experience, to which it owes its origin, but rather simultaneously has to fit for 
countless, more or less similar ones (i.e. strictly speaking never identical), hence 
for totally dissimilar ones. Every concept originates in the identification of the non­
identical’ (ibid. pp. 879-80). Offering a concrete example of this process,
Nietzsche describes what happens with the concept of the leaf, which is meant to f
serve as a denotation for a large variety of leaves, all of them dissimilar, a 
dissimilarity which is neglected due to the levelling process of using the same word g
to refer to all. Generalising the conclusion of this particular example, Nietzsche 
writes that ‘The overlooking of the individual and the actual gives us the concept . I
. . against which nature knows no forms or concepts, hence no types, but rather g
just an indefinable X, inaccessible to us’ (ibid. p, 880).
Against the dynamic nature of the world, ‘the great construction of concepts 
displays the stark regularity of a Roman columbarium, and in logic exhales the 
discipline and frigidity which is proper to mathematics’ (ibid. p. 882). As Sarah W
Kofman has pointed out,^ Nietzsche uses a wide variety of architectural metaphors |
to suggest the very process of petrifaction which occurs when logic appropriates 
the world and makes it into a system of reiterated and iterable units. As Kofman 
indicates, Nietzsche refers to the construction of concepts as similar to the 
production of a columbarium, with its associations of death. More significantly, 
still, he uses that archetypal symbol of death in life, of mummification, the 
pyramid, to describe the ‘order of castes and ranks’ (ibid. p. 881) built up by such |
a régime of tmth.^
Nietzsche sees language as introducing a false universality into the world of 
experience, which strictly speaking, he regards as utterly contingent. Once again, 
even if we disregard his outmoded view of language as consisting of a series of #
names, we have to take seriously his claim that language, through the repetitive 
nature of signification, transforms the world of discursive meaningfulness into one 
of regularity and consistency. Although we are tempted to reject his view of the 
sign as a name, we can nevertheless subscribe to his assertion that the prerequisite 
for any sign within a system of signification is iterability. It is a notion that has 
become the bedrock for twentieth century linguistics, adopted both by Structuralism 
and Post-stmcturalism, and curiously enough, also by Anglo-American philosophy 
of language, in particular by speech-act theory.9
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By virtue of its extension from its original situation to other, non-identical 
cases, the concept operates metaphorically, and truth itself, through its process of 
identification of the non-identical, becomes an aesthetic relation between dissimilar 
experiences and between the subject and the object (Nietzsche still employs the 
vocabulary of Idealism in this early essay), producing a synthetic unity between the 
dis-unified. On the basis of this conclusion he makes the now overly familiar 
assertion that truth is a ‘mobile army of metaphors’ (ibid. p. 880).
Following Nietzsche’s argument in this early essay we can identify 
language, and more particularly language’s mediating function in the constitution of 
truth, thought and meaning, as providing a foundation for Nietzsche’s attack on 
metaphysics. Criticising the notion of truth as a process of uncovering, of concepts 
as somehow describing something in the world, he places language at the 
foundation of truth, as determining what is permitted to count as true, where the 
concepts employed by any particular idea of truth, or to use the Foucauldian term, 
‘episteme’, and the world to which they refer are fundamentally heterogeneous. 
Propositions concerning the world are translations, and moreover translations 
which cannot but mis-translate, inasmuch as they always introduce a false 
universalisation into the world.
Yet at this point we have only just begun, both chronologically and 
thematically, with Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics. For his concern is not so 
much with language per se, as with the wider cultural problems which accompany 
the misunderstanding of the constitutive role of signs in understanding. In short, he 
is concerned not with merely correcting an error (after all Nietzsche does not 
disapprove of error per se), but with correcting the catastrophic consequences of 
that error. I am referring to the problem of Nihilism. Overcoming Nihilism involves 
a two-fold process; first, offering a critique of those assumptions which have 
created ground fertile for its advent, and second, offering a paradigm which can 
point out ways in which it can be left behind. At this stage, I am aware that in 
Nietzsche’s work the notion of Nihilism is deeply ambivalent, as Gianni Vattimo 
has recently pointed out^^, but I shall delay discussion of its finer nuances until 
later.
Amnesia, Metaphysics
If we return to ‘On Truth and Falsehood in Their Extra-moral Sense’ we find 
Nietzsche offering an explanation as to why this metaphorical relation to the world 
has been transformed into the thinking of metaphysics, where words correspond to 
‘things’ in the world. Nietzsche’s answer is amnesia. Due to an over-familiarity 
with the signs of our system of meaning, we have forgotten that they are mere
%  
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metaphors, that they bear a purely arbitrary relation to the world, itself a notion 
reified through the process of signification. Nietzsche presages his argument early 
on in the essay when he notes that ‘It is only through forgetfulness that a person 
could ever come to imagine they were in possession of a truth . . . ’ (ibid. p.
878), a claim he fleshes out a few pages later, asserting that the individual ‘thus 
forgets the original intuitive metaphors [Anschauungsmetaphem] as metaphors and 
takes them for things themselves’ (ibid. p. 883). It is a theme one finds dealt with 
in his unpublished notes from the same period, which confront the relation between 
recollection, cognition and repetition, a relation which itself recalls the intertwining 
of dialectic and remembrance in Hegel.
The Hegelian connection is made quite obvious in a note from 1872, where 
Nietzsche writes ‘The similar recalls the similar and identifies itself with it : that is 
cognition, the swift subsumption of the identical. Only the similar perceives the 
similar: a physiological process. The very same thing which is memory is also 
perception of the new’ (KSA 7: 19 [180] p. 475). Repeating the argument for the 
levelling effect of concepts, Nietzsche introduces the theme of recollection, as that 
which mediates between different experiences and facilitates the universalising 
effect of language to occur. The process of recollection transforms the similar into 4
the identical and thence the subsumptive activity of ‘knowing’ occurs, an operation 
which bears remarkable similarity to that of the dialectic and Aufhebung. Memory |
is what permits the metaphorising effect of language to take place, without which 
we would be subject to a random succession of meaningless sense impressions. It 
is an argument Nietzsche repeats in The Gay Science, noting that in the process of ^
cognition, ‘something unknown is to be led back to something familiar’ (KSA 3 p.
594X
In a further note from the same notebook Nietzsche clearly sees the i
reducing effect of memory as a consequence of a mimetic urge, and contrasts this |
with the metaphysical idea of knowledge. He writes, ‘Imitation is the opposite of 
Knowledge inasmuch as Knowledge does not grant validity to translation, but will 
rather keep a firm grip on the impression without metaphor . . .  To this end it 
becomes petrified, the impression is ensnared and delimited by concepts, then 
killed off, skinned and mummified and preserved as a concept. Now there are no 
‘authentic’ [eigentlich] expressions, no true Knowledge without metaphors. . .
The most familiar metaphors, the usual ones, now count as truths and as the 
measure for the more infrequent ones . . . Knowledge is merely a working with 
the favourite metaphors, thus a process of imitation which is no longer felt as 
imitation’ (KSA 7: 19 [228] pp. 490-1).
This connection between memory, metaphor and knowing is one which 
Nietzsche affirms throughout his writings. Even in his mature works Nietzsche’s
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basic argument still stands, namely that whenever we imagine we are learning i
something about the world or ourselves, and he becomes especially critical of the |
natural sciences, we are in fact doing little other than recovering what we have 
already projected into the world. The new is always assimilated to the old, memory 
and perception of the new are the same operation. He writes in Beyond Good and 
Evil that ‘when we introduce and mix the world of signs into things as if it were 
their “in-itself’ we proceed once more as we have always proceeded, namely 
mythologically’ (KSA 5 p. 36). Attacking the delusions of physicists, he writes in 
a note from the NachlaB of 1887 that ‘They have forgotten to take the power of 
constructing perspectives into their account of true being . . . in the language of 
school, their being-as-subject [das Subjekt-sein]’ (KSA 13: 14 [186] p. 373).
We can identify amnesia as lying at the heart of the myths to which 
metaphysics subscribe, myths to the effect that we can somehow know the world 
as it is, that we have no constitutive function in the determination of its character, 
myths which are quite opposed to Nietzsche’s contention that ‘Philosophising is a #
kind of atavism of the highest order’ and that philosophers’ thinking is ‘less a i
discovering than a re-cognising, recollecting, a return and home-coming’ (KSA 5 
p. 34). It is this difference which permits one to recognise the distinction between f
Nietzsche and Hume which I asserted at the beginning of this chapter. Hume’s i
scepticism is borne out of a desire to know the truth, and thereby resembles the 
Cartesian reduction of everything except the cogito. In contrast Nietzsche would 
have no such delusions, given his recognition of the radical metaphoricity of all 
discursive knowledge. Scepticism carried out in the name of true knowledge, 
which attempts to exclude everything that is extrinsic to the bedrock of absolute 
certainty, is a self-defeating project. As Nietzsche notes in the opening sections of 
Beyond Good and Evil Descartes’ maxim, ‘de omnibus dubitandum’ is one which 
Descartes himself fails to adhere to, not only in his dogged faith in the certainty of 
the cogito, but also in the very fact that his reduction is executed in the name of 
truth, in the name of some foundation. To be consistent, scepticism has to be an 
anti-foundational discourse.
Contrasting Nietzsche with Hume and Descartes in this manner, we 
conclude that for Nietzsche philosophy is not a matter of verisimilitude, indeed no 
discourse can be. Instead, it is a discursive practice, an interpretation (a theme with 
which I shall deal in a subsequent section) produced by a certain episteme, or 
régime of truth. This is not to assimilate Nietzsche’s thinking to that of figures such 
as Rorty, Fish, Lyotard, or, on occasion, Derrida. Nietzsche does not see the loss 
of foundation as implying an abrogation of ethical concern, as compelling us 
merely to assent to what is already practised and believed, as Stanley Fish claims, J
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for exam ple.R ather, Nietzsche’s concern is with the consequences of certain 
epistemes, and in particular with that of metaphysics. As a cultural critic, he is 
concerned with changing the episteme that has governed Judaeo-Christian culture.
To understand this more fully we must delve further into the discourse of 
metaphysics.
Nietzsche likens the process of concept formation to that of constructing a 
tomb, an act of petrification, in that the very nature of the concept as an iterable %
sign promotes a demand for universality and identity. In one sense it is inevitable, 3
given that truth is a function of grammar, that the genesis of concepts, of truth j
values will be forgotten, since conceptuality per se excludes thought of |
Becoming, of the non-identical, in short of the contingency of the world. In his 
later writing on interpretation, Nietzsche also sees the reduction of difference and 
of Becoming as a function of the human form of life, claiming that ‘Behind all 
logic and its apparent sovereignty of movement there stand evaluations, put more ^
clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain form of life’ |
(KSA 5 p. 17). The connection made here between truth and the human form of 
life, where truth is purely contingent upon the requirements of the human life 
form points towards Nietzsche’s perspectivism, a theme I shall deal with later. For 
the moment, however, I shall discuss the question of language, metaphysics and 
Nihilism.
Nihilism
Turning away from the early essay on language, we can locate in Nietzsche’s later 4
writing the constant theme of language and metaphysics, and of the complicity of ■ |
the two. The origins of that complicity lie in the Socratic search for definition.
The Socratic search for definition can be regarded as the first philosophical |
project whose possibility is founded on the forgetting of the origin of concepts, of 3
their metaphorical nature. The Socratic question ‘what is ?’, whether an enquiry 
into ethics, epistemology or politics, is only puiposeful given the assumption that 
its object is self-identical and unchanging with time, that correctly predicated 
properties are valid at all times, and that it has a determinable essence. Yet as |
Nietzsche notes, this basic law of identity ‘here termed “originary” has become’
(KSA 2 p. 39), i.e. it is the product of a particular history and nothing else. 3
Crucial terms such as ‘a priori’, ‘a posteriori’, ‘origin’, ‘cause’,
‘condition’, ‘necessary’, and many others constituting the discourse of 
metaphysics only function in this climate of forgetting, on condition of not 
revealing their utterly contingent status as regulative ideas (though not in the
V |
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Kantian sense). As such, they have to be an object of faith, and Nietzsche sees 
metaphysics and religion as closely related, indicated by the fact that he frequently 
refers to Christianity as ‘Platonism for the People’. He notes, ‘Some have the need 
for metaphysics; but that impetuous longing for certainty, which is released in large 
quantities scientifically and positivistically, the longing to have something stable .
. . that too is the longing for security, support, in short, that instinct o f weakness 
which admittedly does not create religions, metaphysics, convictions of all kinds - |
but conserves them’ (KSA 3 pp. 581-2). One notes here, too, the continuation of <|
the distinction between the process which constructed these systems of beliefs - the : j
human ability to create metaphors in the early language essay, and the process 3
whereby those systems are sustained - forgetfulness in the early essay, now -g
defined as the instinct of weakness.
Metaphysics is thus characterised as a repression of history and of j
contingency, one sustained by a ‘faith in the truth as something found’ [die 9
gefundene Wahrheit] (KSA 2 p. 31), rather than recognising its truths as governed 
by discourse inhabiting a world of signs [Zeichenwelt] (KSA 5 p. 36). It is an 
episteme which has provided the foundations for modem science and mathematics; 3
as Nietzsche notes, mathematics ‘would never have come into being if it had been 
known right from the start that there is no perfectly straight line in nature, no real 4
circle, no absolute system of measurement’ (KSA 2 p. 31). Instead, Nietzsche 
observes, it is the task of thinking to ‘depict the human as a limit’ (KSA 11: 25 
[393] p. 115), to lay bare the semiotic construction of truth, for ‘It is we alone who 
have devised cause, sequence [Nacheinander], reciprocity [Füreinander], relativity, 
constraint, number, law, freedom, motive and purpose’ (KSA 5 p. 36).
It is this ‘naturalisation’ of the system of signs, where signs are no longer 
taken as signs but as revealed truths, which lays the ground for the arrival of 
Nihilism. Nietzsche, of course, is not the first to have realised the dangers of he 
misrecognition of the semiotic nature of truth, for it is a concern apparent in the 
work of Kant, too. The Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason and in particular those passages dealing with the origins of geometry, can 
serve as a starting point for any such reading of Kant.
Kant's account runs as follows: ‘A light flashed in the mind of he who first 
demonstrated the isosceles triangle (call him Thales or anything else you want); for 
he found that he mustn't look into what he saw in the figure or in the bare concept 
of it, and then, as it were, read off [ablernen] its properties [Eigenschaften] from 
this, but rather bring out [hervorbringen] what he himself, following certain 
concepts, has a priori put into the figure [hineindachte] and represented (by means 
of construction), and that in order to know something for certain a priori, he must
AI
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ascribe [beilegen] nothing to the item except that which follows necessarily from 
what he has introduced into it in accordance with his c o n c e p t ’ l l
The origin of geometry is to be found, then, for Kant, in the realisation of 
the constructed nature of the geometrical figure. The truth of geometry lies not in 
its uncovering of an always present objective truth, or in the correspondence of a 
judgement with its geometrical object, but instead in the exposition of figures 
whose character has already been determined by the expositor a priori. The key 
notion at play here is that of construction; the world of geometry which has always- 
already been constructed. The truths of geometry have already been pre-determined 
by the human impulse towards schématisation and typification.
It is a model which Kant extends to all the natural sciences and 
subsequently to knowing in the most general employment of the term such that 
philosophy in general becomes an enterprise in semiotics. In the celebrated passage 
from the Preface outlining the history of physics, Kant concludes that physics must 
seek to learn from nature ‘in accordance with that which Reason introduces 
[hineinlegt - a term Nietzsche frequently uses] into Nature’ (B xiii-xiv) and adds 
later that ‘we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them’ (B 
xviii). Anticipating Nietzsche's assertion that natural science is ‘cognition-of-hu- 
mankind,’ [Menschen-Kenntnis] (KSA 12: 2 [174] p. 154), i.e. an exercise in self­
recognition through the representation of Nature, Kant claims that ‘in a priori 
knowledge nothing can be ascribed to objects except what the thinking subject 
derives from itself (B xxiii).
There is a case for arguing, then, a shared stance towards what Kant terms 
'dogmatic metaphysics' and Nietzsche simply ‘metaphysics’, the character of 
which I have outlined earlier. Moreover both share a common awareness of the 
dangers involved, despite the fact that Nietzsche sees Kant as deeply implicated in 
metaphysical thinking. For Kant’s Copernican turn is carried out as part of a 
strategy to counter the scepticism of Hume, who ‘awoke’ Kant from his ‘dogmatic 
slumbers’, while Nietzsche’s linguistic critique of metaphysics forms part of his 
strategy to overcome Nihilism. I shall explore this parallel further.
Kant is aware of the consequences of taking the forms of representation to 
be more than just that, taking them to be the actual form of the Real, when he notes 
that ‘if we ascribe objective reality to those forms of representation, we cannot 
prevent everything from being changed into mere appearance’ (B 70), in other 
words to the scepticism of Hume, whose Empiricist scepticism refuses to grant any 
privilege to acts which synthesise the inchoate mass of sensation. Kant is here 
alluding to a problem he will later develop at greater length in his discussion of the 
antinomies, which shows how such a misunderstanding of the nature of 
representation can lead to the Humean position. For if we treat space and time, for
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example, as realities, rather than as idealities, we will inevitably hit upon the 
paradoxes Kant elaborates in his discussion. If such aporiae are left as such, their 
lack of resolution will tempt one to dismiss all forms of representation as mere 
illusion, a position which will foster a paralysis of the mind. This, as least, is 
Kant’s diagnosis of the psychology of such misrepresentation.
Nietzsche’s concern is less with the specifically philosophical problems of 
such a position as with the wider cultural impact of such an ideology of the |
given. Guided by the structure of its language, metaphysics, as the philosophical |
expression of such an ideology, has rejected as unreal all that does not display the 3
characteristics of its conceptual foundations, relegating it to the mere realm of M
illusion. Once again the origin can be located in Plato, who is the first to introduce 
the ontological dualism which has sustained metaphysics ever since. Although in 
some of his later works such as Theaetetus he shows less hostility towards the %
senses, the main metaphors which have motivated metaphysics are those of the i
cave and the divided line in Republic , the most graphic expressions of dualistic 
thinking. Consequently, Nietzsche notes, ‘As long as there are philosophers on -ïj
earth . . . there unquestionably exists a peculiar philosophers’ irritation at and 
rancour against sensuality’ (KSA 5 p. 350). For although Nietzsche is far from 
being an Empiricist, he is nevertheless aware of a gulf between the world |
demanded by conceptual thinking and that presented by the senses. |
It is a problem he elaborates further in Twilight o f the Idols , in the first f
aphorism of the section on ‘ “Reason” in Philosophy’, and is worth quoting at 
length. He writes, ‘Everything with which philosophers have worked for 
thousands of years consisted of conceptual mummies [one notes his continued use 
of the metaphor of mummification], nothing real left their hands alive. Whenever 3
they pray, these gentleman servants of conceptual idols kill, they stuff - they 
endanger the life of everything when they pray. Death, change, old age just as 
much as procreation and growth are objections for them - even refutations. What is, 
does not become, what becomes, is not. . . Now they all believe, with 
desperation even, in the thing [an’s Seiende]. Yet since they do not possess it, they 3
search for reasons why they are denied it. “It must be an illusory appearance 
[Schein], a deception that we cannot perceive the thing [das Seiende]: where is the 
deceiver hiding ?” - “we’ve got him” they cry out happily, “it’s sensoriousness !
These senses . . . they deceive us over the true world. . . The moral: Say no to 
everything which lends credence to the senses” ’ (KSA 6 pp. 74-5).
Rather than question the basis of what is taken to be true, e.g. the law of 
identity, the mutual exclusivity of Being and Becoming, the failure of sensory 
perception to meet the demands placed upon it by metaphysics leads to the 
derogation of the latter. Nietzsche explains the metaphysical denial of the sensory
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world as resulting from a conflict between two incompatible modes of 
appropriation of the world. Nietzsche is not thereby claiming that the ‘true’ world is 
that of the senses, since truth is a function of language, he is merely claiming that 
the senses do not lie, which is a different sort of claim. In the following section he 
notes, ‘ “Reason” is the cause of our falsification of the testament of the senses.
Insofar as the senses show Becoming, decay, change, they do not lie’ (ibid. p. 75).
Metaphysics refuses to concede such a point, for its system cannot see truth as a 
function of something else, and cannot admit the possibility of anything existing 
outside the limits of truth and falsehood, or that the criteria of truthfulness and 
falsehood are historically dynamic.
We see an example of this metaphysical inability in the thought of 
Nietzsche’s contemporary Gottlob Frege. In his Foundations o f Arithmetic of 
1884, Frege admits to a problem which highlights the weakness pointed out by 
Nietzsche. In that work, Frege is forced to concede that while most propositions 
can be proven as true, there are also certain fundamental propositions which are 
true yet which cannot be proven in the same way. This phenomenon is for him a 
reflection of the structure of mathematical proof, for he notes that the ‘aim of proof 
is, in fact, not merely to place the truth of a proposition beyond all doubt, but also 
to afford us insight into the dependence of truths upon one another,’ adding that 
‘the further we pursue these enquiries the fewer become the primitive truths to 
which reduce everything’.!  ^These primitive truths are ‘general laws, which . . . 
neither need nor admit of proof’ which he then terms ‘analytic’ and ‘a priori’, 
mirroring Kant’s distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. In his Basic 
Laws o f Arithmetic , written nine years later, he extends this observation to the 
laws of logic, writing ‘Now the question why and with what right we acknowledge 
a law of logic to be true, logic can answer only by reducing it to other laws of 
logic. Where that is not possible, it can give no answer [muss sie die Antwort 
schuldig bleiben].’!^
In essence, Frege is admitting that logic and mathematics are non- 
foundational; there are limits to mathematical and logical explanation. Yet what is 
significant for our purposes here is his response to the problem. For rejecting the 
Kantian thesis that would ground mathematics and geometry in intuition and 
criticising the psychologism of his contemporaries, he rather adopts a neo-Platonic 
position. In other words, the truths of mathematics, logic or geometry are not true 
because we construct them, because we say they are true. Indeed it is precisely 
through their being independent entities that they are true, and here Frege is 
drawing a distinction between appearance and reality. Now this may appear to be 
remarkably similar to the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the 1|
noumenal. There is an important difference, however. Namely, Kant sees the f
f
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phenomenal as constituting the realm of truth, whereas, strictly speaking, the 
noumenal exceeds the limits of rational discourse. Frege’s position is the mirror- 
image of this position, in that the laws of logic are true by virtue of their 
independence from human apprehension. We see an indication of this position in an 
explanation he gives of the objectivity of the sun in the unpublished Logic from the 
1880’s. He writes, Ts not the sun for some people a beneficent or malignant deity, 5
for others a shining disk hurled into the heavens from the East and rolling down 
again towards the West, for others yet an immense spherical white-hot body 
enveloped by a cloud of incandescent gases ? No. To one person it may appear one 
thing, to another, another: it is what it is.!^ Although Nietzsche had no 
acquaintance with the work of Frege, within the context of the present discussion it 
is all too apparent that the Fregean response provides a singularly good example of 
the kind of ‘weakness of will’ which Nietzsche has identified as still operating in 
the putatively secularised and de-mythologised spheres of philosophy and science.
A response which contrasts with, say those of Riemann, Poincaré or Godel, whose 
solutions to the problem of validation in geometry are considerably closer to 
Nietzsche’s in spirit.!^
Condemning change and non-identity as signs of untruth, the path is clear »?■
for the construction of a supersensuous, supra-linguistic realm of true Being, |
which in religious practice takes on the character of some redemptive paradise and 
in its secularised form becomes the logical structure underlying the world, as in the 
case of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Logical Positivism, or the noumenal realm of 
Kant’s system, or indeed the sub-atomic structure of matter which physics has |
‘discovered’. All of these cultural phenomena sustain the same hope for redemption 
from the untruth of the apparent, despite the superficial conflict between religion 
and science.20 The current popular belief that the mathematical regularities of 
particle physics can unlock the innermost secrets of nature testifies to this as do the 
final words of Stephen Hawking’s popular B r /e / / / to /7 of Time , which speculate 
on the possibility of physics coming to know the mind of God. Against this 
Nietzsche claims ‘The “apparent” world is the only one: the “true world” has been |
mendaciously added on’ (KSA 6 p. 75). One notes his refusal to associate the 
‘world of appearance’, i.e. that which has not been constructed by human 
conceptuality, with notions of truth: it is neither true nor false.
Modern science and philosophy have thus provided a secularised 
Christianity, in Nietzsche’s eyes, where knowledge has taken over the redemptive 
function of divine forgiveness. In The Dawn he observes the fact that ‘it was 
always presumed that human salvation [des Menschen Heil] must depend on 
insight into the origin of things’ (KSA 3 p. 51), making this internal connection 
between theology and metaphysics explicit when he writes ‘ “Wherever the tree of
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promise made on behalf of knowledge, and such a demand placed on knowledge, 
which create the conditions conducive to Nihilism.
The term ‘Nihilism’ was first coined by the Romantic philosopher Friedrich 
Jacobi, who employed it to denote those who had simply rejected the Christian 
faith. For Nietzsche, however, the term denotes something rather more complex 
than simple rejection, a phenomenon for which the above discussion serves as a 
genealogy. Going further than the mere identification of Nihilism with atheism,
Nietzsche sees the roots of that rejection in Christianity (and hence in metaphysics 
too) itself. It is a reading which is expressed most dramatically in the thesis of the 
death of God, as presented in the parable of the madman in the third book of The 
Gay Science . In this famous parable, the madman, no doubt considered mad 
because his wisdom is excluded as proper ‘knowledge’ by the culture of scientific 
reason, not only proclaims the death of God, i.e. the loss in legitimacy of any 
transcendent values, but also locates responsibility for this death firmly in the hands 
of those who believed most firmly in God; ‘We have killed him - you and I. All of 
us are his murderers. But how did we do this ? How could we drink up the sea ?
Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon ? What were we doing 
when we unchained this earth from its sun ? Where is it moving now ? Where are 
we moving ? . . .  Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing ? Do we not 
feel the breath of empty nothing ?’ (KSA 3 p. 481).
Nihilism results from the promises held out by the metaphysics, which 
reveal themselves to be empty, to be unsustainable; to quote Nietzsche’s well- i
known diagnosis ‘the highest values devalue themselves’ (KSA 12:9 [35] p. 350).
In a note from the NachlaB of 1887 or 1888, Nietzsche writes, ‘Nihilism as a 
psychological state is reached, second, when one has posited a totality, a 
systématisation, even an organisation in and beneath all events, such that the soul 
which thirsts after admiration and reverence wallows in the idea of some highest 
form of domination and administration’ (KSA 13: 11 [99] p. 47). And the reason 
why this positing is an attainment of Nihilism is explained some years earlier in the #
aphorism from The Dawn quoted above. Nietzsche continues, ‘The 
meaninglessness of the origin grows with our insight into the origin: while the 
nearest, that which is around us and in us gradually begins to show colours and 
beauties and enigmas and riches of meaning’ (KSA 3 p. 52). The further we probe 
into the putative essence of things, the less we actually find, as was shown in the 
case of Frege, for whom there is no founding essence to the truths of mathematics 
or logic. Metaphysics is thus a self-undermining project, resulting in the conclusion 
that ‘if some single standard is not good for everyone and for all time, then no 
standard is good for anyone at any time,’ to borrow the words of Nehemas.^!
a
J
26
that ‘if some single standard is not good for everyone and for all time, then no 
standard is good for anyone at any time,’ to borrow the words of Nehemas.^!
Nietzsche wants to avoid such a conclusion, however. The failure of 
metaphysics, which promised true and timeless knowledge about the world, does 
not entitle one to reject every process of apprehension and comprehension. As he 
says in a note from the NachlaB of 1886, ‘The “meaninglessness of all that occurs”: 
the belief therein is the consequence of an insight into the falsity of interpretations 
hitherto, a generalisation of despondency and weakness - no necessary belief. 
Presumption of the individual -: to deny sense wherever he does not see it ! ’ (KSA 
12: 2 [109] p. 114).
Such a response is characteristic of Humean scepticism, which Nietzsche 
would diagnose as a mark of weakness, borne of rage against the world for not 
fulfilling the expectation that it be meaningful. ‘The philosophical Nihilist’ 
Nietzsche writes ‘is of the conviction that everything that occurs is meaningless and 
in vain; and that Being ought not be meaningless and in vain. But whence this: 
ought not ?’ (KSA 13: 11 [97] p. 45). This form of Nihilism, which Nietzsche 
variously terms passive or reactive, results from a residual attachment to 
metaphysics, a desire for what can never be, as becomes clear through Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of Schopenhauer; ‘Schopenhauer was still so much under the 
dominance of Christian values that once the thing in itself was no longer God for 
him, it had to be bad, stupid, absolutely reprehensible. He did not understand that 
there are infinite ways of being-other, even of being-God. Curse of that narrow­
minded dualism: good and evil’ (KSA 12: 9 [42] p. 355).
This is the cultural crisis Nietzsche is attempting to overcome; his project is 
not primarily a critique of metaphysics through an analysis of the semiotic nature of 
truth. Metaphysics will undermine itself and so save him the job. His project is 
rather to push through, past the passive Nihilism of Hume or Schopenhauer, on to 
an active Nihilism which cuts its remaining ties to metaphysics, one which fully 
absorbs the exposition of grammar dependent truth. The task is to establish how to 
become an active, or accomplished Nihilist [il nichilista compiuto], as Vattimo puts 
it.22
Interpretation
We see in Nietzsche’s account of Nihilism a strongly dialectical structure, inasmuch 
as its meaning is the consequence of a dialectic of history which has yet to be fully 
completed. Reactive or passive Nihilism must be negated by its other, namely 
active Nihilism; the former is ‘only a transitional phase’ (KSA 13:11 [100] p. 50). 
Moreover in terms of content, too, we find a Hegelian structure organising 
Nietzsche’s discourse on Nihilism. For passive Nihilism represents a pure
I
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negativity, in terms of a feeling of complete meaninglessness accompanied by a 
state of inertia, of inactivity; Nietzsche regards Buddhism as the first historical 
expression of reactive Nihilism, and its themes of asceticism, of contemplative 
withdrawal from life are repeated in Christianity and metaphysics, most notably, of 
course, in Schopenhauer’s ideal of the ascetic life. In contrast, however, Nietzsche 3
views active Nihilism as a determinate negativity, one which has learned to 
overcome metaphysics by finding the right means. He attributes the continued 
presence of reactive Nihilism to the fact that ‘the productive powers are not yet 
strong enough or that décadence is still hesitating and has not yet invented its 
remedies [Hülfsmittel]’ (KSA 12: 9 [35] p. 351). Overcoming does not involve a 
mere moment of negativity, which amounts to mere passivity; active must also 
consist in the positing of new values, not just overturning the old ones. It is my 
contention that the notion of interpretation carries out precisely this function.
Until now I have deliberately skirted around the question of interpretation, 4
but I shall now bring the notion back into play. For Nietzsche’s idea of 
interpretation unites the reactive and active components of Nihilism. I have so far 
concentrated on Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, concentrating in particular on 
his recognition of the derivative nature of truth. Bound up with this critique is his |
replacement of the ideas of knowledge and truth with that of interpretation, J
something I have not yet discussed. However, in addition interpretation also serves 
as a model for the establishment of those new values required to complete the €
Nihilist project. In other words interpretation provides for the possibility of a non­
metaphysical normativity, for the establishment of an anti-foundational discourse 
which nevertheless creates a space for some form of normative framework. |
Nietzsche’s contention that all cognitive acts are merely interpretations is 
well known and has become the subject of a number of specialist studies.23 what I c#
am interested in is how the concept serves to provide some kind of post­
metaphysical normativity. To understand more fully how it can do this, we have to 
address two central questions. First, what is being interpreted ? In other words, if 
Nietzsche is going to abandon the correspondence theory of truth, how will he 
describe the relation between the interpreter and their object. What is the status of i
this object ? Second, we must ask what criteria we might have for judging any 
interpretation. If we are to abandon the idea of truth, what is to prevent us from 
slipping into absolute relativism, granting equal value to all interpretations ? Clearly |
Nietzsche does not remain a relativist in this sense, since he has very strong 
feelings as regards the value of metaphysics. I shall deal with each question in turn.
If we are to attribute some form of consistency to Nietzsche’s writings (and 
this is not to be confused with systematicity), then on the basis of the above 
discussion we are going to have to distance ourselves from any interpretation which
1
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sees Nietzsche as merely replacing the notion of knowledge with that of 
interpretation, while nevertheless still adhering to the metaphysical belief in a reality 
waiting to be interpreted, as if the metaphysical relation of subject and object 
remained undisturbed. Although Nietzsche frequently speaks of the privilege of 
Becoming and Life over B e i n g 2 4 , this does not entitle us to conclude that Becoming 
is the essence of existence, in the foundational sense of the Romantics, especially 
Friedrich S c h l e g e l .2 5  Yet it is a feature of his writing which has tempted many 
interpreters to read his work in this way. Most notably Heidegger was lured into 
putting Nietzsche at the culmination of metaphysics, understanding both will to 
power and Eternal Recurrence as expressions of a commitment to a particular 
ontology. More recently Figl, too, has regarded the use of Becoming over Being as 
one of mere substitution, with section headings such as ‘Becoming as the 
foundational character of Being and Exegesis’, ‘Being as Becoming’, ‘Temporality 3
as Structure of Being’, and most significantly, ‘Becoming - the Mode of Being 
[Seinsweise] of Quanta of P o w e r . ’ 2 6
Plainly, such readings clash with the Nietzsche of this thesis, for whom 
Becoming is just as much a sign as is Being. Nietzsche’s recurrent use of these 
terms, plus his use of others including ‘falsehood’, ‘instinct’, ‘appearance’ and 
others should rather be read as signs of his concern with establishing some |
normative interpretative framework through the mediation of a certain vocabulary 
which might facilitate avoiding the descent into reactive Nihilism we have already 
witnessed. Hence Kofman’s reading which gives importance only to the figurai 
language in Nietzsche which displaces the conceptual structure of metaphysical 
discourse, only accounts for half of the story. Were Nietzsche’s writing so earnest 1
in its efforts to elude the delusions of metaphysics, it would be difficult to explain 
Nietzsche’s repeated employment of the same terms.
Alan Schrift has recently suggested that it actually makes no sense to ask 
what is interpreted, for the process of interpretation ‘is not grounded in either the 
subject or the object; it exists in the between, in the space which separates them.’2?
In other words, the interpreting process is a web of relations, as Nietzsche himself 
says; ‘If I remove all the relationships, all the properties, all the activities of a thing, 
the thing does not remain over; because thingness has only been invented by us’
(KSA 12: 10 [202] p. 580). Yet Schrift’s vocabulary still suggests the existence of 
subject and object between which there could be relation, and reminds us of the 
analogy drawn by Bernd Magnus between the world and the lost original of an 
ancient manuscript. The implication of Magnus’s account would be that if we get 
the relationship right, we will then be in a position to restore the lost o r i g i n a l .2 8
Such accounts do not go far enough in stressing the constitutive role of 
interpretation. The web of relationships does not only exist in the space between
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subject and object, it also creates that space, and creates the subject and object 
between which the space exists. In Beyond Good and Evil, for example, Nietzsche 
asks, ‘Why might not the world which concerns us be a fiction ? And whoever then 
asks “but does an author belong to a fiction ?” - might he not be answered back 
with: Why ? Does not this “belong” belong to the fiction ?' (KSA 5 p. 54). In other 
words the interpretative fiction which constitutes the world also constitutes the 
subject of interpretation, and it is in this sense that Nietzsche asserts ‘One cannot 
ask “who is interpreting then ?” ’ (KSA 12: 2 [151] p. 140). Interpretation 
represents a creative act, and in formulating the problem thus, Nietzsche is pushing 
to an extreme the model of ‘knowing as making’ implicit in Kant, stripping it of its 
residual metaphysical attachments, such as the transcendence of the representing 
subject and all the accompanying humanist trappings of Kant’s moral theory.
We can see this view apparent in a NachlaB note written just before that 
quoted above, where Nietzsche writes ‘A thing would be described once all beings 
had asked “what is that ?” and had their questions answered. Supposing one single 
creature, with its own relationships and perspectives for all things, were missing, 
then the thing would not yet be “defined” ’ (KSA 12: 2 [149] p. 140). I take 
Nietzsche to be asserting here, too, that the character of a thing is determined by the 
character of the beings interpreting, that its existence is dependent upon the 
interpreting beings and the uses they have for it. Yet this description does not 
amount to a ‘definition’ of the thing, and Nietzsche’s use of quotation marks 
indicate the distance he wishes to retain towards this most Socratic of words. For 
the thing will always take on new characteristics according to the possibility of it 
being interpreted anew, hence there never can be some final, exhaustive definition. 
Yet as Alexander Nehemas argues, this is not to suggest merely that the world is a 
heterogeneous plenitude which our theories can never exhaust. Instead, Nehemas 
claims, ‘Though the world is always “more” than our theories, this is only because 
there can always be more theories, not because its essential nature remains
untouched.’29
The mention of the idea of a plurality of theories introduces Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism, and with it also touches the second question which I claimed 
requires asking. Namely, if interpretation constitutes the object, can we 
meaningfully speak of better or worse interpretations ? Whence do we gather the 
criteria according to which we might judge competing or conflicting interpretations 
? In answering this question I shall be making my boldest claims as to the 
proximity of Hegel to Nietzsche. Above all, Nietzsche’s grounding of the 
interpretative process in will to power imbues it with a Hegelian character, far from 
being a thinker of plurality, the affirmative thinker par excellence, Nietzsche’s 
theory of interpretation, I am claiming, is one which affirms a dialectical
understanding of knowing. It is a claim which goes against much current Nietzsche 
interpretation, yet it is not an untenable one, and moreover one which is central to 
Nietzsche’s re-assertion of some form of normativity after the crisis in legitimacy of 
the discourse of metaphysics.
Nietzsche’s mature theory of interpretation, inasmuch as it can be 
considered a full-blown theory, represents a widening and a deepening of the early, 
linguistic critique of knowledge carried out in ‘On Truth and Falsehood’. Nietzsche 
has not abandoned the notion of grammar-functional truth conditions so much as 
supplemented it with perspectivism.^® Truth is now no longer a function of merely 
of language so much of the human perspective in general, in other words, it is a 
function of all those aspects, be they linguistic, psychological or even 
physiological, which distinguish the human form of life from other forms, for 4
example that of the bat, to use Nagel’s well-known case. In The Dawn , for 
example, he writes ‘My eye, as strong or weak as it may be, can only encompass a 
certain portion [Stuck], and within this portion I weave and live . . .  we spiders 
are in our web, and whatever we catch in it, we catch nothing unless it allows itself 
to be caught in our web’ (KSA 3 p. 110), having already stated baldly in Human 
All-too human some years earlier that ‘It is true that there might be a metaphysical 
world; we can hardly dispute its absolute possibility. We see all things through the 
human head and cannot cut this head off; though the question remains what would 
there still be of the world, if we did cut it off’ (KSA 2 p. 29). We see Nietzsche 
here qualifying what initially seems an acceptance of the existence of a possible 
autonomous object of knowledge with doubts as to that autonomy and speculation 
on the dependence of this metaphysical world on the human perspective. It is a 
position which is maintained, indeed fortified throughout his career, resulting in 
bold assertions such as the following from 1887 that ‘We belong to the character of 
the world, there is no doubt’ (KSA 12: 1 [89] p. 33).
In this regard, one of the important innovations in Nietzsche’s thought is to 
deprive the conscious subject of its transcendent role in the process of |
interpretation. Interpretation is not merely a function of consciousness, but also one Æ
of instinct, of the body. I do not wish to examine this topic in great depth at 
present, since that will be the task of the next chapter, yet it is important to observe 
that when Zarathustra says ‘Behind your thoughts and feelings stands . . .  an un­
known sage - he is called Self. He lives in your body, he is your body’, adding that 
‘There is more reason in your body than in your greatest wisdom’ (KSA 4 p. 40), 
he is accomplishing two things.
First, he is challenging the privilege accorded to the conscious intellect in 4
the metaphysical tradition from Plato onwards. Secondly he is allowing for the 
possibility of intentional activity taking place in spheres where it has traditionally
J
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been denied. We see this move taking place early in Nietzsche’s work, in aphorism 
18 of Human All-too human . Here he writes, ‘For the plant all things are usually 
still, eternal, every thing is identical to itself. From the period of lower organisms 
humans have inherited the belief that there exist identical things’ (KSA 2 p. 39). 
Later in the same aphorism he adds that ‘the belief in unconditional substances and 
in identical things is a similarly primary, similarly ancient mistake of all that is 
organic’ (ibid. p. 40), It is an atavistic argument which reminds us of his later claim 
that ‘Philosophising is a kind of atavism of the highest order’ (KSA 5 p. 34).
Nietzsche’s attribution of intentional activity to all forms of organic life 
allows him to introduce the notion of interpretation as will to power as a coherent 
thesis explaining interpretative activity. Clearly his view of interpretation as a 
process which both exceeds and constitutes the human representing subject means 
that one cannot possibly construe the idea of interpretation as will to power as an 
anthropocentric doctrine, as does Kaufmann, for example.^! Yet although we can 
confidently assert what interpretation as will to power is not, it is much more 
difficult to assert what it is.
The problem of the will to power still remains highly ambiguous. 
Obviously Nietzsche cannot intend, as Heidegger believes, that the will to power be 
taken as 'what a being as such is, namely, what it is in its constitution,’32 The 
problem of the will to power is rendered more complex by the fact that in 
Nietzsche's published works there are only two references to it, while his 
unpublished notes which refer to it seem more speculative in character than 
anything else. Moreover Karl Schlechta has shown the ‘work’ entitled Will to 
Power to be an arbitrary collection of notes, involving considerable editorial 
violence to Nietzsche's note books.
If Nietzsche did have plans for a comprehensive final work, they remained 
at a very embryonic stage. In his notebooks from 1887 and 1888 there are 
numerous ‘plans’ for the ‘Will to Power’ most of which singularly fail to 
harmonise with each other. Hence it is difficult to treat the will to power as a fully 
articulated doctrine. Rather, it has the character of a large number of often contra­
dictory and uncoordinated ideas and jottings which lurk in the background to much 
his work, both published and unpublished, without being fully worked out. A 
good example of the difficulty in discussing the ‘doctrine’ of the will to power can 
be seen in a passage from the Spring of 1888 included in the text of The Will to 
Power (§ 689). Nietzsche writes of ‘The will to the accumulation of power as 
peculiar to the phenomenon of life . . . could we not accept this will as the 
motivating force in Chemistry too ? and in the cosmic order ?’ (KSA 13: 14 [81] p. 
261). By the end of the passage the reader is quite unsure how to interpret the will 
to power. Is it a feature of organic life, as Nietzsche seems to be at first suggesting.
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or is it a more basic ontological constitutive feature of all matter ? Nietzsche leaves 
the question open, ending instead with a number of unanswered questions. In 
proposing the following brief interpretation of what will to power might mean, I 
shall pursue a line broadly similar to that of Müller-Lauter in his essay 'Nietzsches 
Lehre vom Willen zur Macht'33, though I shall relate it to the specific theme of 
interpretation as I have already developed it.
The first habit we must rid ourselves of, according to Müller-Lauter, is that 
of referring to the will to power, as if Nietzsche were some ontological monist. 
Admittedly, in his early works clearly written under the influence of Schopenhauer, 
he does speak of the will in such terms. However this precedes by some years the 
development of his speculative ideas on will to power. The grounds for the above 
assertion are several. The first derives from Nietzsche's own statement that all 
notions of unity as the irreducible Being of beings are illusory, in the sense that 
numbers are themselves useful fictions. Significantly, while will to power rep­
resents a striving to increase the quantum of power, Nietzsche tends to prefer 
quality to quantity as a determining factor in his interpretative strategy. This inclina­
tion forms one of the main reasons for his critique of mechanistic world views. 
For example in 1886 he writes, ‘mechanistic conception: desires nothing but 
quantities: but power lies in quality: mechanism can only describe processes, not 
explain them’ (KSA 12: 2 [76] p. 96), while later that year he comments that ‘we 
cannot help experiencing quantitative differences as something fundamentally dif­
ferent from quantity, namely as qualities’ (KSA 12: 6 [14] p. 238).
The second ground for dismissing ideas of the will to power is that 
Nietzsche rarely speaks of it in those terms. He writes of will to power, wills to 
power, but seldom of the will to power. Will to power seems to be a determinable 
quality inhabiting and directing all life processes, but this is far from claiming it to 
be the metaphysical essence of the world in a Schopenhauerian sense. Is Nietzsche 
maintaining that all life processes are engaged in a ceaseless struggle for domination 
of the Other ? Not exactly, since will to power manifests itself rather less 
obviously, which might also explain why it has been so misrecognised. To 
understand how it manifests itself one has to return to Nietzsche's idea discussed 
above that knowledge, or in Nietzsche's terms, interpretation, is power. This is not 
to make a Foucauldian point that certain forms of knowledge are formed merely by 
the demands of various power groups, even though Nietzsche’s genealogical 
analyses of the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ do unmask the power interests informing 
Western morality. It is rather the much simpler claim that knowledge enables so 
much manipulation and use of the environment.
An eminent example would be the ‘knowledge’ of Classical physics. 
Although political interests have determined the direction of much research in
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physics, the basic point still remains valid, that Classical physics itself allows a 
certain degree of control over the flux of reality. Nietzsche himself acknowledges '■§
that while it is an interpretation and not an explanation, physics nevertheless has its #
uses, and is moreover necessary in making the world comprehensible and |
manipulable for its human inhabitants. While Nietzsche was not in a position to ï
have been able to predict the change in paradigm which physics has undergone in 
the twentieth century, his initial premise still pertains. Far from being the ‘final 
answer’, the new physics is just another interpretative paradigm with its own set of 
problems, indeed has indeterminacy built in to it in the shape of, for example, |
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. Despite this incompleteness, most obvious in %
the stubborn refusal of the results of research into Quantum Mechanics to 4
harmonise with those of Relativity, twentieth century physics nevertheless 
facilitates a greater degree of manipulation of the environment than did the 
Classical, Newtonian paradigm, a difference symbolised potently in the capabilities 4
of the atom bomb. As Nietzsche says, ‘In truth interpretation is itself a means of 4
becoming master of something’ (KSA 12: 2 [148] p. 140). This simple equation 
between power and knowledge avoids any suggestion of a metaphysical substrate 
which Heidegger and Jaspers, amongst others, attribute to Nietzsche. There need 
be no power interest above and beyond its particular manifestation in a form of 
knowledge.
In his doctrine of will to power one need not see Nietzsche as making any |
grandiose claims concerning the essence of things. It is a much more low level 
theory concerning a certain trait of all organic life forms. It could be seen as 
running thus: forms of life have the need for a ‘home’, an environment in which 1|
they can live, an environment they can control. This control can be achieved 
through an interpretative process whereby the aggregate of elements which 
constitute the world can be ordered and arranged in a way suited to the mental and 
biological needs of the particular organism. Hence the reason why interpretation is 
so perspectival. This is not to turn will to power into a psychological theory, as 
Kaufmann, and more recently Maudemarie Clark have done.3^ For one could argue 
that all psychological drives are secondary to the process of interpretation 
constituting that which those very drives desire. Will to power, as Müller-Lauter 
presents it is rather merely an interpretation of interpretation, of the function and 
extent of interpretation, rather than of any process which might be antecedent to the 
interpreted world.
While Nietzsche is not prepared to grant the world some positive identity, 
he is certain that the metaphysical interpretation of the world as a stable unchanging 4
object is a narrow one. Using the paradigm of textual interpretation, Nietzsche 
notes ‘The same text permits countless interpretations: there is no “correct” inter-
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Ipretation’ (KSA 12: 1 [120] p. 39). I am not thereby repeating the reading of 
Nehemas, who emphasises to an extreme that equation made by Nietzsche between 
the world and the literary text, for there is an important difference. To equate the 
world with a text would in itself be imposing a certain determinacy of meaning on 
the world, which Nietzsche would oppose, and also gainsay his claim that, strictly 
speaking, one cannot say that the world is anything as I have shown above. More 
importantly one might cast doubt on the idea that Nietzsche is actually interested in J
what the world actually consists of. Nietzsche’s interest is not so much in the 
results of interpretation than with the activity of interpretation itself.
Nietzsche’s equation of power and interpretation does, however, render 
Deleuze’s reading slightly problematic. Deleuze writes, ‘The will to power is the 3
element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the 
quality that devolves into each force in this relation,’35 concluding that since will to 
power is what determines difference, we have to see radical plurality as lying at the Û
foundation of Nietzsche’s thinking, which constitutes a critique of the totalising 
impulse of the dialectic. Yet will to power only determines difference in order to 
overcome it, will to power is ‘will to accumulation of power’ (KSA 13: 14 [81] p. 4
261). Admittedly Nietzsche does write of the ‘Principle of life’ as ‘greater 
compexity, sharp differentiation’ (KSA 12:7 [9] p. 297), yet this is qualified in the |
same note with the observation that ‘there is a will to power in the organic process 
by virtue of which dominant shaping commanding forces continually extend the 
sphere of their power and within this always simplify’ (ibid.). It is a view we see |
repeated in many of the NachlaB notes of the later years, such as the following from 
1888, claiming that ‘The degree of resistance and the degree of superior power - 
that is the question in every event’ (KSA 13: 14 [79] p. 257). Will to power as 
simplification, will to power as negation; the contiguity of the two gives the idea of 3
‘difference’ in Nietzsche’s thinking a different function from that which Deleuze 
would accord it.
Dialectics
So where does the discussion leave us regarding Nietzsche’s quest for post­
metaphysical normativity ? I would argue that the equation of power and 
interpretation offers interpretation-immanent criteria for judging the worth of 1
individual interpretations. For if we translate the notion of will to power as will to 
more power into the language of interpretation and perspectivism, the character of 
interpretation is always one of wanting to interpret more, in a constant expansion of 
perspectives. Nietzsche's call is for a practice which, in the vocabulary of 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, engages in the dialectic of the individual and the
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general, accounting for as many affects as possible, able to submit to frequent self­
overcoming in order to constantly widen the scope of perspectives. It is a constant 
and rigorous self-questioning vigilance, which refuses to rest content with its
achievements.36
Nietzsche comments in Genealogy o f Morals on this self-overcoming thus:
‘Precisely because we seek knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to such resolute 
reversals of customary perspectives and values . . to see differently . . .  to 
want to see differently is no small cultivation and preparation of the intellect for its 
“objectivity” - the latter not to be understood as disinterested contemplation . . but 
rather as the ability to control and dispose of one's Pro’s and Con’s, such that one 
can employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of 
knowledge’ (KSA 5 pp. 364-5). Certainly Nietzsche's aim to establish an 
objective knowledge, no matter how provisional that objectivity may be, is difficult 
to reconcile with a reading which turns him into the great parodist of his own |
discourse. There are admittedly only perspectival interpretations in the sense that no 
individual possesses the divine eye with which to oversee the domain of absolute 
truth. To this extent Karsten Harries is correct when he contrasts Nietzsche's 
metaphor of the voyager at sea, uncertain of his or her destination, with Kant's 
notion of the philosopher as the surveyor of the clearly demarcated territory of 
human cognition, or again points out Nietzsche's preference for Don Quixote, 
wandering apparently aimlessly across the Iberian landscape, with Odysseus whose 
sole endeavour is to reach the final and certain destination.^^
Such bold metaphors, however, do not entitle us to claim that Nietzsche 
abandons all pretensions to knowing. They surely indicate rather the provisional 
nature of any such knowing, with an awareness that further researches might 
extend the direction of thinking to hitherto unexpected regions. Certainly there are 
moments where Nietzsche is aware of the paradoxical status of his own claims 
concerning the ‘truth’ of Life and knowledge. However these self-mocking 
remarks do not detract from the far more serious project which gives his work its 
driving force. Nietzsche's own thought cannot pretend, under the terms of his own 
argument, to be the ‘truth’. Yet it can pretend to offer a more complete and there­
fore better interpretation of Life than the 'metaphysical' one. ‘The power of 
knowledge lies not in its degree of truth, but in . . . its character as a condition of 
life’ states Nietzsche (KSA 3 p. 469), and the more control a specific form of 
knowledge achieves the more life-enhancing it is, the nearer it comes to the never to 
be reached goal of absolute control. It is a constant process of reappraisal, though 
without the assured goal of Absolute Knowledge. Seen in such light one can 1
account too for Nietzsche's hostility to Darwin. Will to power, properly speaking, 3
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is will to more power, a never-ending process which is the diametrical opposite of 
Darwin's instinct for self-preservation.38
By casting Nietzsche’s theory of interpretation in this light I am deliberately 
emphasising the similarities between the expansion of perspectives and the 
Hegelian dialectic. Yet the emphasis is far from being illegitimate. For although 
Hegel reserves the right to closure, and indeed each moment of the dialectic 
constitutes a necessary step towards Absolute Knowledge, the parallel between the 
function of negation in Hegel and in Nietzsche is striking.39 For negation in Hegel 
is the means to overcome one-sidedness, just as in Nietzsche, the project of 
interpretation is to overcome the narrowness of prior perspectives. Nietzsche 
ridicules the metaphysical ideal of a perspectiveless knowledge, and likewise Hegel 
claims that ‘Being, pure being, without any further determination . . .  is in fact 
nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.*^ For Nietzsche, although the 
perspective functions as a negativity, i.e. as a limitation which renders obsolete the 
metaphysical ideal of pure knowledge, it is also that which facilitates interpretation. 
With perspectivism there can be no knowledge; without perspectives there can be 
no interpretations. It is a position fully permeated by the spirit of Hegel, where 
negation is that which rescues Being from pure nothingness. T f as Hegel says ‘on 
the other hand, reality is taken in its determinateness, then since it essentially 
contains the moment of the negative, the sum-total of all realities becomes just as 
much a sum-total of all negations, the sum-total of all contradictions.* !^
We can see the proximity of their positions in Nietzsche’s well-known 
assertion in On the Genealogy of Morals that ‘There is only a perspective seeing, 
only a perspective knowing* (KSA 5 p 365). Taken out of context, the passage 
might seem to demonstrate just the contrary, namely that the cumulative workings 
of the dialectic are quite alien to Nietzsche’s thinking. However, a full translation of 
the passage in question runs as follows: ‘There is only a perspective seeing, only a 
perspective knowing, and the more affects we allow to speak about an object, the 
more eyes, different eyes we know to employ for the same thing, the more 
complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity” be*. One sees here an 
endorsement of some form of objective understanding, some form of normativity 
by which judgements can be made. Yet it is not one which appeals to some order oi 
things antecedent and exterior to the discourse of interpretation, but rather grounds 
the interpretative criteria in the demands of the particular form of life interpreting.
With this it becomes quite clearer why Nietzsche views metaphysics and its 
concomitant ascetic ideal scornfully. Metaphysics and the ascetic ideal are devoted 
to an exclusion of the body and all sensuous existence. As Nietzsche says in the 
Preface to The Gay Science all philosq>hy hitherto has been a misundermanding of 
the body. Yet this is not merely an interpretative error, based on a one-sided,
Conclusion
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perspectival view of life. It is an act of self-annihilation. The greater part of in- 
terpretation is guided and motivated by physiological demands, while asceticism =i
seeks to deny its own origins. Nietzsche writes, ‘The unconscious masking of 4
physiological needs under the cloak of the objective, the ideal, the purely-spiritual 
extends to shocking proportions’ (KSA 3 p. 348). It represents a tuning of the 4
forces of life against themselves. This is the paradox of asceticism: the ascetic ÿ
‘priest’, motivated by his own will to power, his own will to promote his particular 4
form of existence, turns will to power against itself. ‘For an ascetic life is a self- 
contradiction: here there rules a ressentiment without equal, that of an insatiable 
instinct and will to power, which would like to become master not over something 
in life, but over life itself, over its deepest, most potent and basic conditions; here 
the attempt is made to use force in order to block up the well-springs of force’ 4
(KSA 5 p. 363).
On the basis of such passages it is difficult to accept wholeheartedly 
Kofman's contention that asceticism is ‘affirmative; negative ideals affirm the being |
which evaluates,’ 2^ nor for that matter Nehemas' view that the ascetic priest is %
negatively evaluated by Nietzsche because he strives to impose his ideal on 
others."!3 while Nietzsche might, at places, admire the strength and discipline of the 4
ascetic (e.g. his highly ambivalent attitude towards both Socrates and Christ as the 4
ascetic types par excellence ) he still regards the ascetic type as a dangerous creature |
per se, regardless of his effect on others, merely by virtue of the fact that all his 4
life-sustaining and enhancing energies have been turned inward upon themselves. |
The drive to impose a stable meaning on the world, uncontaminated by the rf
impurities of the sensuous aspects of life itself, is revealed by Nietzsche for what it |
is, ultimately self-undermining and life-denying. Life interpreting life against itself. 4
It is an interpretation which necessarily leads to Nihilism, by devaluing life and 4
offering a transparently mendacious ‘ideal’ alternative, whether that alternative is 
true knowledge or paradisiacal redemption. When these alternatives are shown to 
be empty, the disenchanted have nothing left to which they can turn . t|
J
In this chapter I have offered an analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and 
Western culture which hinges on the notion of interpretation. Interpretation 
performs two tasks in Nietzsche’s thinking. First, it functions as a weapon against |
the metaphysical idea of knowledge. Both Nietzsche’s early writing on language |
and his later perspectivism can be gathered together under the theme of 4
interpretation, which serves to counter both correspondence notions of truth, and |
also the idea of objective (i.e. perspectiveless) knowledge. "I
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However, interpretation also functions as a posit!vity, supplementing the 
purely negative moment of Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical polemic; For the notion 
of interpretation serves to overcome the threat of Nihilism which is ever present, if 
we are left solely with the demolition of metaphysics. As we have seen, passive 
Nihilism arises when all the structures of meaning which have supported the 
prevailing episteme bring themselves down, without being able to offer any 
alternative. In other words the lack of the certainties of metaphysics becomes the 
lack of anything, sheer nothingness which threatens to plunge metaphysical culture 
into a state of supine paralysis. Nietzsche is hoping to push through the turn to 
Nihilism to its final end, namely active Nihilism where the individual can take on 
responsibility for making meaning in the world. However this does not signify a 
complete absence of restraint, a complete freedom to do what one will, and here the 
notion of interpretation comes back into play. Interpretation, supplanting 
knowledge, is nevertheless guided by criteria, following a certain set of 
perspectives. Although it avoids the illusions of metaphysics, interpretation is still 
structured, and hence I am arguing that it is with interpretation that Nietzsche is 
trying to re-establish some form of normativity after the death of metaphysics. This 
is not to take normative as denoting a purely ethical set of imperatives, but rather as 
that which has a certain structure, yet a structure which is not doggedly bound to its 
present state.
It is with the notion of interpretation as offering a post-metaphysical 
normativity for the production of meaning that Nietzsche hopes to overturn passive 
Nihilism. Yet the paradigm of interpretation, as Nietzsche formulates it, is not one 
which will necessarily lead to dogmatism or metaphysics, despite the restrictions 
Nietzsche will place on the desire for complete freedom. For it is part of the logic of 
interpretation, as will to power, that we should not allow ourselves to become 
attached to any particular perspectives. Interpretation is a constant process of 
dissolution and reconstruction; as soon as any particular perspective has been 
invested with interpretative authority it must be dissolved and replaced with a better 
one. Nietzsche is asking us to undertake the near impossible, i.e. to simultaneously 
affirm and disown our interpretations, to seek to undermine every perspective we 
have formed at its very moment of formation. It is the difficulty of this task which 
leads him to conclude that the human must give way to the overhuman, or the 
Übermensch. For the need for stability and permanence, a need which has given 
rise to metaphysics, is a function of the human form of life, and ultimately 
Nietzsche is suggesting that if we wish to avoid passive Nihilism and debilitating 
Kulturpessimismus we will have change our whole mode of being. As I shall be 
arguing in later chapters, it is the artist who, for Nietzsche points the way towards
I
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this new form of life, whose form of life can encompass both the negation and 4?affirmation demanded by the notion of interpretation.
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Nietzsche’ s Subject: Retrieving the Repressed
In the first chapter I argued that interpretations of Nietzsche have tended to overplay ^
the purely sceptical moment in Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics at the expense of 
his reconstructive theory of interpretation. Critics of a variety of persuasions have 
tended to dichotomise the issues at stake within his work, as if it merely revolves 
around an opposition between rationality and irrationality. Some, most especially 
those in the Marxist tradition, see Nietzsche’s apparent embrace of irrationality as 
cause for especial concern. Habermas in his Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity 
considers the relationship between the rather shabby involvement of Heidegger in 
Nazism and his philosophy, with the looming figure of Nietzsche in the 
background, as more than a merely external one. Discussing the ‘Kehre,’ for 
example, Habermas writes, *It is only after this turn that fascism, like Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, belongs to the objectively ambiguous phase of the overcoming of 
metaphysics.’! At the other end of the spectrum thinkers such as Bataille, Deleuze,
Kofman and Derrida have received Nietzsche with a sense of exhilaration, as a 
figure who can provide a mechanism of release from the tyranny of the rational and 
logical world order and open it up to the aesthetic free play of the metaphor. Yet as 
I have already indicated, a rejection of metaphysics, combined with an emphasis on 
the perspectival nature of cognition and the aesthetic aspects of the human relation 
to the world, does not necessarily oblige us to abandon any and every quest for 
normativity, replacing it with, say, Baudrillard’s endless procession of simulacra or 
the absolutely unlimited free play of differance. The infinite dialectic of 
interpretative will to power, while implicitly aiming at the ideal of objective truth, 
offers a paradigm which displays an awareness of the epistemological pitfalls so 
often ignored by metaphysics, but which also avoids a descent into the abyss of 
absolute relativism.
One of the key areas where Nietzsche challenges the supremacy of meta­
physical discourse is in that of the subject. For if the idea of a transcendent repre­
senting subject can be shown to be at least misguided, then the basis of all forms of 
rational knowledge is severely shaken. So far I have not devoted much attention to 
Nietzsche's ’destruction' of the subject and it is now time to make good this ne- -Il
gleet. The issue is important in as much as Nietzsche's critique of the subject has 
been a powerful influence on subsequent philosophy, especially on post-structural­
ist thinking. This is most apparent in the case of the anti-humanism of Foucault or 
of Deleuze and Guattari, but perhaps too, though rather less directly, it exercises an |
influence on Derrida's own deconstruction of subjectivity. Additionally, though, a
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clear view of Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity is necessary in order adequately to 
understand the importance of art to Nietzsche. As Andrew Bowie has reminded us 
recently, we are not faced with a choice of either subjectivity or an aesthetics of ex­
istence. Rather, the two are interdependent in a most intimate and binding way.^
For philosophical modernity, characterised by the death of God, i.e. the loss of an 
objective order of things previously guaranteed by onto-theology, throws the sub­
ject into the abyss of a meaningless universe. Following the tradition of German 
philosophy from Kant onwards, it falls to art to fill the space left by God, either as 
a means of concealing this meaninglessness or as a model of realising the newly 
found freedom from metaphysical restraint. We see this inter-relatedness of prob­
lems in Nietzsche’s treatment of the question of art, inasmuch as equal attention is 
paid to art and artists, the latter as a specific manifestation of the free spirit or j
Übermensch. As I shall be arguing in later chapters the artist, for Nietzsche, main­
tains a crucial relation to the world and towards his own mode of interpretative ac­
tivity. Indeed it is this distinctive relation which defines the artist qua artist and art 
qua art.
Critique
Nietzsche's critique of the subject has informed contemporary thought in two areas. I
The first is his insistence on the primacy of language as I have outlines in the 
previous chapter. In both Beyond Good and Evil and Twilight o f the Idols he ar­
gues for the determination of thought by language, resulting in his now famous 
exclamation T fear we shall never be rid of God because we believe in grammar’
(KSA 6 p. 78). Elsewhere he gives the problem of language and consciousness an 
anthropological emphasis, claiming that ‘the development of language and the 
development of consciousness . . .  go hand in hand ‘ (KSA 3 592). Moreover this 
dependence of thought on language is not something which can be discarded; it is 
an inbuilt part of the human perspective on the world. One might change one's lan­
guage, but, as he comments in Beyond Good and Evil 3, this is to substitute the I
inherent perspectivism of one language for that of another.4 The belief in subjectiv­
ity, shaped by the grammatical structure and syntax peculiar to the Indo-European 
languages would be replaced by a prejudice determined by the syntactical forma­
tions of, say, the Semitic languages, or to use Nietzsche's own example, the 
Uralic-Altaic family of languages. Both of these arguments, namely that language is 
a determinant of thought and that it is additionally a scheme which cannot be 
thrown off, find themselves strongly echoed in the writing of Derrida, albeit with 
an admixture of Heidegger and Saussurean linguistics. Derrida writes, for example,
:J
that ‘the subject becomes a speaking subject only in its commerce with the system 
of linguistic differences . . . But can one not conceive of a presence . . .  of the 
subject before speech or signs ? . . .  Such a question therefore supposes that |
prior of the sign and outside it, excluding any traces and any diffërance, something |
like conscious is possib le .In  a further passage following that just cited he also in­
forms us that for strategic reasons he would regard consciousness ‘as a g
“determination”, as an “effect”.’ ^ In Speech and Phenomena his book-length study 
of Husserl’s work on signification, he concludes that all acts of self-consciousness 
are always-already mediated by the (linguistic) sign, which he sees as constituting 
subjectivity itself. The subject is no longer the author of meaning, but rather 
inserted into the order of language, to such an extent that the individual has nothing 
to contribute to the general play of semiotic difference. Additionally the prejudices W
which language has bequeathed to us, the assumptions implicit in metaphysical 
concepts cannot simply be dismantled; unlike Nietzsche, Derrida goes still further, #
to announce the impossibility of criticising metaphysics from the outside, with a 5
vocabulary uncontaminated by the patterns of metaphysical thinking; ‘There is no 
sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics.
We have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is foreign to this history; 
we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to 
slip into the form, the logic and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks II
to contest.’7 The historicity of our being requires that all criticism occur from 
within the closure of metaphysics. At this point one should be careful not to 
overemphasise the connection between Nietzsche and Derrida in the critique of the 
subject. On the whole Nietzsche's importance to the French philosopher is far more 
apparent in his deconstruction of rational epistemology, in his placing of 
knowledge ‘sous rature’, yet that notwithstanding, it is clear that a first, superficial, 
reading of Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity bears a marked resemblance to 
Derrida's work.
However, while Nietzsche may be a background influence on Derrida's cri- |
tique of subjectivity, in the case of Foucault, he is omnipresent. We are reminded 
of this most startlingly in the latter's The Order o f Things , where amidst the nor­
mally dispassionate prose of Foucault there suddenly appears an extraordinary 
paean to his German predecessor. Foucault's archaeology of knowledge is mod- 4
elled closely on the former's genealogical studies, and more specifically his onto
logical history of the subject is derived to a large extent from Nietzsche's remarks f■ton subjectivity. For not only does Nietzsche suggest that subjectivity is an effect of #
language, he also contends in numerous places that the whole notion of the subject '-■ï
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may be a fiction, bome out of the desire to posit an agent for an action, a claim I 
shall be examining later.8
It is one of Nietzsche's arguments that belief in the subject arose partly out 
of a misinterpretation of the syntax of Indo-European languages, out of the as­
sumption that the personal pronoun represented a real entity rather than merely 
serving a grammatical function. He notes in the first essay of On the Genealogy of 
Morals that ‘There is no “being” beneath doing, affecting, becoming; “the doer” is 
fictitiously added on to the doing, - the doing is everything* (KSA 5 p. 279), a 
view perpetuated in unpublished notes such as the following one from 1888: 
‘Subject, object, a doer added to the doing, the doing separated from what it does: 
let us not forget that this is mere semiotics and nothing real* (KSA 13: 14(79] p. 
25&X
On the basis of such general statements, which I shall examine in more de­
tail shortly, Foucault develops a history of the ‘subject’, mapping out the various 
historical interpretations of subjectivity. Subjectivity, he informs us, is not a given, 
but rather the product of specific historical discursive formations. As he notes in 
The Archaeology o f Knowledge , the aim of archaeology is ‘to substitute for the 
enigmatic treasure of “things” anterior to discourse, the regular formation of objects 
that emerge only in discourse . . .  by relating them to the body of rules that enable 
them to form as objects of a discourse . . .*9 Here Foucault is of course giving a 
fuller exposition of the position implicit in Nietzsche’s less well developed theory 
of interpretation, whereby the objects of interpretation are constituted by the web of 
interpretative discourse which apprehends them.
In the latter work Foucault is discussing archaeological technique in the 
most general manner. However the indebtedness of his thinking to Nietzsche be­
comes most clear in essays such as “What is an Author ?” where he reveals the no­
tion of authorship, ie. of subjective agency, as having been created by the discourse 
of a certain ideology. It is the ideology which will restrict the proliferation of 
meaning by binding textual significance to the intentional productivity of the author. 
As Foucault notes ‘the author does not precede the works, he is a certain functional 
principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes and chooses; in short one 
impedes the free circulation . . .  of fiction.’!  ^In his later work, more specifically in 
the History of Sexuality Foucault directs his attention solely to the problem of the 
subject, its self-constitution and self-relation or ‘rapport - à - soi*. Once again 
though, the various ideas of subjecthood which he traces from Ancient Greece to 
Early Christianity do not represent a series of interpretations of an anterior entity, to 
use his own terms. Instead they offer a series of fictive creations and recreations. 
The first, introductory, volume of the history of sexuality consists of a genealogy
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of subjectivity, whereby the earlier priority of group identity gradually yields 
ground to the formation of a domain of private experience, symbolised, in a view 
which curiously mirrors Hegel’s Aesthetics , by the shift from the Ancients’ prefer­
ence for the epic narrative to an increasing emphasis on a literature of introspection.
Moreover the dominance of this new paradigm of identity has had such a profound 
effect on us that it has shaped our behaviour, made most notably manifest in the 
urge to confess which for Foucault is so characteristic of modem culture. Crucial to 
the development of the notion of the self is the nature of one's relationship to one­
self, which also forms the axiom of any ethical code. Ethics is founded not on 
moral codes per se, for these moral codes are themselves dependent on a particular 
concept of the moral agent, which in turn constitutes itself by reference to the pre­
scriptive elements of any moral code. Here we are reminded by Nietzsche’s own 
assertion in Twilight o f the Idols that the form of metaphysical subjectivity has 
been determined as a correlate to Christian morality, with its parallel notions of free 
will and sin.
However, although Foucault would deny the givenness of any form of sub­
jectivity, his philosophy of the subject is nevertheless involved in a self-contradic­
tion, as Deborah Cook has recently indicated, n  For while the content of any par­
ticular subjectivity is dependent on a historically specific reflexive self-constitution, 
the ability to exercise a self-relexive movement appears to be a trans-historical phe- f
nomenon, forming the conditions of the possibility of any concept of moral subjec- â
tivity. But on this admission one is obliged to enquire as to what it is that can ex­
ercise variety of historically and linguistically mediated rapports - à - soi. It seems 
that by Foucault's own argument there must be an a priori ontological foundation, 
namely the very capacity to exercise a rapport à soi, the existence of which he at­
tempts to deny. Instead he sees this a priori possibility for self-reflection as a mere 
medium, as the locus of 'games of truth’, devoid itself of any ethical relevance. Yet 
such an answer will simply not do. One cannot simply shrug off such an internal 1
inconsistency, most especially since Foucault's own aim to liberate subjectivity 
from a particularly repressive mode of self-reflection can only be made comprehen­
sible on the basis of a distinction between true and false relations to the self.
This brief excursus on Foucault serves to demonstrate that a critique of the 
metaphysical subject does not necessarily entitle us to espouse its total negation, the 
death of the subject. Decentering the subject, i.e. depriving it of its former privilege 
of being the transcendent source of knowledge, does not imply dissolving the sub­
ject. The inconsistencies which inhere in Foucault's work suggest that we must ap­
proach the problem more carefully, with a greater degree of circumspection than 
Foucault himself. In particular I would argue that Nietzsche's critique of subjectiv-
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i,ity does not consist in an assault on the concept of selfhood per se, but rather on a ï
specific, oppressive conception of selfhood, one whose character is marked by no­
tions of substance, unity and autonomy. The parallels with his critique of 
metaphysical thought in general are quite clear.
First, Nietzsche's sceptical stance does not necessarily lead to an embrace 
of absolute irrationality, but rather to an interpretative position which displays 
awareness of the pitfalls of ‘knowledge’. So too the demolition of the metaphysical 
subject is succeeded by a reinterpretation of selfhood based on the interpretative 
strategy formulated in the first chapter. Second, Nietzsche’s critique of the mind / 
body dualism is evidently a specific case of his wider critique of the ontological 
dualism so characteristic of metaphysics in general.
As a prelude to a study of Nietzsche's concept of the self, one must first 
analyse what he imagines he is attacking. Strictly speaking, the idea of ‘the’ meta­
physical subject is an absurdity. Even metaphysics has never sustained a single 
unified subject as such. Rather, there has always been a plurality of subjects 
according to the function they have to serve. The ‘subject’ of metaphysics itself j
thus represents an interpretative fiction, synthesising the various subjects, e.g. 
political, legal, ethical, knowing and so forth, which all have delimited spheres of 
applicability. Tracing the tradition back to its genesis in Plato, there is already a 
plural subject, inasmuch as Plato draws a clear distinction between the subject of 
knowing and the subject of feeling. What I am arguing, then, is that it is not 
particularly helpful to generalise and speak of Nietzsche’s critique of subjectivity 
per se. Instead, I am claiming that he is criticising the metaphysical concept of the 
representing subject and its cousin, the ethical subject, focusing on a Cartesian 
notion of the self, with its concomitant distinction between the res cogitans and the 
res extensa.
The subject of knowledge in Descartes is nothing but the res cogitans. As 
he says in the second Meditation ‘therefore I am only . . .  a something that thinks, 
that is to say a spirit, an understanding.’12 In the sixth Meditation , devoted to 
demonstrating the ‘real distinction between the human soul and body’, he makes |
an even bolder assertion when he notes that ‘there is a great difference between the 
spirit and the body, in that the body is by its nature always divisible, while the 
spirit is entirely indivisible.’13 The lineage of such a concept of subjectivity can be 
traced back to the Asceticism of the Church Fathers and Augustine in particular, but 
Nietzsche singles out Descartes and Kant as being the most recent and most 
prominent exponents of such a concept. The connection between the metaphysical 
subject of knowing and Christianity is far from being accidental, since Christian 
morality must be predicated on the assumption of a responsible agent, one whose
J
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%moral disposition will be purely rational, unclouded by the physiological demands of post-lapsarian human embodied existence. As Peter Brown has showni4, the 
early church invested the notions of sexual abstinence and renunciation of the body 
with a cosmic significance far exceeding the contemporary pagan norm of re­
stricting sexual activity to marital relations for often practical reasons only. In many 
ways this corporeal renunciation is a deepening and an extending of the old Greek 
maxim yvwGi ocautov, ‘know thyself, which stood above the entrance to the 
oracle at Delphi, and Nietzsche must attempt to demonstrate the misguided nature 4
of such an ethical ideal and its accompanying concept of agency. As he notes:
‘Humans were conceived of as “free” so they could be judged and punished - so 
they could become guilty: consequently every action had to be conceived of as 
intended, the origin of every action had to be thought of as residing in conscious­
ness’ (KSA 6 p. 95).
These few opening remarks are meant to suggest that Nietzsche is targeting 
in particular the autonomous subject of morality and its foundation in the pure res 
cogitans of Descartes, the concept of which relies on two axiomatic principles.
First, that the intellect can be protected from the ravages of the bodily affects and 
achieve a high degree of self-knowledge, and second, that the subject can exercise 
autonomy in its choice of moral action, a principle brought to its extreme |
expression in Kant's categorical imperative. The contents of the last chapter will 
have already made clear the nature of some of Nietzsche’s objections to the meta­
physical subject. Not only is the status of truth dependent on the semiotic order of 
language, but in addition the conscious intellect is only one part of the functioning 
human organism (and ultimately of interpretative will to power). Thus the exhorta­
tion to ‘know thyself’ is shown to rest on very uncertain foundations. In Daybreak |
Nietzsche devotes a long section to the problem of the indeterminacy which inhabits 
any account of agency: ‘The unknown world of the “subject”. What is so difficult 
for people to grasp is their lack of knowledge of themselves . . .  Is this not pre­
cisely the dreadful truth: that what one can ever know of an action will never suffice 
to cross the bridge which leads from a cognition to the action ? . . .  Moral actions 
are always something other’ (KSA 3 p. 108-9). The phenomenal inner world, 
which Schopenhauer had used as the starting point of his own critique of Kant, it­
self turns out to be a complex of different affects of various orders, irreducible to 
any simple relation of willing and acting. In the Gay Science he mocks those who 
would see the intellect as the essence of humankind, commenting that ‘Conscious­
ness is the most recent and latest development of organic being and hence also the 
most unready and feeble’ (KSA 3 p. 382). Zarathustra puts the case more poeti­
cally when he declares to his audience that ‘You have taken the path from the worm
” 1
50
to the human being, and much of you is still worm. You were once apes, and the 
human is even now more of an ape than some apes’ (KSA 4 p. 14).
Nietzsche's particular scorn is reserved for the idea of free will, derived 
from the ascetic ideal. Free will must be an a priori possibility of the ethical subject, 
yet as Nietzsche demonstrates the will may not be a primary force, but rather a sec- ;|
ondary quality which arises from the interpretation of a specific situation ‘so that I
volition can arise one must have a representation of desire and repulsion. Secondly: 
that a powerful stimulus can be felt as a desire or repulsion , that is a matter of the 
interpreting intellect, which works for the most part unbeknownst to us’ (KSA 3 
p. 483). The intellect, as a secondary function of organic life, is inextricably linked 
to those organic functions of the body; seen in this light, the mind - body dualism 
of Descartes appears to be hopelessly naive . This is not to reduce the mind to the 
status of an organ, for such a crude reductionist materialism would be just as 
culpable as the ascetic ideal of severing the intellect from the life forces which give f
it its vitality. However we are forced to reassess the relationship between mind and 4
body, in a manner which perhaps suspends the traditional opposition itself.
Even in his earliest notes Nietzsche stresses the impossibility of neatly de­
lineating between mental and bodily functions. In an unpublished note from 1871 
Nietzsche writes ‘What we call feelings are . . . already permeated and saturated 
with conscious and unconscious ideas’ (KSA 7 12[1] p. 364). Mental acts cannot 
be reduced to mere neuro-physiological activity, to the cathexis of so much energy; 
the mind cannot be seen as a bundle of nerve endings and nothing besides. For just 
as mental functions can be seen to originate in physiological impulses, so too neural 
stimuli have to be interpreted by an intellect in order to be recognised as such . It is 
moreover only the interpretative act that can give these stimuli the quality of mental 
processes. Perception of the colour green can be seen, within the vocabulary of be­
havioural psychology and physics as a reception of light waves of a particular fre­
quency, and this account does explain the physical, biological and neurological me­
chanics of vision. However, we do not ‘see’ light waves, we see green objects, 
and it is this peculiar quality of greenness that the scientific account cannot explain.
Yet at the same time, one cannot neatly distinguish between the physiological and 
the phenomenological aspects of seeing green objects, as if an autonomous inner 
self could ‘choose’ to interpret external stimuli in a certain way. On these grounds 
alone Nietzsche finds Kant’s Critique o f Pure Reason risible, as if one could 
isolate the workings of some pure rational essence, as if one could abstract the 
mental fi-om the material aspects of existence. This realisation is also proclaimed by 
Zarathustra, that ‘Behind your thoughts and feelings stands . . .  an unknown sage -
J
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he is called Self. He lives in your body, he is your body’, adding that ‘There is 
more reason in your body than in your greatest wisdom’ (KSA 4 p. 40).
In addition to the impracticality of the Delphic command to know oneself, 
the ideal of ethical autonomy is further undermined by the facticity of the human 
existential condition. No individual has control over the environment in which they r:
find themselves, indeed they find a world which is always-already there, which has 
shaped the way they are, to such an extent that the notions of guilt and responsibil­
ity so central to Christian ethics and concepts of the soul seem to be irrelevant and J
misplaced. ‘Nobody is responsible for the fact that they are even there’ states Niet- 
zsche (KSA 6 p. 96), adding that the peculiar characteristics of one's existence owe 
more to contingency than to any sense of necessary order, denoting the complete .-j
absence of any foundational or external telos which might give a purpose to an in- |
dividual human existence. On the basis of an overview of Nietzsche's œuvre, we #
see the general target of his discourse to be not subjectivity per se, which I shall |
henceforth term Selfhood, but the ascetic transcendent Subject of knowledge which 5|
underlies the Socratic ethical ideal, the metaphysical tradition and Christian j
morality. With this understanding of Nietzsche in hand, the task is now to produce 
an account of his reconstruction of the self.
Reconstruction
The first aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy of the self to take into account is that he 
regards the self, or consciousness as a given. This might seem a somewhat startling f
claim, given my previous emphasis on Nietzsche’s critique of the ‘ideology’ of the 
given. What I mean by this, however, is merely that one has to distinguish between if
the process whereby consciousness was constituted and its present status. Quite 0
clearly, consciousness is not something which was ‘discovered’; Nietzsche’s 
account of its genesis by the primal violence at the root of social morality makes 
this clear. Yet at the same time the consequences of that act have left a permanent 
trace, and one cannot simply reverse the process which has led to the present. It is 
this view which makes possible the ideal of the Übermensch, who represents an 
authentic self-relation, and it is this view which marks Nietzsche off from the 
writings of Foucault.
Such an interpretation of Nietzsche might seem additionally surprising since 
much scholarship would tend towards a more Foucauldian position. Michel Haar, 
for example, though not being as vigorously anti-subjectivist as Foucault neverthe­
less interprets Nietzsche as seeing the individual self as a fiction, in that the self 
finds its meaning, its identity, in the social group, which gives it roles to play,
'M
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identities to adopt. He writes that ‘A role constitutes the matrix of the individual. It 
provides a text which is not written by “me”, whose authors are the others, whose 
words are learnt by my body.’^^  Obviously Haar bases his interpretation partly on 
Nietzsche's own analysis in the Gay Science (§ 354), which sees self-conscious­
ness as arising out of the need for communication within the community. However 
once again, the circumstances of its genesis and its present function are not neces­
sarily the same thing. Indeed there are strong reasons for assuming that the two 
should not be conflated, for the notion of the self as a ‘fiction’ should alert us to the 
double meaning of the word, denoting something which is a product of the imagi­
nation and also something which is a product of the imagination. Moreover Niet­
zsche's genealogical method performs its central task by demonstrating the variety 
of meanings which have been attached to a cultural praxis, precisely to show that 
the present meaning of a particular praxis cannot be reduced to all earlier meanings.
So too with self-consciousness, its original meaning has not been ossified and pre­
served up to the present but rather transformed, and this is the heart of the problem.
Its multifarious origins have given it a complexity which has subsequently ex­
panded its range of possibilities. Additionally, Haar's reading of Nietzsche fails to 
account for the Übermensch in his struggle for 'heroic individualism", as one 
recent book terms it.i^ The Übermensch represents a form of individual existence, 
which must be bought, if necessary, by suffering, by long periods of solitude, as 
the example of Zarathustra suggests. This is far indeed from the interpretation in 
Haar of the free spirit, who gladly accepts the multiple roles bestowed upon him by 
the commonality, turning it from a burdensome obligation he has to fulfil to a pure 
joy in plurivocity.
Nietzsche offers several different explanations as to the origin of the self, 
none of which are incompatible, but which highlight the very complex nature of the 
self. In the Genealogy of Morals he offers the well known account of the deepening 
of inner consciousness through the turning of energies hitherto directed at the exter­
nal environment back onto themselves: in a move which anticipates Foucault, 
though differing from him in crucial ways, Nietzsche sees the origin of self-con­
sciousness in a reflexive movement, in a relation to the self. As Nietzsche says 
‘The whole inner world, originally thin as if stretched between two membranes, 4
extended and expanded, acquired depth, breadth and height in the same measure as 
outward discharge was inhibited’ (KSA 5 p. 332). However, one must again 
comment, as in the case of Foucault, that this self-relation, this turning of self 
against self is only possible on the basis of a pre-existent and primitive capacity for 
a relation to self, which provides the ontological ground of all subsequent and sec­
ondary transformations, such as the development of self-consciousness. Niet-
4
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zsche’s account is less one of the birth of consciousness per se than of the birth of 
modem self-consciousness out of a more primitive form of consciousness, which 
latter, of course has already been constituted by a variety of organic and commmu- 
nicative needs. Unlike Foucault, Nietzsche recognises this problem. In the Gay 
Science he notes that while self-reflexive activity is determined by thought, and to 
that extent is part of the public sphere which Haar so emphasises, there is also a 
more primordial layer of mental activity which precedes linguistic articulation. That 
form of consciousness whose entire energies are turned inward on themselves, is a 
very secondary form of mental being. He notes, ‘To say it once more: the human 
being, like every thinking creature, is always thinking, but doesn't know it; think­
ing of which one becomes conscious is only the slightest part of it, let us say: the 
most superficial, the worst part: - for only this conscious thinking occurs in words, if
that is to say, in communicative signs, whereby the origin of consciousness covers 
itself up’ (KSA 3 p. 592). Nietzsche is trying to uncover a layer of indeterminate, 
primordial Selfhood which precedes all the effects which subsequent constitutive 
processes such as insertion into the symbolic order of metaphysical language and 
moral judgement have had. As we shall see, though, in overcoming the meta­
physical subject of knowing and of morality, the Übermensch cannot simply return 
to this putative primordial state; self-consciousness is a fact that must be accepted 
and cannot be circumvented, however neither is it the only aspect of the self.
The brief account of the pre-linguistic aspects of the self brings us to a fur­
ther constitutive element of Selfhood, namely the physiological affect of the human 
body. Consciousness arises as a function of the organic as was already noted 
above, and not only has this bequeathed to consciousness a permanent disposition %
towards the world, it also still determines the course of much thought and interpre­
tation, as I demonstrated in the first chapter. Indulging in his predeliction for 
atavism, Nietzsche notes that ‘For the plant all things are usually still, eternal, every 
thing self-identical. From this period of lower organic being humans have inherited 
the belief that there are identical things’ (KSA 2 p. 39). Yet by stressing this I am 4
far from implying there to be a biological essence to Selfhood, for as Nietzsche t|
himself remarks, not even biological functions, not even instincts, should be con­
sidered as unchanging and permanent entities. Though their importance to much 
thinking remains fairly constant (and even this cannot be guaranteed as an eternal 
‘truth’ of humankind), their content and form are highly variable.
Nietzsche's various analyses of the functions and origins of consciousness 
also serve to clarify why Nietzsche rejects the notion of the self as a simple unity.
The fact that the self has grown up out of a wide variety of heterogeneous elements, 
the fact that it still fulfils many roles and that it is composed of many layers, make it -I
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difficult to see it as a unified, simple res cogitans. In Beyond Good and Evil we are 
given a very precise account of the new attitude towards the self, which involves 
not a dispensing with the whole concept, but instead a reassesment of it: ‘Between 
us, it is not at all necessary to be rid of the “soul” itself and to do without one the 
oldest and most respectable hypotheses . . .  However the road to new concepts and 
refinements of the hypothesis of the soul remains open: and notions such as “mortal 
soul” and “soul as plurality of subjects” and “soul as social structure of drives and 
affects” want to have their rights within science’ (KSA 5 p. 27). As I suggested in 
the first chapter, the perspective view of the human is not only a result of his /  her 
individual interpretation of the world, but also internally, the self is composed of a 
variety of drives and affects which offer competing and conflicting interpretations 
of the experiential continuum. One observes here, too, how according to the criteria 
of better and worse judgements, Nietzsche’s own interpretation of the self is better, 
inasmuch as it is one based a wider set of perspectives than that of metaphysics.
At this point one might feel entitled to object that Nietzsche is just repeating 
a theory of the soul which has seen wide currency in earlier thinkers. From Plato 
onwards, there has been an awareness that the soul is not a simple unity. In the Re­
public , Plato recognised the existence of three elements, each being in competition 
with the others for domination. For this very reason Plato recommended a strict ed­
ucation and training for the philosopher-kings precisely so that the rational element 
of their soul might gain mastery over the others, or to use his striking metaphor 
from the Phaedrus , so that it might become the charioteer of the soul. Similarly 
Kant's account of the subject does not permit us to speak of the self as a monad, 
indeed any notion of unity is merely a synthetic one brought about by an object of 
cognition. The response to such an objection would have to be that whereas Plato 
and Kant both offer a clearly compartmentalised and neatly divided self, Niet­
zsche’s self is a much more haphazard, chaotic phenomenon. Whereas Kant's rep­
resenting subject (though not the noumenal subject, which is far more problematic) 
is a plurality of cognitive functions, brought into synthetic unity by the cognitive 
act, Nietzsche's self is a collection of cognitive and physiological elements, which 
have developed at different times in response to different needs. In contrast to 
Plato, Nietzsche rejects the ideal of reason governing the soul, partly because rea­
son and rational thought are themselves dependent on other traits, lacking au­
tonomy, and partly because the Platonic Ideal is built on self-deception, on a refusal 
to recognise the importance of all its constituent elements. It is to deny the fluid and 
dynamic nature of the self, whose elements are arranging themselves in ever vary­
ing configurations according to the circumstance. The self is not some permanent
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substance, not even a plural substance, for we inhabit a world of Becoming, and 
this Becoming affects the make-up of our Selves.
Curiously enough, Nietzsche's anti-essentialist attitude with regard to the 
self bears a resemblance to Wittgenstein's critique of notions of the ‘essential’ self 
or the ‘substantial’ self in his later writings, though one might regard the latter as 
going still further in his critique. Thinking, for Wittgenstein, is not a mental state 
which can somehow be separated from one’s active relation towards objects and the 
world in general. As he notes: ‘Of course we cannot separate his thinking from his 
activity. For the thinking is not an accompaniment of the work any more than of 
thoughtful speech.’17 Consciousness is thus a complex web of interrelated emo- t
tional and cognitive dispositions to habitual ways of acting in the world. In his 
Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein compares language to the confused lay- f
out of an old city, seeing it as ‘a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new I
houses, and of houses with additions from various periods’18 a metaphor which f
has been taken up by Nehemas and Amélie Rorty to describe the self.i^ Wittgen­
stein's use of the word ‘maze’ should remind us of Nietzsche, who displayed a 
penchant for the conceptually similar metaphor of the labyrinth. Consciousness is 
not some static, a priori determined substance, but rather grows in accordance with 
the actions we perform, and of course this parallels Nietzsche’s insistence on the 
artificial nature of the separation of the agent from the act. Naturally one cannot 
posit a direct link between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, that would be absurd, but 1
one can see in their philosophies an alternative to the Cartesian cogito which does M
not simply resort to the denial of any mode of consciousness whatsoever. As 
Charles Altieri suggests^®, the scepticism which denies subjectivity per se, is but 
the reverse side of the essentialist argument. It is an argument which anticipates 
Peter Dews’ more general critique of the post-structuralist anti-Humanist turn, I
which posits in the place of the Humanist subject something which happens to have 
the same characteristics. We have seen this apparent in the work of Foucault, 
whose initial anti-humanism turns out to be self-defeating since it requires what it 
seeks to deny, namely a subject that can exercise self-reflection. Similarly, Derrida I
rejects any notion of a spontaneous ego, replacing it with the concepts of écriture 4
and différance, which just happen to have exactly the same characteristic as the 4
spontaneous subject. Derrida refuses to allow speakers the privilege of intending 
any meaning at all, while allowing language the ability to indulge in precisely this 
play with signification. The paradigm of Derrida fails in many ways to move away 
from the problems of Idealism and Husserlian Phenomenology, a shortcoming 
which has been given its due prominence recently^i. In contrast, Nietzsche’s 
positing of Selfhood as a given does not involve him in an inconsistency. He need
56
ci
■4
j
not be regarded as reinstating essentialism by the back door. The self is a given 
inasmuch as it has been constituted by the web of contingent relations produced by I
interpretative will to power. Hence it does not have any necessary essence which 
might be said to somehow exist independent of the interpretative process of which 
it is the result. Nevertheless this web of relations is our world, and the self is 
equally enmeshed within that web of relations and fulfills specific functions in that '1
web. It is as real as is the interpretative fabric of the world.
Yet if Nietzsche views the subject as a confused multiplicity, lacking any a 
priori centre or any single regulating principle, how are we to understand his call 
for a return to authentic selfhood ? What does Nietzsche mean when he gives Ecce 
Homo the subtitle How one becomes what one is ? What is this ‘what’ which one 
is ? Is Nietzsche just being inconsistent ? How can one become oneself, given that 
there is no essential self to become, or to which one can return ? Nietzsche's own I-Îresponse to the question hardly clarifies the issue. He comments that ‘To become |
what one is, one must not have the slightest inkling of what one i s . . .  where nosce 
te ipsum would be the recipe for disaster, self-forgetting, self-misunderstanding. .
. becomes Reason itself’ (KSA 6 p. 293). Evidently becoming oneself cannot de­
rive its force from the Delphic command to ‘know thyself, which Nietzsche here 
quotes in Latin. In contrast to the restrictive self-knowledge of Delphi, becoming 
what one is consists in recognising oneself as interpreter, and as interpretee, what 
Nietzsche calls self-overcoming. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra , Nietzsche's answer 
to the nineteenth century Bildungsroman, the goal is not self-knowledge in order to 
have an understanding of one's limits. The self-knowledge of Willhelm Meister is 
replaced by the self-overcoming of Nietzsche's hero. ‘Human being is something 
that must be overcome’ is the prophetic cry of Zarathustra (KSA 4 p. 44), and with 
this cry we are brought back to the endless dialectic of interpretation.
The dialectic of the hermeneutic process must of necessity always be in­
complete: it always harbours the possibility of its own self-overcoming as I demon­
strated in the first chapter. Individual interpretations can never be fully subsumed 
under the more general inter-subjective interpretation, and moreover there is always 
the potential for new individual interpretations. Hence the ideal 'objective' interpre­
tation will harmonise as many individual perspectives as possible. Becoming what 
one is means precisely this; an interpretative understanding of oneself, whose one­
sidedness is revealed at the moment of its articulation. Will to power motivating in­
terpretation always desires more, always desires more complete interpretations, the 
revelation of greater possibilities. The interpretation of the self, the recognition of 
oneself as always already interpreting and interpreted, is not a discovering of one's 
limits; it is an expansion of those limits. Hence we are restored to the ideal which
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1Nietzsche had already expounded in his genealogical study of asceticism: it is the 
ideal of allowing as many of the affects to speak out as possible. In the case of the 1
self, it is to give the affects their proper place in the society of the soul rather than 
deny their very existence, as in Descartes, or admit their existence but use oppres- 4
sive violence against them as in Plato or the Church Fathers.
Having reached this stage of the argument, one might object that Niet- ÿ
zsche's politics of the soul, dialectically opposed as they are to those of Plato, 
would force us to read him in a manner similar to Deleuze, whose interpretation I 4
have already taken great pains to refute. Certainly Nietzsche's reservations about 
the idea of a unified subject, together with Zarathustra’s more general polemic s
against the ‘One’ seem to imply a radical pluralism and substantiate this possible 
objection. However, an argument of this kind is largely informed by a one-sided 
understanding of Nietzsche's self. The self in Nietzsche can already be seen as a 
range of non-specified potentialities, which can be become actualities if the inter- '4
pretative act allows them to do so. For we have already seen the range of processes 
which have contributed to the genesis of the self and given it certain characteristics 
which the ascesis of metaphysics seeks to deny, or at least repress. Hence self­
interpretation is also a mode of self-creation.
Yet interpretation is also mastery, and consequently self-interpretation is 
also self-mastery, though a self-mastery of a quite different order than the self-sub­
jugation of the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche envisages a control over the affects which 
nevertheless does not deprive them of their vitality. In the summer of 1888 he |
writes: ‘Mastery over the passions, not a weakening or a rotting of them. The 4
greater the will's power of mastery becomes, the more freedom can be given to the 
passions. The great human is great through the room for play of his desires: how­
ever he is strong enough to make these wild animals into pets’ (KSA 13: 16 [7] p.
495). The Übermensch, as the ideal self-interpreting, self-creating being, is an aris­
tocracy of the affects: there is order without subjugation, a sense of purpose with­
out the imposition of a restrictive goal. The affects must be orchestrated so as to 
maximise their potential, while will to power recognises the necessity of a perma­
nent readiness to change their configuration, in order to expand still further the 
horizon of possible action and control over the environment. In Ecce Homo Niet­
zsche offers an account of his own ideal of self-creation which mirrors precisely the 
reading I have given above when he writes ‘For the task of a revaluation of all val­
ues perhaps more capacities were necessary than have ever been together in one in­
dividual, above all contrary capacities too, without allowing them to disturb and 
destroy each other. Hierarchy among these capacities; distance; the art of separating 
without creating emnity; to mix nothing; to reconcile nothing; a monstrous multi­
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plicity which is nevertheless the opposite of chaos; this was the precondition, the 
long secret work and artistry of my instinct’ (KSA 6 p. 294), Once again in this 
passage one can see a reflection the process of the interpretative dialectic; competing 
capacities must be brought into some kind of order, yet into an order which does 
not rob them of their particularity, much as in interpretation individual perspectives 
must be allowed to maximise the general range of perspectives, while without being 
allowed to tyrannise the others.
The Nietzsche of Deleuze, the affirmer of pure difference, takes a further 
blow upon examination of Nietzsche's politics of the soul, and his particular ob­
jections to Modern man. Bruce Detwiler has recently brought to prominence the I
extent to which Nietzsche's anti-democratic political views have been whitewashed 
or conveniently circumvented since the apologia performed by Kaufmann rehabili- ç
tated Nietzsche as a respectable thinker.22 One need only consult Twilight o f the 
Idols to gain a clear impression of his contempt for the democratic egalitarian 
ideal. Liberal institutions, he notes, are a form of decadence as soon as they appear.
Freedom is not something which should be guaranteed in order to produce an 
environment free of tension. The only freedom worth having is that which has been 
fought for, and the greater the resistance to be overcome, the greater the value of 
the freedom achieved. Nietzsche writes in Twilight o f the Idols : ‘My concept of 
freedom. The value of a thing lies not in what one can achieve with it, but in what 
one has paid for it, - what it costs us. I shall give an example. Liberal institutions .
. . undermine the will to power, they are the levelling of mountain and valley 
given moral legitimacy . . . with them the herd animal always triumphs’ (KSA 6 
p. 139-40). Nietzsche's politics are especially important for his account of the 
Übermensch and his criticism of the decadence of Modernity. 1
As I have demonstrated above, allowing the affects to ‘speak’ does not im­
ply an abandoning of oneself to the passions. There must also be an ordering of the 
passions, to promote the existence of the Übermensch, to increase his /  her power.
Otherwise a lack of direction results in so much wasted force. This lack of restraint, 
this pure affirmativity had been seen early on by Nietzsche as one of the main 
weaknesses of modern culture. Already in ‘Homer’s Competition’ the fifth of his 
Five Prefaces to Unwritten Books which he had presented to Cosima Wagner in * j
1872, he had compared and contrasted Greek culture with that of his own time. The 
central feature whereby one could distinguish the two was, in his eyes, the lack in 
modern culture of a determinate negativity. One can flesh out in concrete terms the 
meaning of this strikingly Hegelian sentiment as follows.
The guiding force of all Greek culture, seen most clearly in the Homeric po­
ems, was the desire to compete; Greek culture was founded on strife, competition.
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the aim to excell. The Greek word for virtue, arete, had the sense of excellence, 
rather than the humility associated with Christian ideas of moral virtue. The scorn 
of Homer is reserved not for evil doers, but for Thersites, for being weak, for 
lacking the aristocratic status which would signify his supremacy over others, 
becoming also the object of ridicule. So too the performance of tragedies was not 
executed merely for its own sake, but as part of a competition in honour of Diony­
sus. Even the Platonic dialogues were written, according to Nietzsche, out of this 
desire to do better than the rest, to show Socrates arguing with greater eloquence 
than the Sophists and making them appear foolish, even if the ostensible aim of the 
dialectic was to gain knowledge by mutual consent. As Nietzsche says ‘From 
childhood onwards every Greek found in himself a burning desire to be a tool for 
the health of his own city in the battles between cities: therein was his ambition f
kindled, and therein was it reined in and restrained. Therefore individuals were 
freer in Antiquity, because their goals were nearer and more palpable’ (KSA 1 p.
790). The Greek affirmation of life was possible only on the basis of a determinate 
negation, a theme which Nietzsche retains up until his last work, exemplified by his 
comment in Ecce Homo that ‘negation and destruction are conditions of affirma­
tion’ (KSA 6 p. 368) and his hopes that the destruction wrought by present-day 
Nihilism may yet turn out to be a necessary moment on the way to establishing 
post-moral values. The Greek could not use his energies unless channelled into a 
specific purpose, which involved a denial of some possibilities of action and an af­
firmation of others. Yet modern culture, with its democratic and egalitarian ideals, 1
has forgotten this fact, and has engendered a sickly kind of human, one who |
desires everything indiscriminately, who is caught up by a debilitating vertigo in the 
face of the infinite and lapses into a paralysis of action. As Nietzsche states in his 
essay on Homer, ‘like swift-footed Achilles in the similes of Zeno the Eleate, infin- %
ity restricts him, he doesn't even catch up with the tortoise’ (KSA 1 p. 790),
Moreover such thoughts cannot be regarded as mere Hegelian 'deviations' 
from his youth. Nietzsche's own comments on his early writings, especially the 
'Attempt at a Self - Criticism' preceding the Birth o f Tragedy , and his account of 
that work in Ecce Homo should not be regarded as exercising a paternal authority |
over the meaning of his work. Though these comments are of interest, and Niet- 
zsche freely admits the Hegelian, Kantian and Schopenhauerian tenor of his early 
work, the texts elude their author's own attempt to grasp them. The Hegelianism of 
the Birth of Tragedy is present in all his texts, whether it be in the will to power's 
negation of the Other or supplanting by Dionysus of first Apollo and later Christ.
For throughout his writings Nietzsche's emphasis is on the necessity for resistance, 
negation, and above all suffering, in the production of the Übermensch. Humans
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suffer in the name of the production of higher culture and higher forms of life, and 
it is the precondition of the achievement of the Übermensch that the majority of 
Mankind should suffer. In ‘The Greek State’, the third essay of the Five Prefaces 
Nietzsche justifies slavery in the ancient world as a necessity to ensure great men: 
‘The suffering of wretchedly living people must be increased in order to facilitate 
the production of an artistic world by a limited number of Olympian humans’ 
(KSA 1 p. 767).
On the individual level too, the self cannot produce a wider horizon of self­
interpreting and self-creation except by overcoming resistance, by suffering. In the
Twilight o f the Idols he remarks that ‘Today the individual can only be made pos- {
sible by pruning,’ adding that the root of modem decadence lies in the refusal to ac­
cept this need for discipline and restraint (KSA 6 p. 143). Modernity is decadent 
because it seeks to deny, in a manner similar to the ascetic ideal of metaphysics, the 
vital flux which constitutes the authentic self. The Cartesian subject is posited as a i
substance untainted by the dynamics of the external world. Plato's soul is immor­
tal, and not only does one lead a just life to be sure of a healthy soul, but also with 
an eye to the possible judgement in the afterlife which Rhadamanthus might pass on 
one's actions. In the Phaedo Plato's Socrates sees the symmetrical harmony of the 
soul as an indication of its immortality, of its resistance to change and decay.
Likewise Modernity seeks rest from the ceaseless struggle and conflict which de­
termines the self and which is the source of the energies for self-overcoming. In I
contrast, Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical rejection of the possibility of absolute 
knowledge, combined with his adoption of the dialectic of hermeneutics with its 
implicit goal of attaining the Absolute means that there never can be a moment of 
satiety, of rest. Will to power will always be confronted by the possibility of more, 
indeed life itself can never be fully exhausted, for it is always possible to produce 
more interpretations, as Nehemas has a r g u e d . 2 3  In contrast, Nietzsche writes of 
the modern human that ‘his most fundamental longing is for the war which he is to 
finally come to a stop; happiness is to him . . .  pre-eminently the happiness of 
resting, of being undisturbed, of being sated, of unity achieved at last’ (KSA 5 p.
120-1) and compares him to the higher type of individual, whose instinct to live is 
born of precisely the opposite drive, the drive to wage war, the refusal to be satis­
fied, the individual who has achieved self-mastery, but only the mastery of his 
drives in order to direct them towards dissolving his own being and resurrecting 
another. ‘Thus arise those magical ungraspable and unfathomable ones, those 
enigmatic humans predestined to victory and seduction, whose most beautiful ex­
pression is Alcibiades and Caesar. . .  amongst artists perhaps Leonardo da Vinci’
(ibid. p. 121). The greatness of mankind is not to be sought in the noble simplicity
1
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which Winckelmann thought he had found in the Greeks. Neither is it to be sought 
in the ascetic ideal of self-knowledge and self-denial. It is rather more to be found 
in ‘his range and multiplicity, in his wholeness in the manifold’ (KSA 5 pp. 146- 
7).
The ideal self in Nietzsche, the Übermensch as representative of the ideal 
individual in a post-metaphysical culture, is one whose status is always provisional 
and contingent. It is an openness to its constant potentiality for new inteipretations 1
of self and the world, a form of individual being which always awaits its own 
dissolution. As Nietzsche says, ^Losing oneself. Once one has found oneself one 4
must understand how from time to time to lose oneself . . . For to the thinker it is |
disadvantageous to be tied to one person all the time’ (KSA 2 p. 689). Yet this is 
far from approximating to Haar's conception of a being who willingly adopts the 4
multiplicity of roles given him by the social body, who rejoices in the play of roles 
and the dissimulating adoption of masks. For the Übermensch is a solitary being. f
The implicit parallel I have drawn between the Übermensch and Heidegger's au- |
thentic Dasein is also no accident. In his openness to ever further potential ways of 
acting and being, the Übermensch offers a striking anticipation of authentic Da- 
sein's openness to its ownmost potentiality for being. So too, like authentic Dasein, #
the Übermensch pays no attention to the babble of ‘das Man’ in order to follow his 
own peculiar path.
Greatness does not lie in the herd; democracy and utilitarianism, with their 
concern for the common weal can only bring about a decline of human existence 
and a weakening of the instincts. Nietzsche writes ‘He shall be greatest who can be 
most solitary, most hidden, most deviant, the human being beyond good and evil, 
the master of his virtues, the one who is overrich in will’ (KSA 6 p. 147). One 
hesitates to actually name a figure who could embody those values which Nietzsche 
views as paradigmatic, yet his comments on Goethe in Twilight o f the Idols make 
clear the kind of person he envisages. Goethe, notes Nietzsche, has the naturalness 
of the Renaissance man, whereby he refers to that kind of person for whom exis­
tence is a constant challenge to grow. ‘He enlisted the aid of history, natural sci­
ence, Antiquity, especially Spinoza, and above all practical activity’ notes Niet­
zsche. ‘He didn’t cut himself off from life, he plunged himself into it; he was not 
disheartened and took as much as possible on himself, over himself, into himself.
What he wanted was wholeness; he fought against the separation of reason, sensi­
bility, feeling, w ill. . .  he disciplined himself for totality, he created himself. . . ’
(KSA 6 p. 151). Goethe is the ideal future kind of individual, who keeps himself 
open to as many styles of understanding and being as possible, yet without lapsing 
into the modern hankering for absolute freedom, which as noted earlier, leads to a
J
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paralysis of action; his is the ‘wholeness in the manifold.’ In contrast the ‘Freedom 
which I don’t mean’ (KSA 6 p. 143) of Modernity with its ‘demand for indepen­
dence, for free development, for laisser aller’, devoid of any restraint and self-dis­
cipline, ‘. . .  is a symptom of décadence’ (ibid.).24
A recent c o m m e n t a t o r ^ ^  has chided Nietzsche for his inability to conceive of 
a completely open self, inasmuch as ‘letting go of oneself, allowing for that rever­
sal of customary perspectives, is always undertaken in the name of self-interest. 
Admittedly, Nietzsche does show marked scepticism toward all forms of altruism, 
and he does seem to regard all human activity as bound to some form of interest, 
though in a sense far more fundamental than that envisaged by Foucault or current 
sociologists of knowledge. However Houlgate’s view that Nietzsche’s thought 
would be more accomplished if he had taken on board the Christian perspective (as 
manifest in the slave’s comportment in his dialectic with the Master) apart from be­
ing somewhat bizarre, is also misplaced.
Central to Nietzsche’s project, as I have interpreted it, is the attempt to 
somehow reconcile radical scepticism with faith in normativity, contingency and 
chaos with necessity. If we refuse to do this, if we refuse to submit our 
knowledge, our self-knowledge to scrutiny, there is a potential for catastrophe. Yet 
the way to avoid descent into reactive Nihilism is not an easy one, since it involves 
a substantial risk. It involves putting all our ‘customary’ perspectives in question, 
making everything which is familiar to us unfamiliar. As Nietzsche says in the 
preface to Ecce Homo , ‘Philosophy, as I have hitherto understood it is living 
freely in ice and high mountains - seeking everything strange and questionable in 
existence’ (KSA 6 p. 258), a view which he supports when he writes ‘Every 
achievement, every step forward in knowledge follows from courage, from 
hardness towards oneself’ (ibid. p. 259). It is a risky venture inasmuch as the 
human form of life is one that thrives on stability, on the ossification of 
perspectives. Yet if we try to imagine a self, or an interpretative practice in general 
which is not motivated by interpretative will to power, the significance of self- 
overcoming, as an act which places everything on which we depend in jeopardy, is 
lost. For if nothing is at stake, if there are no vested interests at work, there is also 
no sense in which self-overcoming is an achievement. Letting oneself go in the 
name of will to power is not a form of egoism, but rather is all the more significant 
an action when set against the background of one’s being as a finite, self-asserting, 
desiring being. The free spirits are precisely those beings that can live by 
overcoming the selfsame perspectives on which they depend.
Nietzsche is of course aware of the possibility of an absolute openness, 
which he named as Buddhism. Yet this type of openness is not one which can ever
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figure in his thought, for it is a consequence of passive or reactive Nihilism. All 
forms of appearance are felt to be mere illusion and hence their constitution be­
comes indifferent, since nothing is at stake. It is a way of thinking which cannot 
but lead one to pure inactivity, something which Nietzsche abhores, not in the name 
of selfishness, but rather because that is an easy or weak response. For as Houlgate 
himself admits, and it is a ciriticism which Georges Bataille has also made^^, the 
slave in Hegel’s dialectic is open with a view to saving his own skin; he willingly 
submits to the rule of the Master because it is an easier choice than risking all in a 
life or death struggle. For Nietzsche there can be no such easy option, since 
without accepting risk nothing is achieved. As Zarathustra says, ‘Free to die, and %
free in death, a sacred sayer of no, when it is no longer time for saying yes: thus he J
is an expert at life and death’ (KSA 4 p. 95).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued for a number of points concerning Nietzsche's philos­
ophy of the self, which will serve as a basis for investigation into his aesthetic the­
ory. The first theme was the assertion that Nietzsche's so-called critique of the 
subject is much more limited in scope than that which many contemporary believe 
him to have carried out. The word 'subject' has for Nietzsche the connotation of a f
specific concept of human agency and knowing derived from a complex of interre- <
lated and mutually dependent metaphysical, religious and morals ideologies. In 
metaphysics the most prominent proponents of this ‘subject’ are seen to be Plato 
and Descartes, while in the spheres of morality and religion the most culpable agent 
is Christianity and its ascetic morality. All three spheres share a common con­
ception of human subjecthood as a unified, stable and autonomous intellect, one 
which in the right environment can exercise its powers of cognition unaffected by 
the putative ‘lower’ instincts and passions. As such it is a subject endowed with 
moral autonomy and responsibility, one of whom adherence to unconditional moral 
tenets can be expected, whether they be the ‘thou shalt’ of a legislating divinity, or 
obedience to an internal voice of conscience, as in Kant's categorical i m p e r a t i v e . ^ 7  
The second theme was to argue that concomitantly Nietzsche develops a 
theory of the self which in many ways represents a determinate negation of the 
‘metaphysical’ subject knowing . Nietzsche's alternative concept is of a self whose 
origins are many and varied, a self which cannot easily be dissociated from the 
physiological functions of the organic being of human existence, yet which simul­
taneously cannot simply be reduced to those functions of the organism. Because of 
its complex nature, the self cannot be interpreted as a simple unity, or indeed as a
I
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simple relation of cognitive functions. It should be seen instead as a multiplicity, S
one which lacks any a priori order or regularity, a rethinking of the self which natu- 'I
rally reminds us of the proximity of Nietzsche’s work in this respect to feminist cri- 4
tiques of the (decidedly male) metaphysical subject.
Thirdly I argued that although the self is not an a priori unity, it must never­
theless strive to attain an aesthetic unity, no matter how provisional that unity, in 
order to act on and control the environment. In his more general critique of meta­
physics Nietzsche claims that although the fabrications of human interpretation bear 
a metaphoric relation to reality, they are nonetheless necessary fictions, so as to J
make life possible. Will to power which motivates the interpretative process 
ensures that the ‘healthy’ individual never ceases his drive to produce ever more 
complete, more comprehensive interpretations of the world, no matter how elusive 
the ideal of an ‘objective’ knowledge may be. By bringing this model to bear on the 
problem of the authentic mode of existence Nietzsche is arguing that the authentic S
lifestyle cannot derive its inspiration from the commands of Christian morality, 
which depends on a specific idea of subjecthood already revealed as being the pure 
negation of life itself. Instead, authentic existence, ‘becoming who you are’ %
consists in an application of the interpretation to oneself as interpreting being in the ^
world, according the sensuous, physiological aspects of the self their due place, yet 
at the same time avoiding decay into an egalitarian democracy of the affects. It is a 
style of being which combines an exuberant affirmation of the vital forces of life I
with a severe discipline of the passions, in order to forge them into a weapon to f
maximise one's potential for action. Yet the impossibility of Absolute Knowledge j
means that this process of self-interpretation, self-expansion can never be #
exhausted: the Übermensch is the individual who is always engaged in the activity i
of self-overcoming, and never one that represents a utopian e n d - p o i n t . ^ 8  Despite 
his obvious Hegelian leanings, and his critique of Modernity's lack of determinate 
negativity is another example, Nietzsche's Übemiensch never reaches the Absolute.
There is always the possibility of more, never a moment of rest and stasis. 4;
I
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Laughter and Sublimity: Reading ‘The Birth of
Tragedy’
Having dealt with interpretation in Nietzsche, both as a paradigm to overcome the 
narrow ‘metaphysical’ assumption of objectivity and as a model for establishing 
some form of authentic self-understanding, we are in a position to approach the 
question of art. As I have indicated previously, it is within the sphere of art that 
interpretation is given space for its own free play, and it is the artist who best 
embodies the type of individual that can live with insecurities Nietzsche is asking us 
to accept.
This in itself is not a particularly startling or original claim with regard to 
Nietzsche’s thought. However while the importance of art in his work is univer­
sally recognised, the question of art still remains often superficially understood.
Attention tends to focus solely on The Birth o f Tragedy, being the only full-length ;|
treatment of art in Nietzsche’s oeuvre, dominates interpretations of the subject. It is 
a perfectly comprehensible state of affairs, inasmuch as his later writing on art 
remains in many respects quite scattered and unfocused. While we find in the first 
volume of Human All-too human the fourth section of some 78 aphorisms devoted 
to art and artists, this tends to be the exception.
Despite the difficulties involved it is necessary to sift through his entire 
body of writing to produce some synthesis of his mature statements on art and 
artists. The Birth o f Tragedy represents an immature expression of a philosophy of 
art which is subsequently reformulated in many ways, yet which is guided by the 
pre-occupation I outlined above, namely the proper mode of reconciling 
contingency and necessity, of how to best formulate ‘the doctrine of lawfulness in 
Becoming and of play in necessity’ (KSA 1 p. 833). As such one might argue that 
Nietzsche’s attempt to come to grips with the question of art is what gives shape to 
his wider criticism of metaphysics, for ‘Only the aesthetic person sees the world 
thus, who has learnt from the artist and the work of art how the struggle of 
multiplicity can nevertheless carry within itself lawfulness and right . . . how ne- 
cessity and play, conflict and harmony have to come together in the production of 
the work of art’ (ibid. p. 831).
I am arguing, therefore, that The Birth o f Tragedy should not be interpreted i
as an isolated phenomenon within Nietzsche’s œuvre, but rather as alluding to and ^
introducing themes recurrent throughout his career, and with this we come to a 
second claim. Just as The Birth o f Tragedy should not be understood as an isolated 
phenomenon amongst Nietzsche’s own writings, so neither should Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of art be understood as an isolated outburst or polemic without
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precedent in the history of that philosophy. I am not thereby endorsing the view of I
Julian Young^ that Nietzsche’s philosophy of art constitutes little more than an 
expression of Schopenhauerian Kulturpessimismus. I am arguing, however, that it 
has to be set against the tradition of aesthetics, specifically from Kant onwards. ;f
Nietzsche’s writing constitutes a perpetual impulse to elude the thought of Kant, 
whose presence repeatedly reinscribes itself within the Nietzschean corpus. A 
recent commentator has declared that ‘No step in Nietzsche’s thought is a mere 
transmission of the old tasks, even if its completion recalls them.’^  Against this I 
am arguing that Nietzsche’s critique of Aesthetics often fails to deliver what it 
promises. We see this most apparently in The Birth o f Tragedy , where he claims 
to provide a new insight into art, yet produces an account which is both deeply 
Hegelian and Kantian. Hegelian in the dialectical structure of the Apollo - Dionysus 
relation, and Kantian in his use of the discourse of the sublime to narrate the 
function of the tragic.
This claim is again not a particularly original one yet it is one frequently 
overlooked, supplanted by considerations of the abstraction of the Apollinian and 
the Dionysian, without taking into account the genealogy of the ideas at work in 
The Birth o f Tragedy and Nietzsche’s later writings on art. And here we come to a 
third aspect of Nietzsche, which has only recently attracted attention amongst 
German commentators, and none at all amongst anglophone critics.^ This concerns 
the problem of reconciling the privilege Nietzsche accords to art with those other 
aspects of his thinking which tend toward a denial of the distinction between art and 
its other. Nietzsche apparently maintains a belief in the existence of a difference, yet 
his remarks on interpretation and on the metaphoric foundation of language have 
led to the post-structuralist dissolution of the philosophy - literature opposition, a |
dissolution which accords well with the Avant-garde’s attempts to undermine the 
autonomy of art and its institutions. This latter issue will have to be dealt with in 
due course, but before I return to it I shall first offer an analysis of the salient 
aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy of art as they bear on the thematics of the first 
two chapters.
In his essay Genesis and Genealogy ^ Paul de Man uses Nietzsche's work 
on tragedy as an opportunity to offer an exemplar of deconstructive interpretation, 
focusing on the difference between Apollo and Dionysus on the one hand, and the 
process whereby the rhetoric of The Birth o f Tragedy undercuts its own putative 
claims on the other. For de Man Nietzsche brings a ‘negative valorisation’ to the 
(Apollinian) category of representation, which serves to mediate, or hide the 
unspeakable truth of Dionysus, yet at the same time he claims to make present in 
the Apollinian rhetoric of The Birth o f Tragedy that same Dionysian truth, with a 
voice of authority to which he is not entitled. As de Man notes: ‘The authority of
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his voice has to legitimise an act by means of which the aporia of unmediated rep­
resentation, by itself a logical absurdity, would be suspended [aufgehoben]’ (p.
96). The logocentric authority with which the authorial voice claims to speak the 
truth about tragedy, simply doesn’t square with the thematics of the text which 4
speak of the illusion of textual representation and form. It is a familiar problem 
which has occupied philosophy since the time of Plato's attack on the arts for their |
inability to represent the truth as such , a criticism which is in turn compromised by 
Plato's own need to use literary devices (eg. dramatic dialogue, myth) to present 
the truth of his discourse
In response to de Man's deconstruction both Henry Staten and Thomas 
Boning^ have offered critiques of his position to the effect that it is not a simple op­
position of the real and the representation, or truth and illusion. In their interpreta­
tions the Apollinian and the Dionysian are equi-primordial, neither derived from or 
secondary to the other. Their relation could not be further from Kofman’s paternal f
metaphor, where the Dionysian is somehow a father to the secondary, Apollinian |
representation, a metaphor which de Man cites with approval. Consequently both 
the Dionysian and the Apollinian are to be seen as forms of representation |
(Nietzsche uses the term Erscheinungsform or ‘form of appearance’), a realisation |
which even de Man notes Nietzsche had made in his unpublished notes of the same 
period. Most notably in the long note from Spring 1871 (KSA 7 12: [1] pp. 359- 
369) Nietzsche repeatedly subverts the Schopenhauerian vocabulary of the Will we 
find in The Birth o f Tragedy by stressing that the Will is itself an 
Erscheinungsform, terming it ‘the primordial form of appearance whereby all 
Becoming is to be understood’ (ibid. p. 364). 1
Now although these criticisms are timely and perceptive, neither Staten nor 
Bdning pay attention to the tragedy in the book's title; instead, the argument tends 
to get bogged down in the discussion of the Apollinian and the Dionysian in 
abstracto . Moreover neither Boning nor Staten manage, or indeed even intend, to 
cash out in concrete terms the precise significance of these two ill-defined terms. I
While they are undoubtedly central to The Birth of Tragedy , and an account of it 
would be unimaginable without them, it is perhaps useful if one temporarily 
circumvents the arguments concerning the nature of representation in order to 
examine the function of the tragic in The Birth o f Tragedy . Above all, what does 
Nietzsche mean when he informs us that tragedy provides us with metaphysical 
consolation through the mimesis of human destruction ? How does Nietzsche's 
work offer us an interpretation of Greek tragedy more satisfactory than Aristotle's ?
What relation do the lofty abstractions of the Dionysian and the Apollinian actually 
bear to the concrete praxis of tragic drama ? Why is the destruction of the tragic 
hero of cardinal importance ?
Sublimity
If we seek to answer such questions it is necessary first to locate Nietzsche's book 
within the history of nineteenth century philosophies of tragedy, and in particular it 
is in the light of those writings which map out the relation of the tragic to the 
sublime that I shall read The Birth o f Tragedy . In this respect it is no accident that 
Nietzsche praises Schiller's subtle understanding of the true significance of the 
tragic chorus, an understanding which the latter puts into practice in The Bride of 
Messina . For it is Schiller who plays the seminal role in making explicit the con- |
nection between the sublime, in particular the dynamic sublime of Kant's Critique 
o f Judgement and the affirmative pleasure we derive from tragedy, a connection 
later made by the Romantics and Schopenhauer, and one which organises the con­
ceptual framework of Nietzsche's treatise.
The concept of the sublime is one with a long history, beginning with 
Longinus’ On the Sublime , the rediscovery of which led to the proliferation of 
works on aesthetics in eighteenth century Britain. I do not intend to embark on a 
history of the subject. That would require a separate study, and in any case has 
been exhaustively discussed elsewhere.^ However its salient aspects are worth 
recalling briefly. In Longinus the sublime denotes that moment when one’s 
affectivity and cognitive disposition towards the world are subjected to a sense of 
displacement. He writes, ‘amazement and wonder exert invincible power and force 
and get the better of every hearer . . . Sublimity . . . produced at the right 
moment, tears everything up like a whirlwind.’7 I use the word displacement, 
because the words which Longinus uses to describe the effect of the sublime, 
cKoraais [‘ecstasy, or literally ‘standing outside oneself], and the action of the 
‘whirlwind’, 0ia4>opc(i) [lit. ‘to carry off’] both contain a sense of physical 
displacement, one that is taken up by the eighteenth century motif of sublime 
‘transport’, as Peter de Bolla has indicated.^
It is a description which accords well with the eighteenth century penchant 
for psychologising accounts of aesthetic taste, and hence finds itself echoed in the 
work of, say, Burke who writes that in the sublime ‘the mind is so entirely filled 
with its object that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that 
object . . .  it anticipates our reasonings and hurries us on by an irresistible 
force.’9 The sublime is not merely an irresistible power, it also presents an occa­
sion when the subject has an overwhelming experience of its own nullity, when the 
mind is literally robbed of its own powers. Yet at the same time, this annihilation of 
the subject is accompanied by the paradoxical expansion of the mind. Burke writes 
that the mind will always assimilate ‘some part of the dignity and importance of the
■=i
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things which it contemplates’ (pp. 50-1) a process which leads to ‘that glorifying 
and sense of inward greatness that always fills the reader of such passages in poets 
and orators as are sublime’ (p. 51). Hence the concept of the sublime has a 
dialectical structure, whereby the subject is robbed of its autonomy yet finds itself 
expanded by the same experience. It is a simultaneous negation and affirmation of 
the subject, a feature incorporated into the German tradition from Kant onwards.
Turning to Kant the crucial passage with which to begin is the ‘Analytic of 
the Sublime’ in the 3rd Critique where he describes the feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure aroused by the sublime in nature. In particular the key is the discussion 
of the dynamically sublime in § 28. The judgement of the dynamically sublime oc­
curs when we are confronted by a natural object whose overwhelming power has 
the capacity for annihilating our sensuous existence: ‘Hence the aesthetic judgement 
can only deem nature a might, and so dynamically sublime, in so far as it is looked 
upon as an object of fear.’ This is not to imply, however, that we are actually 
threatened by the object, for then we would be more concerned with self- 
preservation than with judging its sublimity. Above all one must be able to ‘look 
upon an object as fearful, and yet not be afraid of it,’ in other words one must be 
able to imagine oneself being in a situation where one would be in a state of fear, 
without actually being in fear of the natural object. The reason for this is that 
accompanying our affective response (i.e. non-conceptual) to the object and the 
concomitant estimation of our physical helplessness in facing it, is the disclosure of 
our capacity to transcend the omnipotence of nature such that we are no longer 
concerned with natural needs and quotidian interests, and hence feel no longer 
subject to it. Kant notes that ‘we also found in our rational faculty another non- 
sensuous standard . . .  in comparison with which everything in nature is small.’ 
It is a parallel to the mathematical sublime where our feeling of displeasure at the 
inability of the imagination to form an adequate intuition of a colossal object, for 
example the Milky Way, is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure due to our 
capacity to form a ‘logical estimation’ of its overwhelming magnitude.
This disclosure of a super-sensuous faculty which can transcend the 
concerns of our physical being and exercise free will in the face of necessity, points 
toward morality, and within the architectonic of Kant’s system this is precisely the 
function that aesthetic judgement fulfils, namely that of a bridge between represen­
tation and moral action. Indeed Kant himself is anxious to stress this connection in 
order to defend himself against the charge that since the danger is only imaginary 
the sublime is a matter of ‘little seriousness’ , and hence the relation between the 
sublime and morality needs a little more explanation.
In the introduction to the 3rd Critique Kant stresses that judgement 
mediates between the two otherwise heterogeneous spheres of morality and
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cognition, or practical and theoretical reason. In the latter, Kant notes, ‘Concepts of 
nature contain the ground of all theoretical cognition a priori and rest . . . upon 
the legislative authority of understanding , whereas in the former the concept of 
freedom . . . rests upon that of reason’ (p. 15). In the ‘Analytic of the Sublime’ 
he notes too that the Imagination, which in the aesthetic judgement engenders a 
pleasurable and harmonious interplay between the faculties of reason and un­
derstanding, achieves its effect partly through dependence on the physical condi­
tions of the judging subject, but also partly in accordance with the ideas of reason, 
which exercises free will in the act of judgement. Hence although the aesthetic 
judgement is a universal one (i.e. is not completely arbitrary), and demands univer­
sal assent, it is at the same time subjectively universal. As an instrument of reason, I
aesthetic judgement cannot be reduced to an objectively determined set of rules.
Now while the Beautiful may maintain this delicately maintained balance between 
the Understanding and Reason, with neither gaining the upper hand, in the judge­
ment of the Sublime, the balance tips firmly towards pure Reason. No longer gov­
erned by the conceptually bound interests of our sensuous existence, we can turn to 
the super-sensuous standards of pure Reason.
This super-sensuous standard [MaBstab] is nothing other than the moral 
law, and judging sublimity discloses our nature as moral beings, who can obey, 
moreover are obliged to obey, the moral law in the exercise of free will, and Kant 
acknowledges that ‘the intellectual and intrinsically final (moral) good, estimated 
aesthetically, instead of being represented as beautiful must rather be represented as |
sublime’ (§ 29). Thus Kant regards as sublime too the waging of war, provided it 
is waged for the sake of moral duty rather than self-interest. For it reveals the 
capacity of humans to pay scant regard to their physical welfare in order to fulfil 
their higher obligations to their moral, rational self . One notes he is explicitly 
drawing out the tension between the finitude of humans as natural beings and the 
infinitude of the demands of the moral law, and as such seems to be regarding the 
aesthetic experience of the sublime as something amounting to a call to authenticity, 
though the notion of authenticity would, strictly speaking, have little place in 
Kant’s project.
Kant’s account of aesthetic experience is highly ambiguous, despite the ap­
parent clarity which the above exposition might suggest. Occupying a mediating 
position between the psychologising theories of taste of Hutcheson, Shaftesbury 
and Burke on the one hand, and the fully-blown philosophies of art of the German 
Romantics, Hegel and Idealism on the other, it remains unclear whether Kant is de­
scribing subjective or objective phenomena. What initially seems to be a subjective 
psychology of aesthetic experience becomes compromised by his analysis of the
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properties of the object which are relevant to judgements of taste, an ambiguity 
which provokes the critical response of, amongst others, Schiller.
Dissatisfied with the ambiguous status of the notion of subjective universal­
ity in the Kantian sublime, Schiller attempts to establish an objective ground for the 
experience of the sublime such that it can be reproduced at will. Indeed it is tragic 
drama which in his eyes can engender a feeling of the sublime unmatched by nature 
itself, and the sublime changes, in the hands of Schiller, from a merely subjective 
experience to an objectively determinable feature of trag ed y .T h e  disinterested 
self, that from a safe spectatorial distance passes an aesthetic judgement on the 
sublime, becomes in Schiller quite literally the spectator in a theatre.
I shall not discuss Schiller’s better known works, but rather examine his 
shorter essays on the sublime and tragedy, including ‘On the Sublime’ , ‘On the 
Basis of the Enjoyment of Tragic Objects’ , and ‘On Tragic Art’ In many re­
spects Schiller offers little in these essays that deviates substantially from Kant’s 
position, but he does discuss the dynamic sublime more extensively than Kant and 
in terms which, although dressed up in the moral language of the Enlightenment, 
look forward to Nietzsche's Birth o f Tragedy . In Schiller’s essays the sublime has 
become less an epistemological and moral problem than an existential challenge. At 
the beginning of On the Sublime he outlines the human existential condition thus 
‘This is the case of Man. Surrounded by innumerable powers which are all superior 
to him and which play a game of mastery over him, he demands, through his nature 
[i.e. as the one being that can exercise free will] to suffer at the hands of no force’
(SW vol. 21 p. 38). Continuing further, Schiller notes that culture, whose goal is 
to enable the exercise of free will, has devised two ways to escape this 
predicament. The first, which he terms ‘physical culture’, is to achieve mastery 
over nature through science and learning. In the supreme act of will to power 4
mankind kind seeks to redress the imbalance of forces by turning the forces of 
nature into ‘tools of his own will’ (p. 39). Yet as he notes, this strategy is a limited 
one, for there are limits to what science can achieve. Inevitably the forces of nature ü
will ‘evade human power, and subject him to their own’ (ibid.). The alternative 
strategy which culture has devised, so-called ‘moral culture’, is to transcend al­
together the natural world, to abrogate the physical aspect of human existence. This 
moral education, which discloses the moral, rational and supersensuous self can be 
enhanced by appeal to the aesthetic tendency within us whereby our true nature can 4
be ‘aroused by certain sensuous objects, and cultivated towards this Idealist change 
in disposition by purification of one's feelings ‘ (p. 40).
Having established the pivotal role of sensuous objects, and Schiller later 
sees art as a supplement to nature in the task of moral education, he goes on rigor­
ously to distinguish between ‘merely’ beautiful and sublime objects. Above all
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Schiller warns against becoming too attached to the sensuous form of the beautiful 
object. The feeling of freedom offered by the beautiful object is illusory; it provides 
pleasure because it harmonises nature with reason, and hence tempts us to make the f
same mistake as the scientists in ‘wanting to bring this arbitrary chaos of phenom- |
ena into the unity of cognition* (p. 48). In other words beautiful works of art (‘fine 4
arts’ Schiller calls them in On the Basis o f the Pleasure the Enjoyment o f Tragic 
Objects ) are deceptive through their luring us into too great an attachment to the 
world of sensuous form, a world where we allow ourselves to become enslaved 
once again by the overwhelming forces of nature. Thus the task of moral education 
must be carried out by the sublime work of art (Schiller terms such works the 
‘emotive arts’ in On the Basis ), the work of art which although a sensuous object 4
must efface itself as such, a work where ‘reason and sensuousness are not in ac- #
cord’ (p. 43), a work which as in Kant discloses our super-sensuous nature by 
sensuous means. Schiller adds: ‘The sublime therefore creates for us a way out of 
the sensuous world, a world where the Beautiful would like to keep us forever ^
prisoner . . . often a single sublime emotion suffices to tear apart this web of 
deception’ (p. 45). As such it is a work which, far from seeking to shelter us from 4
the suffering caused by the overwhelming powers of the contingent, natural world, 
rather confronts us with them: it is a mimesis of the destructive forces at large in the 
realm of the sensuous; ‘Our salvation does not lie in ignorance of the dangers be­
leaguering us, for this ignorance must eventually ceases, but only through acquain­
tance with them. We are helped to this acquaintance by the terrible, magnificent 
spectacle of change, which destroys everything, then creates it again, then destroys 
it all again . . . which history displays in adequate measure, and which tragic art 
mimetically brings before our eyes’ (p. 52).i3
It is also this affirmative catharsis accompanying destruction which explains 
the peculiar attraction that fear and pain seem to exercise on humans as a whole.
Schiller notes in On Tragic Art that the degree of pleasure obtained from an affect 
seems to be in inverse proportion to the agreeableness of its content; ‘Everyone 
presses around the narrator of a murder tale; we devour the most fantastic ghost 
story with ever greater enthusiasm the more our hair stands on end’ (SW vol. 20 p.
148).
Following Kant, Schiller sees this encounter with the sublime as a shatter­
ing event. The nullity of the subject’s sensuous existence is revealed, causing a 4
feeling of depression [Unlust], together with the revelation of the subject’s super- 
sensuous, literally super-natural self, a realisation which is the cause of elation 
[Lust], and hence we see preserved the dialectical structure of the sublime as inher­
ited from, amongst others, Burke. Naturally that art form which elicits these two 
responses simultaneously par excellence is tragedy, for on the tragic stage is per­
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formed the annihilation of one or more human beings, only to bring us to a higher 
awareness of our nature. It is the poetic genre which, as Schiller writes in On the 
Basis o f the Enjoyment o f Tragic Objects manages to ‘delight us through pain’
(SW vol. 20 p. 140). As if to capitalise on this insight Schiller lists a number of ex­
amples from tragedy where dramatic heroines and heroes achieve a moral sublimity 
in the face of overwhelming adversity in the physical, indeed figures who in the 
most extreme cases display an active will to self-destruct in their refusal to submit 
to sensuous contingency.
In tracing the transition from Kant to Schiller we notice a shift in emphasis.
Although the basic structure of the sublime remains constant, there are certain 
differences which leave Schiller closer to Nietzsche, as will be apparent later. The 
most important difference between Schiller and Kant is that the former places the 
sublime firmly within the sphere of the cultural; the response to the tension between 
on the one hand, the finitude of subjective sensibility, and the demand to be able to 
exercise free will on the other, is now a cultural responsibility. As such it falls to art 
to articulate this problem and provide a satisfying resolution. Beautiful art, while 
appealing to the aesthetic ‘tendency’ within humans cannot do this, for it tempts the 4
spectator to linger in the realm of the sensuous. Instead the beautiful must be allied 4
with the sublime, in order to efface itself, to point toward that which exceeds repre­
sentation.
Before relating the above discussion to Nietzsche’s Birth o f Tragedy I 
shall examine one further theory of the sublime which preserves much of the Kan­
tian and Schillerian discourse while at the same time emptying it of its Enlighten­
ment moralising. I am referring to Schopenhauer, who occupies a pivotal position ^
as mediator between Idealism and the Romantics on the one hand, and the young I
Nietzsche on the other. For Schopenhauer aesthetic experience (and that of the #
sublime in particular) constitutes that enlightened state where one achieves insight 
into the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, dominated by the principium 'û
individuationis and the will-to-live. It is an insight which reveals the autonomous I
self for what it is: a self-objectification of the Will and nothing besides, a mere #
nullity. This dissolution of individuality which occurs in the act of aesthetic 
contemplation, where one savours the prospect of one's own extinction, shows the §
fear of suffering and death too, to be illusory, bound as they are to the notions of 4
selfhood and self-interest. Fear of death is entirely irrational for Schopenhauer, 
since death serves merely to restore one to one's true, subjectless, state. 4
The sublime in particular renders the turn to aesthetic, will-less, contempla­
tion all the more shattering since one is literally forced to wrench oneself free of 
considerations of self-preservation and desire. Contrary to the sublime object in 
Kant, sublimity for Schopenhauer presents the beholder with a spectacle whose
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threat to his continued phenomenal, bodily existence is actual. Schopenhauer 
writes: ‘with the sublime, that state of pure knowing is obtained first of all by a 
conscious and violent tearing away from the relations of the same object to the will 
which are recognised as unfavourable, by a free e x a lta tio n .T h is  state of pure 
knowing can be obtained either by being confronted by a hostile spectacle (i.e.
Kant’s dynamical sublime), and Schopenhauer gives the example of a desert, or by 
an encounter with the absolutely great (the mathematical sublime). As an illustration 
of this latter type of experience Schopenhauer offers the following: ‘If we lose our­
selves in contemplation of the infinite greatness of the universe in space and time .
. . we feel ourselves reduced to nothing . . . But against such a ghost of our 
own nothingness . . . there arises the immediate consciousness that all these 
worlds exist in our representation . . . our dependence on it is now annulled by 
its dependence on us’ (WWR vol. I p. 205).
In the same tradition as Schiller, Schopenhauer sees tragedy as the art form 
which best facilitates experience of the sublime, and like Schiller before him, char­
acterises the essence of tragedy as the mimesis of human catastrophe, which in «
Schopenhauer's thought is an epiphenomenon of the Will itself in its blind, pur­
poseless striving. In particular, Schopenhauer devotes section 51 of the first vol­
ume of The World as Will and Representation to an extensive account of the func­
tion of poetry and its place within his metaphysical system.
Tragedy is ‘the description of the terrible side of life. The unspeakable pain, 
the wretchedness and misery of mankind . . .  It is the antagonism of the Will 
with itself’ (WWR I p. 252). At the same time the depth of suffering, the insidious 
wickedness which is the object of tragic mimesis serves to tear away the veil of the 
Maya, to expose the deceptive truth of the principium individuationis. As 
Schopenhauer says ‘The motives that were previously so powerful now lose their 
force, and instead of them, the complete knowledge of the real nature of the world, 
acting as a quieter of the will, produces resignation, the giving up not merely of 
life, but of the will-to-live itself’ (WWR I p. 253). For this reason too it is wrong,
Schopenhauer notes, to demand poetic justice. To demand this would be to restrict 
oneself to the concerns of the phenomenal world, to assume that the individual soul 
of the tragic hero deserves justice. The wisdom of tragedy is to render such 
demands obsolete and absurd.
In the first volume of The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer 
is keen to ridicule any notion of a self as substance; and hence the ultimate paradox 
of tragedy is that it should provide a consolation for us by offering the disintegra­
tion of our own egos in the form of a dramatic spectacle. In the second volume, 
there are indications that he tends towards a more Idealist position, albeit without 
the moral imperative accompanying both Kant's and Schiller's notions of the self. 4
- S— -c e  ----1 .
77
For in the section on poetry in the later volume he remarks that ‘precisely in this 
way we become aware that there is still left in us something different that we cannot 
possibly know positively, but only negatively, as that which does not will life’
(WWR II p. 433). This is one isolated remark though, and one should beware of 
laying too much emphasis on it, for the general outline of Schopenhauer’s position 
a further shift away from the original formulation of the sublime. Schopenhauer has 
now rejected the dialectical structure of the concept; whereas it had hitherto 
involved moments of negation and affirmation, sublimity in his thought no longer 
contains any affirmation of the subject. I shall be arguing that The Birth o f Tragedy 
represents an attempt to answer both the naive metaphysics of the tradition from 
Burke, Kant and Schiller, though an answer which avoids the Nihilistic 
consequences of Schopenhauer, who in many respects employs the theory of the 
sublime in order to turn it on its head.
The World as Aesthetic Phenomenon
In the previous section I have mapped out the discourse of the sublime laying 
special emphasis on the tragic as a privileged locus of understanding, where the 
usual categories of knowing are pushed to their limits then revealed for what they 
are, namely schematic forms of representation. In all three philosophers discussed 
this knowledge can only be disclosed when the sensory aspects of human existence 
are stretched to the limit, whether it be through mortal threat to our sensuous 
selves, or the inability of the imagination to provide an intuition adequate to a §
particular concept. In all cases there is revealed an aspect to human being exceeding 
sensuous finitude, one transcending the boundaries of the phenomenal world. 
Simultaneously, this knowledge is seen by Schiller and Schopenhauer to offer a 
solution to certain existential dilemmas. For Schiller it is the problem of reconciling 
the demand to exercise free will with the empirical fact that as embodied beings we 
are surrounded by natural forces far superior to ourselves. For Schopenhauer it is %
the matter of coming to terms with the meaningless suffering which lies at the root 3
of all phenomenal existence. Assiduously avoiding the Christian impulse to give 
suffering a meaning, i.e. as the atonement for original sin, he prefers the deeper 
insight that fear of suffering and pain is misplaced. Unlike the theodicy of Greek 
tragedy Schopenhauer's sublime represents an algodicy, to borrow Peter 
Sloterdijk’s n e o l o g i s m , i.e. an attempt to come to terms with the problem of pain 
after the death of God. The key to all these thinkers lies in the category of the %
sublime, a category which combines beautiful sensuous form with the recognition 
that this form is itself only a phenomenal representation, or objectification, of
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another underlying metaphysical reality. Having dealt with these earlier thinkers it 
is now time to turn to Nietzsche and set him in relation to these other theories.
If one follows even the most conservative account of Nietzsche's epistemo- I
logical critique, of necessity the function of the sublime as described above will be 4
somewhat modified. Talk of revealing the real essence of the world, of tearing >
asunder the veil of the Maya, or of the disclosure of the immortal super-sensuous 4
self can have no place within The Birth o f Tragedy . Although this work is still 
permeated, as Nietzsche later admits, with the vocabulary of Schopenhauer and 4
‘reeks offensively Hegelian’ (KSA 6 p. 310), it has to be discussed against the 4
background of the approximately contemporary essay ‘On Truth and Lie in their 
Extramoral Sense’, with which I began my analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of f
metaphysics. Additionally it has to be related to those NachlaB writings of the early 
1870’s which indicate the extent to which Nietzsche has already distanced himself 
from the metaphysics of his inspiration, Schopenhauer.
As we have seen, there is even in Nietzsche's earliest work a refusal to ac- |
cept any metaphysical notions of essence or any distinctions between essence and 
appearance, essentia and existentia. Individuals inhabit a world of representations, 
to remain entrapped within a semiotic universe, and herein lies the paradox of 
trying to understand a universe which is recognised to have no intrinsic meaning­
fulness. The closest they can come to understanding the ‘indecipherable’ reality is #
to see it as a goalless, insatiable, self-consuming will along the lines of Schopen- 4
hauer. Yet even to declare that the world and its suffering are meaningless is in it­
self to make a meaningful statement. Notions of meaninglessness are already tied to 
a particular set of meanings, to a specific conceptual history, enmeshed within a 
certain configuration of values. In Schopenhauer's case it is as the determinate 
negation of the Christian and Hegelian teleological notions of a purposeful uni- |
verse. This realisation is apparent in The Birth o f Tragedy too when the ‘truth’ of 
existence cannot be conveyed directly, but has to be mediated in the form of a 
myth, that of King Midas’ encounter with Silenus. Indeed the most powerful way 
of expressing this lack of meaning in the world which Nietzsche uses is not to 
attempt to name it at all but instead to describe the feeling of nausea which results 
once one has seen the elaborate of meaning humankind has created for what it is.
He writes ‘In this sense the Dionysian person is similar to Hamlet: both have once 
cast a true glance into the nature of things, they have gained knowledge, and it 
nauseates them to undertake any action, for their action can change nothing in the 
eternal nature of things, they find it laughable or ignominious’ (KSA 1 p. 56-7).
In the light of these remarks it becomes clear that within the framework al­
ready apparent in the early Nietzsche's thought, the sublime is no longer simply a 
means to overcoming the limitation of human embodiment through the disclosure of
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the metaphysical super-sensuous truth underlying all phenomenal existence. As I 
shall demonstrate shortly, the function of the sublime in Nietzsche is analogous to 
that in the thinkers already discussed inasmuch as it dispels the aura of representa­
tion which Schiller had already warned against. However it provides metaphysical 
consolation not so much by revealing some metaphysical ‘truth’ but by offering an 
existential challenge, thus avoiding the resignationism inherent in Schopenhauer’s 
account. In my first chapter I had already suggested that Nietzsche does not criticise 
the conceptual apparatus of metaphysical thinking merely to score philosophical 
points, but out of a desire to go beyond the reactive Nihilism he sees as a necessary 
consequence of metaphysics. It is a concern with spiritual health, and hence too his 
paradoxical use of Christian and medical imagery to describe both societies and 
moral codes. Consequently in The Birth o f Tragedy it is not merely a matter of 
types of representation, but rather of choosing the appropriate ethical and existential 
response to the challenge which tragedy lays before its spectators. In this respect, 
and before continuing further this line of discussion, one must secondly consider 
Nietzsche's statement that ‘only as an aesthetic phenomenon can existence and the 
world eternally be justified’ (KSA 1 p. 47).
There are two, by no means necessarily mutually exclusive, ways of inter­
preting this phrase. The first, looking forward to Nietzsche's later insistence on the 
fictional status of logic and scientific knowledge, assumes that for Nietzsche indi­
vidual and societal existence can only be rendered endurable if we remember that 
the world we inhabit is a fiction. By this Nietzsche would be referring to the ety­
mology of fiction from ‘fingere’ - make, to designate the world as the product of a 
constitutive consciousness. Though not wanting to make the human subject the 
transcendent ground of the world as a system of significations, Nietzsche is clearly 
making explicit what is latent in Kant's Critical Project, namely that the interpreter, 
far from finding a pre-existent reality, in fact produces that reality .H ence accord­
ing to this interpretation of Nietzsche's assertion one need not feel oppressed by the 
strait-jacket of Christian and bourgeois morality, since they themselves are manu­
factured values, and can be, indeed should be replaced by other, more self-critical é
and hence authentic ones.
Alternatively one can interpret him as claiming that it is only through aes­
thetic objects, and here Nietzsche means works of art, that the world and human 
life can be redeemed. The passage which immediately precedes the one under 
discussion can be adduced to support such a reading, for Nietzsche writes ‘we may 
well assume of ourselves that . . .  we have our highest worth in works of art - for 
only as an aesthetic phenomenon can existence and the world eternally be justified’
(ibid.). Nietzsche's inclusion of the words ‘higher worth’ in this passage points 
towards that dialectic of negation and affirmation characteristic of earlier accounts
' ’ - '  ■ 'û  ........
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of the sublime we have seen. For thus the work of art would be thought of as offer­
ing a perspective on the world and the human existential condition which discloses 
a capacity within individuals to relate to their representations in a manner free of the 
ideology of metaphysics. By this is meant the capacity to disengage from one’s av­
erage ‘everyday’ absorption in signs, in order to gain a deeper insight into their 
status as constituents of a web of signs. If this interpretation is valid, and Niet- 4
zsche's mention of works of art in the plural might not be insignificant in this re­
spect, we have a much more low level aesthetic concern. As in the case of Schiller «
and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche seems to be awarding a special status to tragic works 
of art, as aesthetic objects which provide an insight inaccessible to the scientific 
world view, one which provides a temporary release from the nausea of quotidian 
life.
So far I have only tentatively suggested that one move in this direction, yet |
a further examination reveals passages which are much more explicit, and allow us |
to feel quite entitled to link Nietzsche's book with the theory of the sublime. In par­
ticular, section seven, which deals with the function of the tragic chorus, quite 4
openly speaks of the sublime in Greek tragedy, the relevant section being worth 
quoting in its entirety; ‘Here, in this highest danger of the will, there approaches, as 
a redeeming, healing enchantress, art; it alone can turn those nauseous thoughts I
about the horror and the absurdity of existence into representations with which one 
can live: these are the sublime, as the artistic harnessing of the horrific, and the 
comic, as the artistic breaking of the nausea of the absurd’ (KSA 1 p. 57). As if 
this were insufficient evidence Nietzsche notes earlier in the same section that 
tragedy provides the one true ‘metaphysical consolation . . . that at the bottom of 
things life, despite all apparent change, is indestructibly powerful and joyful’ (ibid. 4
p. 56). These are motifs which will reappear in due course. However, having dealt 
with preliminary aspects of this interpretation it is now time to go into greater detail.
Contrary to de Man one can argue that the basic assumption underpinning 
The Birth o f Tragedy and the logic of the Apollinian and Dionysian opposition, is 
the acceptance that the world. Being, existence, reality, truth, whichever term one 
chooses, can never appear as such. Since truth is a function of grammar knowledge 
would be a discursive relation of the form ‘/? is q ‘, an operation which also creates 
an intelligible w o r l d . D  Moreover as I have suggested in the account of the dialectic 
of interpretation in chapter one, although one can attach ever more predicates to the 
world of experience, although one can interpret it on the basis of ever wider per­
spectives, rendering it ever more determined and complex, with the implicit goal of 
exhausting the total possibilities available, Nietzsche recognises that this Hegelian 
attitude is simply not possible. The dialectic of knowledge presents an infinite task, 
for the world cannot be reduced to any number of predicates that can be attached to
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it or to the number of interpretations which can be made of it. However, this repre- &
senting activity nevertheless answers a number of ethical and existential demands "
which preoccupied the early Nietzsche, responding to the figure of Schopenhauer. |
These concern the possibility of attaching value to the world once it is recognised as 4
denuded of intrinsic meaning, as a site of unmitigated suffering, in the absence of 
any Hegelian redemption of history. We know the Schopenhauerian response to 
these questions, one characterised by an attitude of resignation. That of Nietzsche is 
of course quite the opposite, for his rejection of Schopenhauer’s reactive Nihilism 
is undertaken in the name of a will-to-live (which will later be superseded by will to 
power), and in The Birth o f Tragedy he is exploring the forms of representation 
which can go beyond the Schopenhauerian passivity he will later condemn so 
definitively.
The first way to further the will-to-live is to create a world of beauty, from 
which the nausea of life, the fear of meaninglessness, is banished. I am speaking of 
course of the Apollinian artistic impulse which echoes Schiller’s remarks noted f
above concerning ‘physical culture’. This is the world of forms which seduce with |
their beauty, becoming themselves objects of desire, such as to elicit the response 
‘It is a dream ! I want to dream further ! ’ (KSA 1 p. 27). In a later portion of the 
text which ironically borrows heavily from Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory Niet- |
zsche sums up the aim of the Apollinian thus; ‘here Apollo conquers the suffering 
of the individual through the illuminating glorification of eternal appearance, here 
beauty gains victory over the suffering which permeates life’ (KSA 1 p. 108).
Drawing on Schopenhauer's equation of beauty with knowledge of the timeless -g
Platonic Idea^^, Nietzsche observes how Apollinian representation, manifest pri- 4
marily in myth, strives towards a denial of the temporal, a denial which he more­
over claims facilitates political life. For once a people has failed to understand itself 
in terms of timeless myth, it undergoes a crisis of self-estimation, a condition 
which prepares the ground for the advent of Nihilism. He writes, ‘A people is only 
worthy, as is also a person, for as long as it can impress upon its experiences the 
mark of the eternal. . . and displays its unconscious conviction of the relativity of 
time’ (KSA 1 p. 148). As Nietzsche notes, the beautiful finds itself symbolised by 
Apollo, the etymology of whose name can be traced back to notions of appearing 
and shining [der Scheinende]. This is the world of forms which supplement the 
contingent, fragmentary and arbitrary processes which rule everyday life. As Niet­
zsche says ‘The higher truth, the perfection of these states of affairs in contrast to 
the sketchy intelligibility of daily reality . . .  is the analogue both of the capacity 
for affirmation and of the arts in general, whereby life is made possible and worth 
living’ (KSA 1 p. 27). Hence the Apollinian form (and the beautiful work of art is 
a mimesis of this natural impulse) supplements the essential lack or negativity at the
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base of existence, a lack which Schopenhauer had defined as the blind desire of the 
Will but which Nietzsche refuses to name as such .
Having established these basic elements of the Apollinian drive, Nietzsche 
then goes on to flesh out in concrete terms how this manifests itself in the world of 
the Greeks. Both in its poetic form and in its mythological content Greek culture |
succeeded in banishing the nauseous from its cultural consciousness, instead hiding 
it under the mask of the olympian pantheon and the Homeric epic. Indeed one can 
conduct an archaeology of Greek mythology and see the sedimentation of different 
layers of Greek consciousness. For Nietzsche claims that the mythic victory of the 
‘light’ Olympian gods over the titans mirrors the actual historical censorship exer­
cised by the Greeks on themselves. ‘In order to live, the Greeks had to create these 
gods, out of the direst need . . .  the joyful olympian divine order was developed 
gradually from the original, titanic divine order of terror by that Apollinian impulse 
to beauty’ (KSA 1 p. 36).
In the Homeric poems we see too a reflection of this same drive to transfig­
uration. What Rousseau had seen as a ‘natural’ and authentic harmony of humans 
with their environment, the nostalgia for which Schiller terms ‘naive’, turns out to 
be the final victory of the Apollinian illusion. The apparent artlessness of the 
Homeric poems is produced by the ability of the epic to hide its own illusory na­
ture. The simulacrum of the epic poem has displaced the ‘Real’, and in its 
transfigurative function has become the desired object, desired because of its ability i
to make good the primordial lack. Nietzsche says of the Greeks ‘in order to idealise 
themselves, they had to see their reflection in a higher sphere. . .  This is the sphere 
of beauty, where they saw their reflected images, the Olympians. With this 
reflection of beauty the Hellenic “Will” fought against the artistically correlative 
talent for suffering . . .  ’(KSA 1 p. 37-8). Hence the world of the Greeks is lifted 
up, in Homer, out of its condition of everyday anxiety and suffering into the time­
less, eternally laughing world of the Olympians.
This self-effacement of the art work, which naturalises what is an illusory 
product of art (in the sense of both art-ificial and art-istic) is to be found repeated in 
the ideology of the pastoral, which Nietzsche notes to be an essential element in 
modern culture. It is an image of nature which refuses to acknowledge its own 
imaginary status, but rather claims to disclose the ‘natural’, unaffected by the trap­
pings of civilisation as in the naive optimism of Rousseau. Nietzsche notes ‘That 
idyllic shepherd of modem Man is merely a portrait of the sum of educational illu­
sions which count for him as nature’ (ibid.).
In all his remarks concerning the beautiful, or the Apollinian, Nietzsche is 
in many respects echoing the ideas of Schiller. Schiller had noted the danger of 
lingering too long on the merely beautiful representation, in that it makes us overly
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dependent on its sensuous form. The goal of aesthetic education was to employ the 
sensuous representation in order to go beyond such that a higher truth might be 
disclosed. In Nietzsche too, although notions of the super-sensuous have no place 
in the narrative of The Birth o f Tragedy , the rule of the Apollinian, although a nec­
essary fiction, is a dangerous one when given free reign. The result is the poten­
tially dangerous exclamation Tt is a dream, I want to dream more.’ It represents 
only one side of the dialectic. Its attempts to censor the ineffable, no matter how 
rigorous, will eventually fail, and hence the other, Dionysian, drive will demand to 
be represented.
Within The Birth o f Tragedy there is a double negation of the Dionysian as 
part of the dialectic which creates Greek culture. The first negation, both logically 
and temporally, is what Sloterdijk in his book on Nietzsche terms ‘Dorian pre-cen­
sorship’. With this we are brought back to the problem of articulating the inarticu- 
lable. Before the entry of the Dionysian into Greek culture, it is already engaged in 
a dialectic with the Apollinian before the second sublation of the Dionysian and the 
Apollinian in tragedy itself.
The Dionysian, as preserved in the myths of the arrival of Dionysus in 
Greece from the East, originates from beyond the sphere of Greek culture, though 
Nietzsche is not interested in the facts concerning the historical origins of the cult of 
Dionysus. For Greek culture in The Birth o f Tragedy stands as a cipher for human 
culture in general, just as the Orient serves to symbolise the pre-cultural, by which 
is to be understood that stage of human existence prior to the capacity for the pro­
duction of discursive meaning in the world, and hence prior to the establishment of 
any specific régime of truth. This polarity of culture and the pre-cultural becomes 
clear through the terms Nietzsche uses to describe the Dionysian rites of Babylon, 
which represent a ‘regression of human to tiger or ape’ (KSA 1 p. 32). So too 
when he first introduces the Dionysian, Nietzsche stresses the fact that it trans­
gresses the boundaries between human and animal. He notes that ‘The chariot of 
Dionysus is covered in flowers and garlands: the panther and the tiger stride under 
his yoke . . .  all the stiff . . . distinctions fall apart’ (KSA 1 p. 29). The 
Dionysian represents the dissolution of the subject, or the principium individuatio­
nis as Nietzsche calls it, following Schopenhauer. Yet this condition is not a 
characteristic of a more authentic culture, and The Birth o f Tragedy is far from 
being an exercise in Rousseauesque nostalgia, indeed by the terms of its own 
argument, in its exposure of the ideology of pastoralism, it cannot be. This 
condition which Nietzsche is attempting to symbolise obtains prior to the birth of 
culture.
In its dissolution of all the barriers set up by culture this pre-Hellenic 
Dionysian state is what Nietzsche will later describe as ‘Becoming’ or ‘Life’.
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Strictly speaking one should not even call it the Dionysian, for the metaphor of the 
‘Dionysian’ which Nietzsche uses indicates that it has already been inserted into the j
symbolic order. In order to speak of the Dionysian, Dorian pre-censorship has al- i
ready taken place. Hence there is always already representation, humans are always |
captives of their semiotic universe. One might go even further and claim, against 
the orthodox view, that the Dionysian, as a metaphor for ‘reality’ is always i
secondary. To put it in mythological terms, the father of Dionysus is none other %
than Zeus, the head of the Olympian pantheon, and hence of the whole Apollinian |
order too. The sense of nausea which the human existential predicament produces, 4
and which the slick world of Apollinian forms and values endeavours to hide, is the 
result of a particular way of imagining the human condition. As Nietzsche develops 
his thoughts about art, knowledge and morality, we see that this nausea need never |
have existed. Not because it can be hidden by some reassuring illusion, but because 
it is itself a response to a prior illusory representation, namely, that an absence of 
stability in the world should make it an object of anxiety. Leaving behind the her- f
itage of Schopenhauerian Kulturpessimismus, art will later become a much more #
affirmative activity.
The arrival of the ‘Dionysian’, and the concomitant Dorian pre-censorship, 
is important for another reason too. To understand why and how we must look at 
the passage where Nietzsche describes this Dorian response to the Oriental intruder. i
He writes the following: ‘For a while they were completely secure and protected 
from the feverish stirrings of those (i.e. Dionysian) festivals . . .  by . . .  the figure jà
of Apollo, who could hold out Medusa’s head towards no more dangerous power 
than this grotesque and barbaric Dionysian force. It is in Doric art that the 4
Apollinian majestic posture of refusal has immortalised itself. Yet this resistance be­
came questionable, even impossible once similar impulses grew out of the deepest 
roots of Hellenic culture: now the power of the Delphic god was restricted to de­
priving this mighty opponent of his destructive weapons by an act of reconciliation, 
concluded at the right time. This reconciliation is the most important moment in the 
history of this Greek c u lt. . . ’ (KSA 1 p. 32). The crucial event in this semi- 
mythic, semi-historical narrative is the failure of the Apollinian impulse of Doric art 
to completely suppress the Dionysian drive. The relation between the two alters 
from one where the Dionysian is excluded, to a new relation of compromise, where 
Apollo is engaged solely in damage limitation. Dionysus has been awarded his 
place on Olympus.
Now underneath this mythology Nietzsche is making claims regarding the 
limitations of the Apollinian analogous to those of Schiller concerning the beautiful.
We recall that for Schiller the danger was of becoming too absorbed in the beauti­
ful, and hence too dependent on the sensuous, material world. If this occurs then
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one remains trapped in the world of the contingent, the demand to be able to exer­
cise free will remains unfulfilled. Thus when confronted with the fact of human 
sensuous finitude, even the beautiful form or work of art will eventually fail to 
provide metaphysical consolation. So too the purely Apollinian representation, al­
though it endeavours to create a world of illusory forms which banish any existen­
tial anxiety, cannot but fail in its task. As makers of meaning, humans will always 
come up against that limit, where the fragility of meaning is revealed, where its 
shaky foundations will finally give way. At this point the Apollinian must effect a 
compromise with the Dionysian recognition of the meaninglessness of the universe. 
Nietzsche writes of the Apollinian Greek, ‘his whole existence full of beauty and 
proportion rested on a hidden underground of suffering and the knowledge which 
was uncovered by the Dionysian. And look ! Apollo could not survive without 
Dionysus ! ’ (KSA 1 p. 40).
Having reached this stage of the argument, we also come up against the 
weaknesses of Nietzsche's own prose. For in interpreting Birth o f Tragedy one 
becomes aware of the sheer burden of meaning which Nietzsche imposes on his 
text. It attempts to be both mythological and historical, both philological and philo­
sophical. Above all there is an extraordinary seepage of meaning from the terms 
Apollinian and Dionysian. We have now concluded that the Apollinian, despite its 
seductive illusions, will be revealed for what it is, mere representation. Thereupon 
it must enter into a compromise with the deeper wisdom of the Dionysian. Yet as I 
have suggested above the Dionysian can only become an object of consciousness as 
an Apollinian representation. This too is narrated by the story of the Dorian pre­
censorship. Can the two be reconciled ? In spite of the difficulties which Nietzsche 
creates for the interpreter there are grounds for attempting a reconciliation of these 
two apparently contradictory statements.
The term ‘Apollinian’ has two meanings. The first refers to the human im­
pulse to make meaning wherever they find none. The Apollinian is the possibility 
of forming representations of the world. (I leave the nature of these representations 
deliberately indistinct, since although Nietzsche is most obviously implying works 
of art, the term could also include mental representations). The second meaning of 
Apollinian implies a specific kind of representation, namely one which attempts a 
false naturalisation of the human representing activity. It is a representation which 
refuses to acknowledge its status as such, but instead masquerades as reality. 
Hence it can be seen as a mis -representation.
If we turn to the Dionysian, then under the first meaning of the Apollinian, 
it too is an Apollinian representation. As I noted earlier, one would have to con­
clude that the Apollinian must in some sense be considered to be prior to the 
Dionysian. However, the Dionysian also refers to a type of representation, and it is
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in considering how this type representation differs from the Apollinian, and more­
over how it can be related to theories of the sublime. To understand how Dionysian 
representation differs from Apollinian, one must examine its function within Greek 
lyric and the dithyramb.
Within the history of Greek literature, the birth of lyric poetry in the figure 
of Archilochus is always regarded as an extraordinary event. For the first time there 
is an authorial voice which proclaims itself as such. Additionally, in the surviving 
fragments of Archilochus there appear to be elements of his own biography in­
cluded. One need only compare him with Homer, whose poems begin with an in­
vocation to the muse or the goddess to tell or sing the story to realise the difference.
In the Homeric poems the poet enacts a self-effacement by relegating himself to the 4
status of a mouthpiece of the narrating divinity, and then the authorial voice retreats 
into the background of the narrative, in a second self-effacing gesture.
Nietzsche, however, influenced by Schopenhauer whom he quotes at 
length, imagines there to be something more subtle at work. Far from presenting if
the fortified ego, the principium individuationis, for the first time in literary history 
through the strident subjectivity of the author, Archilochus is doing precisely the 
opposite. In portraying the lyric voice as one full of contradictions, paradoxes and 
conflicting desires, in short as a collection of heterogeneous elements, Archilochus #
is revealing the shortcomings of the notion of an individuated authorial voice. As 
Nietzsche says ‘The ‘F of the lyric poet thus resounds from the abyss of Being: his I'x‘subjectivity’, in the sense of the more recent aestheticians, is a delusion’ (KSA 1 |
p. 44). In other words Archilochus is using a representation of a strong authorial 
individual voice, and at the same time undermining the authority of that representa­
tion. One need not go as far as assuming that he is denying any notion of subjectiv­
ity per se, but rather, as I have suggested in my second chapter, of the strong, 4
neatly individuated rational subject. Nietzsche adds ‘In truth Archilochus, the man 
who is passionately fired by love and hate is merely a vision of genius, who is no 
longer Archilochus, but world genius, who expresses his primordial pain symboli­
cally through the allegory of Archilochus the person’ (KSA 1 p. 45).
In examining subjectivity in lyric, I am not interested in subjectivity per se, 
but rather in the importance it has for defining the Dionysian representation. Fol­
lowing Nietzsche’s account we can see that the lyric poet sets up a representation 
vested with authority (after all, who could be more authoritative about 
Archilochus's desires than Archilochus the poet ?) only then to reveal this represen­
tation to be just a representation, full of flaws and weaknesses. Thus the Dionysian 
representation seems to be performing a reflexive act, undermining its own status.
We can see, too, with regard to subjectivity how it is that Homer's poems are 
firmly entrenched within the realm of the Apollinian. For although the authorial
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voice effaces itself in the act of narrating, this is a deceptive, and superficial differ­
ence. More importantly within the poems, no representation is ever shown to be in­
adequate to its object. In particular the poems are dominated by unified, fortified 
egos, which survive unchanged after death. In the Odyssey Odysseus visits the 
underworld and encounters a number of figures who were living in the Iliad , and 
who are exactly the same, bar their lamentable circumstance. The souls of 
Agamemnon and Achilles are perfectly lucid and rational, a fact which provides 
their pathos.
Following this interpretation we can see clearly the difference between the 
Apollinian and Dionysian representation. Put quite simply, the Apollinian represen­
tation refuses to renounce its claim to be a surrogate reality, whereas the Dionysian 
representation performs the reverse operation, and draws attention to the fact that it 
is a representation. Already the descent of the Dionysian from the sublime is 
becoming clearer. To recapitulate, the sublime in Kant and Schiller, though not in 
Schopenhauer, described the feeling engendered by an aesthetic object which 
pointed towards the inadequacy of sensuous representation or the human sensuous 
condition, but simultaneously disclosed the higher, super-sensuous truth of the 
self. It was a feeling of pain and pleasure intermingled. In Nietzsche, such human­
ist talk of the moral higher super-sensuous self is anomalous, yet the function of 
the Dionysian is similarly aimed at revealing the limitations of representation. In the 
terms of Nietzsche's critique of Schopenhauer's essentialism, there can be no direct 
comparison of the representation and the true metaphysical ‘essence’ of the world. 
At best it can be done purely negatively, as in the lyric of Archilochus, by disclos­
ing the paradoxes and self-contradictions at work within the object.^^
Having thus suggested a way of differentiating the Apollinian and the 
Dionysian, one must go further and examine how these two forms of representing 
occur in tragedy, and how it is that tragedy can become an affirmative art, given the 
stress hitherto on the purely negative aspects of Nietzsche's sublime.
Nietzsche begins his discussion of tragedy proper with an analysis of the 
historic origin of the tragic form, in the main following Aristotle's genealogy of 
tragedy, who traces it back to the dithyramb, a primitive narrative verse form, of 
which no examples survive. This retrieval of the satyric chorus of course represents 
a return to the strictly Dionysian origins of drama, where the satyr acts as the 
counterpart of the Apollinian pastoral shepherd. One notes Dionysian, because the 
satyr shows all the illusions of culture for what they are; his is a primitive variety of 
Ideologiekritik. As Nietzsche says ‘The satyr was something sublime and divine . 
. . here the illusion of culture was wiped away from the archetypal idea of 
humanity’ (KSA 1 p. 58). Inasmuch as the satyr caused the ideologically permeated 
image of humanity to ‘shrink into a mendacious caricature’ (ibid.) the Dionysian
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satyr was more truthful, because less deceiving and self-deluding. Yet this alone 
did not constitute tragic drama, for this would place tragedy on the same level as 
lyric, as a product of the first entry of Dionysus into the representative order of 
Apollo. What occurs in tragedy is a second sublation of Apollo and Dionysus, but 
this time not Apollo in the sense of the capacity to render the world meaningful 4
through representations per se, but in the second sense of the drive to wilfully hide 
the world through beautiful forms. It is a classically Hegelian move, since both |
elements are negated and preserved at the same time, though neither is unchanged.
Formally the synthesis occurs with the introduction of action into the 
dithyramb, whereupon it becomes drama for the first time. Nietzsche envisages that 
the drama occurred when Dionysus appeared on stage rather than being the absent 
referent of the dithyrambic narrative. This moment represents the first element of 
the dialectic, for Dionysus now speaks in the language of Apollo: Nietzsche notes 
‘as an epic hero, almost in the language of Homer’ (KSA 1 p. 64). Keeping in line 
with the philological tradition, Nietzsche observes that originally tragedy was ex- |
clusively concerned with the sufferings of Dionysus, hence its restriction to the cel­
ebrations and festivals in his honour, but moreover adds that while in the extant 
tragedies the concerns seem to be with other mythical figures such as Heracles, the 
house of the Atreids, Medea and the like, it is certain ‘that all the famous figures of 
the Greek stage Prometheus, Oedipus etc. are merely masks of that original hero 
Dionysus’ (KSA 1 p. 71). In other words they are all symbols of the same phe­
nomenon, namely that beneath the illusory and beautiful forms of the Apollinian, 
there is another wisdom which recognises the suffering and nausea which 
acknowledgement of the meaninglessness of the world can engender.
With this conclusion we are brought back to the problematics which I noted 
earlier, namely the problem of reconciling the need for a meaningful universe with 
apparent lack of any system of values to offer security or certainty. We see this 
dramatically presented in Oedipus Tyrannos and Antigone , as well as in Aeschy­
lus’ Prometheus Bound , where the hero suffers punishment for an apparently in­
nocuous transgression of a completely arbitrary law, such that one is led to the 
conclusion that ‘Everything present at hand is just and unjust and in both cases 
equally justified’ (ibid.). However although the deceptive and self-satisfied 
Apollinian wisdom of Oedipus has been shown to be flawed, indeed with disas­
trous consequences, this is not a sufficient response. For were we to rest with the 
simple admission that our values are flawed, there would be the risk of he descent 
into Nihilism, a prospect which Nietzsche viewed with horror. The clue to the af­
firmative aspect of tragedy must be sought in section nine, which I shall quote at 
length. The subject of the passage is Oedipus ‘who is destined to error and misery 
in spite of his wisdom, but who through his monstrous suffering finally exercises
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a magical beneficent force, which remains potent after his departure. The noble per­
son does not sin, the profound poet intends to say: through his action every law, 
every natural order, indeed the moral world may well go to ground, yet precisely 
by virtue of this action a higher magical circle of effects is drawn, which found a 
new world on the ruins of the old one which has been toppled’ (KSA 1 p. 65).
Later on, when discussing the play Oedipus at Colonus which depicts the old 
Oedipus shortly before his death, Nietzsche informs us that ‘the hero performed his 
highest activity in his purely passive behaviour’ (KSA 1 p. 66).
Here, if anywhere Nietzsche comes closest to the language of more tradi­
tional theories of the sublime in tragedy. Although Oedipus is annihilated by forces 
beyond human comprehension, his fate is nevertheless not an ignoble one.
Through his passivity, through his willing acceptance of his fate he exudes an aura, 
and provides the impetus for others to reconstruct the world which has been torn |
apart by the events on stage. Like the Schillerian tragic hero, Oedipus refuses to be 
daunted by the coming calamity, but instead continues questioning about his own 
past, in attempt to save the city he rules. Moreover if one turns to Antigone one *
notes an actual will to self-destruct. Antigone refuses all the opportunities to save 
her life, and instead defiantly steers the same course into oblivion. So too 
Prometheus, who also features in the same section of the book, steals the gift of 
fire fully aware that he will be punished by the gods, thanks to his capacity for 
foreknowledge.
What one notes instantiated in all these examples is not a disclosure of some 
immortal soul which will survive, but simply the capacity to remained undaunted 
by the overwhelming powers of the world. Echoing Schiller, there is implicit in 
Nietzsche the belief that one can only truly render life bearable by confronting its 
most nauseating aspects. Schiller had emphasised the responsibility of moral 
culture to present a mimesis of nature at its worst in order to achieve genuine moral 
enlightenment. So too in The Birth o f Tragedy the annihilation of the tragic hero is 
a necessary process. By actually willing his or her downfall, the tragic hero can 
make light of the human existential predicament, in an act of sublime mockery of all 
that threatens to disrupt human life. For this reason too, though it remains 
undeclared, Nietzsche associates the sublime with the comic. Unlike 
Schopenhauer, who discourages laughter as a foolish affirmation of the will-to- 
live, Nietzsche sees the comic as a companion of the sublime, in its refusal to 
submit to the nausea of existence. Later in the text Nietzsche concludes in the same 
note that ‘Dionysian art too intends to convince us of the eternal joy of existence: 
only we are to seek it not in appearances, but behind them’ (KSA 1 p. 109), also 
repeating Schiller's reservations about attaching too much significance to the 
beautiful form. Hence we should express no surprise that Nietzsche should choose 4
J
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the absurdly comic figure of the satyr as the archetypal Dionysian symbol, nor that 
historically during the festival of Dionysus the tragic poet was always required to 
submit, in addition to three tragedies, a comic satyr play. Not as light relief after the 
draining effect of watching a trilogy of tragic dramas, but rather as an indication of 
the double aspect of the Dionysian. As Nietzsche says ‘The Olympian gods grew 
out of the smile of Dionysus, and humans out of his tears’ (KSA 1 p. 72).
With Nietzsche’s assertion of the internal unity of the tragic and the comic 
we are reminded of the theme of laughter which recurs throughout Nietzsche’s œu­
vre. One finds the theme announced in the very title oî Die Frohliche Wissenschaft 
, variously translated as the Gay or Joyful Science , and one finds it repeated 
within the text of that work, where Nietzsche speaks of the eternal comedy of exis­
tence’ (KSA 3 p. 372), commenting that the moralist ‘does not at all want us to 
laugh at existence, neither at ourselves nor at him’ (ibid. p. 371). One finds the 
theme prominent, too, in Thus Spake Zarathustra , as John Lippitt has recently 
shown.20 For the parable of the metamorphosis from camel to lion to child, with 
which Nietzsche opens the first book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is supplemented I
with Zarathustra’s declaration in the fourth book that ‘higher, stronger, more victo­
rious, more joyful men, such as are square-built in body and soul: laughing lions 
must come’ (KSA 4 p. 351) as a prelude to the advent of the child-like Übermen- 4
sch. Zarathustra asks, for example, ‘Who of you can both laugh and be elevated at Fi■Ïthe same time ? Whoever climbs onto the highest mountains laughs at all tragedies’ 4
(ibid. p. 49).
Nietzsche’s allusion to the theme of the comic in The Birth o f Tragedy , a 
theme which will have so much significance for his later thinking, once again re­
minds us of the debt his thinking owes to the theory of the sublime. Raimonda 
Modiano has pointed out^i the importance to the Romantics and to philosophers 
including Hegel and Vischer, of seeing the unity of the comic and the sublime, 
noting, for example, that ‘the comic needs the sublime for its survival, for other­
wise it would lose the very contrast between ideality and mundane existence which 
defines its special dialectical character’ (p. 241). So too in Nietzsche, the theme of 
laughter stems from the problematics of sublimity thrown up by the tragic world 
view, and is paradoxically invested with special significance. For Nietzsche com­
edy is a matter of great seriousness.
If we chose to rest with the above account, however, we would be entitled 
to regard Nietzsche as in some sense merely continuing the project bequeathed by 
Kant, Idealism, Romanticism and perhaps even Vischer (whom he mentions in the 
first Untimely Meditation ) albeit denuded of the Christian moral sentiment of those 
predecessors. Yet this would be solely to heed the Dionysian side of the equation.
The Apollinian side, which has been both negated and preserved, remains under-
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represented, and it is this which distinguishes Nietzsche's tragic theory from that of 
those others. It additionally provides a connection between this early work on 
tragedy and his later critique of metaphysics in the name of language and interpreta­
tion.
Commenting on the consequence of the tragic treatment of the Oedipus 
myth Nietzsche notes that in addition to the aura which Oedipus’ behaviour and 
destruction projects, and which might termed the feeling of the sublime elicited in #
the spectators, there is also an awareness to build anew on the foundations of the 
ruined world to which Oedipus belongs. With this architectural metaphor Nietzsche 
is articulating the position of those who are left over after the calamitous events 
have run their course, in other words, in the knowledge that the semiotic web of the 
universe is one which has limits, and given that we will inevitably come up against 
those limits, what is to be done ? Are we to follow the Oedipal ethic and embrace 
the pure negation of all semiosis, tout court ? As my account of Nietzsche’s con­
cerns in the first two chapters suggests, the answer would be no, and for two prin­
ciple reasons.
First, in The Birth o f Tragedy as well as in his more specifically anti-meta­
physical work Nietzsche repeatedly stresses the impossibility of renouncing all 
forms of normativity. What enhances life is not the absence of norms, perspectives 
and so forth, but rather the self-conscious adoption of certain perspectives over oth­
ers, and as we have seen, what is so problematic about metaphysics is not the fact 
that it is a perspective, but that it is a narrow one, allowed to become ossified. This 
is why the ‘death of god’, to borrow Nietzsche’s metonym, is greeted by many not 
as so much liberation, but rather with a distinct sense of horror evolving into pas­
sive Nihilism. Thus after the dramatic catastrophe there must take place an act of re­
construction and rebuilding. The loss of one perspective anticipates only the estab­
lishment of another, more life enhancing one. As I have argued in the last chapter, 
the free spirit is not one that gives itself up entirely to non-sense, but rather one that 
lives perpetually on the edge between meaning and non-meaning, and it is this abil­
ity to conduct life as an experiment (Nietzsche uses the word ‘Versuch’) which is to 
be seen as a mark of strength.
Second, there occurs in tragedy the highly symbolic act of expulsion which 
excludes the tragic hero from the sphere of the social. Sublime ridicule of the hu­
man condition may be possible for the rare individual, such as Prometheus or Oedi­
pus, but it is not possible for the whole community. The parallels between the 
tragic hero and the Übermensch should be quite clear. For example, upon reve­
lation that Oedipus’ fate has been fulfilled, he is literally cast out from the com­
munity, so that the city can continue to exist. In other words the continued presence 
of Oedipus within Thebes threatens to disrupt the entire social order. As Jean-Pierre
I
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Vemant notes, Oedipus ‘is from then on “apolis”; he incarnates the figure of the 
excluded. In his solitude, he appears at once not yet human, a wild beast, a savage 
monster, and beyond the human, bearer of a formidable religious qualification, like 
a “daimon”.’22 Similarly at the end of Antigone , Creon, though admittedly the 
anti-hero, demands to be expelled from the city, to save it from the desolation 
inflicting it. Finally in Prometheus Bound Aeschylus uses abundant spatial 
metaphors to emphasise the isolation of Prometheus from society, and indeed 
beyond the bounds of the entire known world.
It should be apparent that although Dionysian wisdom will break through, 
as symbolised by the fate of the tragic protagonist there is a simultaneous 
recognition of the necessity of Apollinian illusions. We cannot discard them like ^
Oedipus. It seems that the final lesson of tragedy is this: the Apollinian world of 
illusion is all we have, and it is not possible to step outside of it; we must instead 
use it to the best possible ends. The catastrophe on the tragic stage teaches us of the 
fragility of goodness and of all other values: it alerts us to a constant reassessment 
of the truth régime under which we live. As in the never-ending dialectic of knowl­
edge I outlined in Chapter one, tragedy presents a constant challenge to self- 
criticism and appraisal. Moreover it is a lesson which remains relevant for 
Nietzsche's contemporaries, for the ancient paradigm represents a ‘healthy’ 
response to the human condition, one avoiding the Nihilism Nietzsche anticipated |
in the late nineteenth century.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have thus focused on two themes concerning The Birth o f Tragedy 
. The first has been to understand the work within the history of eighteenth and 
nineteenth century theories of the sublime, in order to map out its relation to and re­
ception of the dialectical structure sublimity as it evolves into a theory of tragedy in 
the hands of Schiller. While not wanting to assimilate Nietzsche’s thinking to that 
of the earlier thinkers discussed during the course of the chapter, it is nevertheless 
important to recognise that The Birth o f Tragedy was written as a response to a 
particular set of concerns and their history.
The second theme governing the argument of this chapter has been a desire 
to analyse the relation between The Birth o f Tragedy and Nietzsche’s wider 
critique of metaphysics. As I have suggested above, the dialectic of Apollo and 
Dionysus articulates a problem which mobilises Nietzsche’s entire philosophy of 
interpretation. One might be tempted to conclude that Nietzsche’s philosophy thus 
represents an extended commentary on the theory of the sublime. It would be 
premature, however, to use The Birth of Tragedy as the sole reference point for an
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understanding of Nietzsche’s writing on art, for I shall be discussing in the 
following chapters the ways in which many of the concerns expressed in this early 
work come to be either rejected or at least substantially reformulated. It is to 
Nietzsche’s subsequent development that I now turn.
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Immanence and Transcendence. On Aesthetic 
Redemption
In the years following the publication of The Birth o f Tragedy Nietzsche comes 
either to reject much of its content, or to at least express reservations about the 
manner of its presentation. Quite apart from his later sense of disaffection with 
Wagner and the real significance of the Wagnerian project, he recognises that so 
many of the important insights of his first book, most especially his ‘discovery’ of 
the Dionysian and Apollinian artistic drives, is hindered by the vocabulary used to 
formulate them. Both in the ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ with which he prefaced 
the second edition of the work in 1886, and in his later account of it in Ecce Homo 
Nietzsche is all too aware that at the time of composition he was still responding to 
the influence of Idealist and Schopenhauerian metaphysics. This is not to imply that 
the early Nietzsche was an Idealist, for as I have suggested in previous chapters his 
early writings do indicate the existence of a considerable distance between the |
young Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.
However, while there are these substantial differences between the two (and 
in the last chapter I have demonstrated these) Nietzsche was still obliged to employ 
the metaphysical vocabulary inherited from his predecessors. As Nietzsche 
comments in the ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’: ‘How very much I now regret that I 
did not have the courage (or immodesty ?) at that time to permit myself in every 
respect a personal language for such personal views and ventures - that with |
Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulae I laboriously sought to express alien and 
novel evaluations, which were fundamentally opposed to the spirit, and equally the 
taste, of Kant and Schopenhauer !’ (KSA 1 p. 19). As I have suggested 
previously, though Nietzsche’s reading of tragedy diverges significantly from 
Schopenhauer, much of its conceptual shape is informed by the aesthetics of both 
Kant and Schopenhauer, with particular regard to their theories of the sublime. Yet, 
as Nietzsche comments on Schopenhauer’s doctrine of tragic resignation, ‘How 
differently Dionysus spoke to me ! How far removed from me was just this whole 
resignationism at the time ! ’ (ibid. p. 20).
In Ecce Homo Nietzsche acknowledges the Hegelian organisation of much 
of the argument of the Birth o f Tragedy , resulting in a seeming untimeliness: ‘I 
thought these problems through while serving as an orderly during cold September 
nights in front of the walls of Metz: one could well believe rather that the tract was 
50 years older . . .  it reeks offensively Hegelian. . .  An “Idea” - the opposition 
Dionysian and Apollinian - translated into metaphysical terms; history itself as the 
development of this “Idea”; the opposition sublated into a synthesis by tragedy . .’
..M
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(KSA 6 p. 310). As I have argued previously, though, while Nietzsche recognises 4
his early debt to Hegel, it is not one he easily pays off, since he never fully 
manages to disburden himself of the weight of the latter’s thought. Nietzsche’s 
own late remarks in Ecce Homo thus have to be received with a certain degree of 
caution.
In reflection what preoccupies Nietzsche more with The Birth o f Tragedy 
than this matter of ‘mere’ style however, is the readiness he displayed in 
assimilating his hope for a cultural renewal to the artistic project of Wagner. As he 
notes in the ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’, far worse than corrupting the thought of 
the Dionysian by forcing it into the strait-jacket of Schopenhauer’s vocabulary was 
the fact ‘that I ruined the grandiose Greek problem, as it unfolded in front of me, 
by mixing in the most modern things. That I had pinned my hopes where there was 
nothing to hope for, where everything pointed all too clearly towards an ending’
(KSA 1 p. 20). In the last third of the work Nietzsche equates the Wagnerian 
‘Gesamtkunstwerk’ and its putative dialectical synthesis of music and text, with the 
tragic drama, whose unity of Apollinian and Dionysian performs an analogous 
function. Against this Nietzsche contrasts the wholly ‘unaesthetic’, ‘Socratic’ tradi­
tion of opera since Monteverdi, which in its demand for textual intelligibility fully 
subordinates the music to the libretto.
Since Greek tragedy had performed a function of personal and cultural re­
demption and consolation, so Nietzsche reasoned, the opera of Wagner could ac­
complish a similar task for modern culture and save it from the encroachment of 
Nihilism. That this hope was a misguided one is recognised early by Nietzsche, 
since he subsequently sees in Wagner’s work symptoms of that modern decadence 
which he hoped a renewal of tragic, or Dionysian wisdom would combat. What he 
is not prepared to admit to in the two works quoted from however, is the internal 
relation between his choice of metaphysical vocabulary and the enthusiasm for 
Wagnerian opera. The one entails the other, most particularly in the attitude it 
shapes towards the problem of redemption. The question which informs both 
Wagner’s work and Nietzsche’s later violent disagreement with him is whether or 
not redemption implies transcendence. More importantly, Nietzsche’s answer to 
this question turns out to be central to his criticism of metaphysics and especially to 
his understanding of art.
The Meaning of Transcendence
In my account of The Birth o f Tragedy I drew attention to the manner in which 
Nietzsche absorbs and reacts to the eighteenth and nineteenth century theories of the 
sublime. Not only does the opposition between the Apollinian and the Dionysian
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through its very function recall the well-known pairing of the Beautiful and the
Sublime, particularly as this distinction is developed in Schiller. Additionally, the
artistic forms which Nietzsche characterises as objectifications of the two artistic :
impulses show little divergence from those artistic forms which have an analogous
function in the art theories of the Romantics, of Hegel and of Schopenhauer. For
Nietzsche the artistic form which exemplifies the Apollinian will-to-form is ?
sculpture, a claim which repeats both Schopenhauer’s understanding of Beauty as
the will to make permanent, and Hegel’s interpretation of Greek sculpture as the %
only stage in the history of art when Beauty was achieved (i.e. when the sensuous
manifestation was adequate to the Idea). Similarly, the Dionysian artistic form is
best exemplified in Nietzsche’s eyes by music, an interpretation which draws on
Schopenhauer’s own metaphysics of music, itself influenced by the Romantic
understanding of music as the one ideal artistic form which can best symbolise the
infinite. 1
The purpose of this comparison is not to belittle the achievement or deny the I
originality of the Birth of Tragedy . Rather it is to enable us to focus on a feature 
which Nietzsche’s book is in danger of sharing with these earlier authors; a feature I
which Nietzsche’s Idealist vocabulary encourages us to see when reading the book, 
and which draws Nietzsche (mistakenly) to the artistic output of Wagner. I am 
referring to the interpretation of aesthetic experience, and most especially the 
sublime, as a means to redemptive transcendence. In Kant, and more markedly in 
Schiller and Schopenhauer, the sublime is an occasion for authentically moral 
behaviour, when one can transcend the limitations of sensuous existence. For Kant 
and Schiller, the sublime offers a chance to act as a moral being, which they both 
see as a higher calling than the everyday demands of physical embodies existence.
Indeed for Schiller, one’s moral behaviour is only regarded as truly moral if 
pursued and accomplished at the cost of one’s sensuous being. So too in 
Schopenhauer, the sublime offers an opportunity to escape from the relentless 
strivings of the Will and of embodied existence, and to gain a penetrating insight 
into the true ‘metaphysical’ reality of the world. Not that Schopenhauer is interested 
in morality or the challenge of truly authentic moral conduct, for the very idea of a 
moral agent is absurd, given the deluded nature of all notions of selfhood, in short, 
the principium individuationis.
Despite these differences, however, the feature shared by all three thinkers 
is the idea that redemption can be achieved through a negation of the sensuous 
world, through an act of transcendence. In Schopenhauer the figure who develops 
the ideal pattern of behaviour is consequently the ascetic, whose knowledge of the 
vanity of all egoism and willing leads him to a voluntary renunciation of all aspects 
of his material existence. Schopenhauer writes that ‘The will now turns away from
Î'I
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life; it shudders at the pleasures in which it recognises the affirmation of life. Man 3
attains to the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true composure and 
complete willlessness’ (WWR I § 68 p. 379).
Yet although Nietzsche’s interpretation bears a formal resemblance to 
Schopenhauer’s theory of tragedy and of aesthetic experience in general it should 
have become clear that there are significant differences. Nietzsche’s theory, as he 
notes in the later retrospective accounts of The Birth o f Tragedy , is far from 
exhorting his readers to renounce all willing or any form of selfhood. His choice of 
Schopenhauer’s vocabulary, his references to the Will, to ‘das Ureine’, the ‘Primal 
Unity’, masks significant differences. Likewise his account of the Dionysian state t
as one of intoxication (‘Rausch’), where all the fortified boundaries of the self are 
broken down, should not be equated with Schopenhauer’s dissolution of the self in 
a supreme moment of life-denying ascesis. As Heidegger observed, while the t
notion of ‘Rausch’ remains central to Nietzsche’s understanding of art throughout 
his career, its meaning and function exceed the boundaries of the conceptual world 
of Schopenhauerian metaphysics, and it is not until Nietzsche develops his own 
style of thinking that a more adequate means of expression is found for his ideas.
To explain why the two should be dissociated one must recall the general tenor of 
his critique of metaphysics, and in particular his critique of ‘Platonism for the 
people’ , namely Christianity.
One of Nietzsche’s more substantial criticisms of metaphysics was that the 
philosophical faith in logical categories leads to a petrifaction of life. The vital flux 
of Becoming is devalued and instead notions of Being, stability, in short, 
timelessness, are valued more highly. As Nietzsche notes, such desire for stability 
and unity results from a ‘need for inertia’ (KSA 12: 2 [117] p. 120), whereas the 
ability to accept ambiguity, constant change and the ‘reversal of customary 
perspectives’ (KSA 5 p. 364) constitutes a ‘sign of strength’ (KSA 12: 2 [117] p.
120). Commenting on Nietzsche’s opposition to any such flight to timelessness,
Josef Simon concludes that ‘instead of being understood as “oiiginary” law . . . 
the law of identity is to be understood as “having become” [geworden].’^
One of the principal causes of this process is a mis-recognition of what the 
vocabulary of logic, and language in general, signifies. The crucial error, for 
Nietzsche, is to have assumed language to actually refer to a pre-existing real, 
awaiting the correct term to be applied to it, rather than to recognise language, and 
logic in particular, as a semiotic system, a critique I have already outlined in the 
first chapter.
The reification and hypostatisation of language which Nietzsche identifies 
as one of the primary characteristics of the metaphysical tradition necessarily 
bequeaths to us a certain conception of time in its wake. The faith in the certainties
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of grammar necessarily restricts a priori what can be considered to be an existent, 
and even what it means to exist. As I have demonstrated in the first chapter, the 
problem can be traced back to Socrates, whose apparently innocuous search for 
definitions, far from remaining a problem merely of semantics is transformed by 
Plato into one of ontology. The inability of mundane existence to offer anything 
which could fulfil Plato’s desire for an adequate definition of such notions as 
‘good’, ‘true’ or ‘just’ compels him to posit the truth of the matter as a world of 
atemporal forms, a move which is seen as necessary only on the basis of the 
following assumptions;
a) that the ‘good’ is a real, and not just a quality predicated of actions, objects etc. 
In other words, for every word there is a corresponding existent.
b) that the ‘truth’ about, e.g. the good must be singular, corresponding to the 
singularity of the word ‘good’ (or t o  KaXdv). Hence the impossibility of a plurality 
of ‘goods’, each with their own particular logic, an assumption which refuses to 
accept the metaphoric origins of conceptuality.
c) that the ‘truth’ of goodness is temporally invariable and always present: just as 
we shall continue to employ the same word for ‘good’ in ten of fifty years, so too 
the ‘truth’ will be the same.
The combination of these three assumptions leads to the conclusion that an 
object can only truly exist if it is self-identical and not subject to temporal change. It 
is thus because of this assumption that Plato refuses to acknowledge the right to 
existence of the ephemeral things of this world.
It is an assumption inherited by Aristotle in his discussion of time in Book 
IV of The Physics . In this work Aristotle is puzzled by the paradox of time 
inasmuch as ‘Some of it has been and is not, some of it is to be and is not yet.’^  
From this observation he notes that ‘it would seem to be impossible that what is 
composed of things that are not should not participate in being’ (218^ 1-2). Yet as 
various commentators have objected, Aristotle’s couching of the problem of time in 
these terms appears possible only on the premise that existence can only be 
predicated of something in the present, i.e. an object referred to in the present tense 
of the verb ‘be’. Hence if we cannot say that something ‘is’ in the present, we must 
infer that it does not have full reality or existence, a conclusion which parallels 
Plato’s argument that because mundane objects are brought into being and then 
decay with time, they therefore do not truly exist.^ ^
The determination of existence as being-present, a determination which 
Derrida identifies as the ‘metaphysics of presence’ is what underlies the constant 
struggle for redemption which I have analysed above. For Nietzsche’s analysis of 
metaphysical conceptions of time as derived from Aristotelian and Platonic ideas 
emphasises the melancholia inhabiting Western thinking, the sense of loss towards
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time past which produces Antiquarian history, indiscriminately clutching on to the 
relics of the past, in a vain effort to bring the flow of life to a standstill. Even 
Hegel, who more than any other philosopher prior to Nietzsche could be said to 
display a sensitivity towards the problem of history, even Hegel subscribes to the i
same set of premisses. For the dialectic, though significant in its recognition of the 
historicity of knowledge, nevertheless projects itself toward totality, toward the 
final moment of static self-congruence.^
As a consequence of this rejection of time, and the desire to transcend time, 
metaphysical thinking thus seeks ‘revenge’ on the world, as Nietzsche puts it, by 
denying the flow of life. To do this successfully, it must ‘invent’ an other, truer 
world (Plato’s world of forms, and in Christian terms, the kingdom of Heaven). I
Nietzsche notes in Twilight o f the Idols that ‘we take revenge on life with the I
phantasmagoria of an ‘other’, ‘better’ life’ (KSA 6 p. 78). In the same work, i
Nietzsche undertakes his well-known genealogy of the metaphysical desire for #
transcendence in the section entitled ‘How the “True World” eventually became a 
Fable’, tracing notions such as the Kantian noumenal realm with its moral conno­
tations back to their origins in the Platonic idea of ‘The true world attainable for the 4
wise man, the pious man, the virtuous man’ (ibid. p. 80). Earlier in The Gay 
Science Nietzsche had seen the deluded metaphysical search for ‘Truth’ as a mere |
descendant of the general religious belief in the other world (implicitly of 
Salvation). In aphorism 151 he writes ‘People have become accustomed to the idea 
of an ‘other (further, lower, higher) world’, and feel an uncomfortable sense of 
emptiness and loss upon the annihilation of religious delusion - and now this ‘other %
world’ springs up once more, but this time it is just a metaphysical one, and no 
longer a religious one’ (KSA 3 p. 494).
In one of the notebooks of 1887, Nietzsche observes this tendency even in 
the work of Schopenhauer, who more than most metaphysicians had helped banish 
the hope of some form of redemptive transcendence. He writes that ‘Around 1876 .
. . I understood that my instinct was going in the opposite direction from that of 
Schopenhauer: towards a justification of life, even at its most terrible, ambiguous 
and deceptive . . . that an “in-itself-of-things” must necessarily be good, blessed, 
true and one. Against this Schopenhauer’s interpretation of the In-itself as Will 
constituted an important step: only he did not understand how to deify this W ill. .
. Schopenhauer still stood so far under the dominion of Christian values that now, 
once the thing in itself was no longer “God”, it had to be bad, stupid, absolutely 
contemptible’ (KSA 12:9[42] pp. 354-5). Hence Nietzsche’s frequent diagnosis of 
‘Kulturpessimismus’ as one of the many symptoms of the moral decay of 
Modernity.
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Owing its origins to the metaphysical negation of the transient and the 
sensual, the notion of transcendence thus turns out to be enmeshed in the cultural 
and intellectual history of Western society. Both produced by and producing the 
slave morality of ressentiment, it finds itself recurring in many different areas of 
Western culture. The most obvious case is the explicit goal of redemption in 
Christian morality. The Christian ideal of Salvation represents an open declaration 
on the value of mundane life, by setting up a mendacious ‘other’ world. As 
Nietzsche comments in The Antichrist ‘God deformed into a contradiction of this 
life instead of a transfiguration of it and eternal Yes. With God hostilities 3
announced towards life, nature, the will to life ! God the formula for every 
defamation of the “Here and now”, for every lie about the “Beyond” ! With God 
the deification of Nothing, the will to nothing pronounced sacred ! ’ (KSA 6 p.
185).
Bound up with such a defamation of the ‘Here and Now’ is a concomitant 
rejection of all the material, sensuous aspects of human existence, and it is this 
which has remained, long after the authority of the Christian divinity has waned. s
Transformed from the religious sphere into that of science and metaphysics, the 
feeling of ‘emptiness and loss’ which Nietzsche had seen as accompanying the re­
jection of the Christian Heaven is more than supplemented by metaphysical notions 
of logic and truth. We have previously observed Nietzsche’s criticisms of philos­
ophy’s persistent refusal to make room for the senses, focusing in particular on 
accounts of the subject, which appear to Nietzsche to be united in their opposition 3
to allowing the body any role in determining human thinking, as if this might 
undermine the ‘purity’ of logical thought. In short, the target of Nietzsche’s critique 
is the continued metaphysical belief in the Absolute after the death of God. The 
most obvious target would be Hegel, but it could equally apply to, say, the 
Cartesian attempt to begin with first principles in the search for the bedrock of 
certainty. Likewise with the sciences the implicit assumption is that the object of 
research is to discover that sacred grail of the ‘Truth’ about the world, beyond the 
limitations of the human sensorium. Yet at no time is the status of that knowledge, |
the status of the scientific paradigm as such ever brought into question.
Contra Wagner
In order to combat this metaphysical search for transcendence Nietzsche adopts a 
wide variety of strategies subsequent to The Birth of Tragedy , both linguistic and 
conceptual, which go some way towards the formation of what might be termed a 
philosophy of ‘immanence’. Most obviously, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is aimed at 
overcoming the belief in the possibility of a turn ‘back to basics’, whether it is
I
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Descartes’s reduction of everything extrinsic to the pure cogito, or the more recent 
phenomenological epoche of Husserl, with its positing of an Archimedean point to 
survey the workings of consciousness. One hesitates to call this anti-transcendental 
turn a critique of logocentrism, not only because of the historical impropriety of the 
term, but also because the strategies of the latter do not share the moral concerns of 
Nietzsche’s ‘immanentism’. More subtly, Nietzsche will come to employ a wide 
variety of linguistic devices, most especially a heavy use of physiological and :t
corporeal metaphors, which once again bring the attention of the reader away from 
ideas of the transcendent and back to ‘this-worldly’ concerns. I shall deal with this 
interest in immanence shortly.
I suggested earlier that one of the principal reasons why the early Nietzsche 
largely misreads the significance of Schopenhauer and the Idealist heritage is that he 
himself still employs the language of that tradition. Similarity of language hides |
significant intended differences, and hence while Nietzsche may well later claim 
that he intended something other in his study of tragedy than the Schopenhauerian 
attitude of tragic resignation, its form of articulation in fact results in its being easily 
assimilated to the aesthetic of the earlier philosopher.
Nietzsche’s misreading of Wagner is somewhat more complex, but it is also 
bound up with the composer’s shared enthusiasm for Schopenhauer’s metaphysics |
of music. As Tracy Strong has recently suggested,^ the grounds for Nietzsche’s 
initial enthusiasm for Wagner may not necessarily lie in their shared interest in 
Schopenhauer, even though, as I shall argue, it was the eventual cause of their 
parting. Instead, Strong suggests, we should seek the reason for Nietzsche’s early |
attraction to Wagner in the political role which the composer gives to art. In his 
essays Art and Revolution and German Art and German Politics Wagner stresses 
the crucial role which art should play in culture, arguing that it made possible an 
ennobling of ‘public spiritual life.’
An emphasis on the political aspects of Wagner’s understanding of the arts |
certainly makes sense of many aspects of The Birth o f Tragedy , in particular the 
concern of Nietzsche with not only the renewal of the individual spectator of the |
drama, but also the central role occupied by tragic drama in sustaining the edifice of 
Greek culture as a whole. Additionally Nietzsche’s extravagant claims made on 
behalf of Wagner are justified on the grounds of the cultural renewal and redemp­
tion which he sees as imminent. What has to be redeemed is not just the Socratic 
individual, but Socratic society as a whole. Modem society. Modernity, theoretical 
culture is the problem, and it is a phenomenon that can be redeemed by the com­
munal aesthetic form of Wagnerian opera. As Nietzsche says, the world can only i
be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon.
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However, the significance of Wagner goes further than this mere political 
appeal. For the relation of the two is largely determined by their individual re­
sponses to the metaphysics of music inherited from Schopenhauer. Nietzsche’s en­
thusiasm for Wagner stems largely from his disillusionment with Modernity’s self- 
imposed goal of scientific knowledge. In his account of the development of tragedy 
he sees the birth of Western theoretical culture at the moment when Socrates, as the 
archetypal ‘theoretical’ spectator, demands that the work be intelligible. Born less 
out of a hypertrophy of the Apollinian than out of a fundamentally extra-aesthetic 
impulse, this theoretical drive, or as Nietzsche terms it, ‘Socratic optimism’, %
appears on stage in the form of Euripidean drama, which subordinates all the 
symbolic elements of tragedy to the overarching demand for logical, intelligible 
discourse, hence the large number of set-piece debates in the plays of Euripides.
To stress still further the distinction between tragic and modem, theoretical, 
culture, he describes the goals of their artistic expression with different termi­
nology. Nietzsche characterises tragic culture as ‘the culture whose important mark 
is that of putting wisdom [Weisheit] as its highest goal instead of knowledge 
[Wissenschaft]’ (KSA Ip . 118). In other words, tragic culture aims at a symbolic, 
indeterminate, expression of its understanding of the world, since such an under­
standing can only be a symbolic one. Contrariwise, Socratic culture deludes itself 
in believing it can actually ‘know’ the world in intelligible, dialectical concepts.
Hence the subordination of tragic symbol to discursive logic, a process which 
translated into the artistic production of Nietzsche’s own time becomes the 
subordination of operatic music to text. Nietzsche writes, ‘Answering the wish of 
the listener to understand the words being sung, the singer speaks rather than y
sings, and increases the expressive pathos of the words with this half-singing: 
through this increase in the pathos he facilitates comprehension of the words and 
overcomes that remaining half, the music’ (KSA 1 p. 121).
In his unpublished notes from the same period as The Birth o f Tragedy 
Nietzsche claims that music, or as he calls it, the tonal basis of all speech, 
constitutes the condition of its meaning anything at all, when he writes that 
‘Inasmuch as that primal ground [i.e. the Will] is the same in all humans, so too is 
the hidden tonal ground the basis of the intelligible basis to the plurality of 
languages’ (KSA 7: 12 [1] p. 361) drawing an explicit equation between the Will 
and pure tonality when he notes, further, that ‘The consonantal-vocalic word relates 
to its tonal foundation as does our embodied being to that primal form of 
appearance, the Will’ (ibid. p. 362).
Now although we have seen how Nietzsche differs from Schopenhauer |
inasmuch as he refers to the Will as a ‘form of appearance’ [Erscheinungsform], 
thereby recognising the Will to be already a human interpretation of the world’s
j
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primal ground, his notes of 1871, together with the later sections of The Birth o f 
Tragedy , giving priority to music over text, nevertheless bring him close to 
Schopenhauer and to Wagner. He moreover professes to see in Wagner’s work the 
rebirth of those very aesthetic impulses that were stifled with the advent of 
theoretical culture. For, as he notes later in the fourth of the Untimely Meditations 
‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, Wagner not only reverses the traditional hierarchy 
pertaining to the relation of words and music. In his use of myth he mobilises 
textual structures and content which resist the Socratic demand for conceptual 
clarity. He writes ‘Myth is not based on one thought. . . but is itself a process of 
thinking; it communicates its ideas of the world, but as a succession of events, 
deeds and afflictions. The Ring o f the Nibelungen is a huge system of thoughts 
without the conceptual form of thinking’ (KSA 1 p. 485), a statement which 
complements his remarks from the notes of 1871 on programme music, so popular 
in the nineteenth century: ‘Imagine . . . what an undertaking it must be to make 
music into a poem, i.e. to illustrate a poem with music in order to help music to a 
conceptual language: what a perverse world ! A task that comes across to me like a 
son wanting to sire his own father’ (KSA 7: 12 [1] p. 362).
Yet while Wagner’s musical praxis embodies for the young Nietzsche the 
rebirth of an authentically aesthetic art form, the surface similarities hide significant 
differences, as was the case too with Nietzsche’s relation to earlier aesthetic 
philosophies. Wagner’s commitment to Schopenhauer, the authenticity of his mid­
life conversion, cannot be doubted. From the mid-1850’s there is a number of 
letters to friends and acquaintances which testify to his enthusiasm for the 
philosopher’s works. In December 1854 he writes to Liszt that ‘I have been 
concerning myself with a person who has come to me in my solitude . . . like a 
gift from heaven. It is Arthur Schopenhauer, the greatest philosopher since Kant’7, 
and writes on Schopenhauer again to Liszt in the following year (7th June), noting 
that ‘This act of denial of the Will is the genuine act of the saint: he reaches 
perfection only in the complete negation of his personal consciousness.’^
Wagner’s commitment to Schopenhauerian metaphysics is naturally most 
manifest in his operas, which represent a potent symbolic expression of the meta­
physics of the Will. As Tracy Strong has indicated^, Wagner was concerned with 
the problem of redemption and transcendence throughout his career, both before 
and after his encounter with Schopenhauer. However, Schopenhauer’s work did 
offer Wagner a set of ideas which he found fruitful in his operatic oeuvre. From 
Tristan und Isolde , with its notions of the lovers’ redemption through death and 
negation^o to Parsifal, where the eponymous hero redeems everything and ev­
eryone through his unconscious bumbling, Wagner’s ideal is one of redemption 
through complete dissolution of self-consciousness, whether this becomes manifest
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as the actual termination of individual lives, or as the complete lack of self- 
consciousness through sheer idiocy, or as the amnesia of Siegfried, the redemptive 
hero of the Ring, whose inability to recall his own past signifies the selfsame 
dissolution of subjectivity. The origin of such ideas is clear, for they repeat 
Schopenhauer’s understanding of the redemptive function of asceticism and all 
forms of negation of the will-to-live, and it is clear, too, that as Nietzsche becomes 
more and more aware of the extent of his differences with Schopenhauer, so too he 
will distance himself from Wagner.
Nietzsche’s break with Wagner is not so significant in itself, but rather 
more as a symptom of Nietzsche’s rejection of the metaphysical and Christian 
structures of thinking which require redemption and transcendence. Wagner be­
comes the target of his two late polemics. The Case o f Wagner and Nietzsche con­
tra Wagner and also of numerous unpublished notes from the late 1880’s, princi­
pally because the composer is for Nietzsche merely the most prominent example of 
the moral malaise of modernity. Nietzsche writes in § 11 of the Case of Wagner 
that ‘Victor Hugo and Richard Wagner - they signify one and the same thing, that 
in cultures of decline wherever the choice falls into the laps of the masses, authen­
ticity always becomes superfluous, disadvantageous, retrogressive’ (KSA 6 p. 37), 
thus equating the mass appeal of Wagnerian theatre with a bogus popular culture 
still bound to the demands of slave morality.
Regarding Wagnerian drama he writes in the first ‘Nachschrift’ to TJte Case 
o f Wagner that ‘Everything that has ever grown up on the soil of impoverished 
life, this entire false coinage of transcendence and the Beyond, has found its 
sublimest advocate in the art of Wagner. . . My friends, drink just the philtres of 
this art ! Nowhere will you find a more pleasant way of unnerving your spirit, and 
of forgetting your masculinity under a rose bush . . .’ (ibid. p. 43).
One notes, too, that while Nietzsche rejects the morality that Wagner typi­
fies, even now he has to acknowledge the extraordinary power Wagner's music 
exerts over the listener. Hence Nietzsche's repeated insistence on his differences 
with the composer, as if it were intended to convince him as much as his readers.
In the section of Nietzsche contra Wagner entitled ‘We Antipodeans’ he writes 
‘The revenge on life itself - the most wilful kind of intoxication for such impover­
ished people ! . . .  Both Wagner and Schopenhauer answer the two-fold need of 
these last people - they deny life, they defame it, for this reason they are my an­
tipodeans’ (ibid. p. 425).
Undoubtedly the most serious charge which Nietzsche brings to bear 
against Wagner, though, is that of having destroyed music. In order to further dis- 3
tance his own conception of the artist from Wagner, Nietzsche uses almost any 
word available for Wagner except that of artist. Wagner is a charlatan (a term also 1
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reserved, strangely, for Victor Hugo), a decadent, a seducer, a womaniser, an 
actor, and his music is a kind of ‘underhand’ Christianity, but it is not ‘authentic 
art’, since ‘music has lost its world-transfigurative, affirmative character - it is the 
music of decadence, and no longer the flute of Dionysus’ (ibid. p. 357).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have traced the development of Nietzsche’s thought after The Birth 
o f Tragedy, and more specifically by examining his reactions to that work and to 
his debt to Wagner and Schopenhauer. There is no question that Nietzsche was 
merely replicating the ideas of the two earlier figures, for as I have shown in the 
last chapter, there is already a considerable distance between his ideas and those of 
his mentors. However in his later work that distance becomes explicit and the cause 
of Nietzsche’s polemic against Wagner. More particularly, we see exemplified in 
Nietzsche’s confrontation with Wagner his wider rejection of philosophies of 
transcendence and redemption, a rejection which should warn us of the complex 
nature of the function of tragedy in The Birth o f Tragedy . We also see in 
Nietzsche’s later polemic against Wagner the outlines of a theory of ‘authentic’ art, 
which is to counter the ‘bogus’ art of Wagner and opera in general. This distinction 
was already apparent in The Birth of Tragedy, yet what Nietzsche is admitting to in 
his later comments on Wagner is in effect the ease with which one becomes fooled 
by Wagner, and the ease with which metaphysics insinuates itself into the work of 
art. Hence Nietzsche’s hope for cultural renewal through art is not imagined as an 
easy task - rather as a struggle, and this parallels the difficulty of the actual 
cognitive demands he is making of the post-metaphysical individual.
If Nietzsche sees tragic consolation and wisdom as offering everything but 
some moment of redemptive transcendence, how are we to understand Nietzsche’s 
tragic sublime ? Above all, how are we to understand the nature of Dionysian -|
‘Rausch’, or intoxication, if it is not to be equated with the simple redemption 1|
through self-dissolution of the subject that occurs in Schopenhauer or Wagner ?
How does the notion of intoxication, or rapture, relate to this undeclared 
philosophy of immanence which Nietzsche is setting up in opposition to ^
metaphysics ?
To provide answers to these questions it is necessary to examine the role of 
time in Nietzsche’s philosophy, and more specifically to examine the temporality of 
immanence in contrast to that of metaphysics and transcendence. I have introduced 
the theme briefly in this chapter, and it is now time to explore it further.
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Art and Eternal Recurrence
It is well known that one of the key terms Nietzsche employs to counter the 
metaphysical petrifaction of ‘life’ is that of ‘Becoming’. It functions as a counter­
weight to the fetish of Being, with its concomitant denial of the temporal. Yet it is |
not a move without its own attendant dangers. Metaphysical resistance to temporal­
ity is also manifest in the connotations of the word ‘become’. As we saw in the ex­
ample of Hegel in the last chapter, ‘Becoming’ is still closely bound to a 
teleological understanding of the world, with the implicit goal of a moment of final 
stasis.
In both his published and unpublished work Nietzsche places great empha­
sis on the importance of abandoning any teleological principles, even if, as in Kant, 
they are recognised as merely regulative ideas facilitating the study of the nature. i 
For example he criticises the notion that during evolution the eye somehow 
developed in order to facilitate vision, suggesting instead that vision ‘rather 
occurred once pure chance had assembled the apparatus’ (KSA 3 p. 115), and 
attacks too the habit of ‘interpreting history to the honour of divine reason, as a 
constant indicator of a moral world-order and a moral ultimate purpose’ (ibid. p.
600).
It is on the basis of this specific critique of the metaphysical refusal of 
temporality that we must understand Nietzsche’s writing concerning time, and more 
particularly his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Eternal Recurrence is notorious as 
the most difficult aspect of Nietzsche’s œuvre, and one cannot hope to give an 
exhaustive account of its full range of meanings and uses within the space of a 
single chapter. Hence my treatment of the Eternal Recurrence will of necessity be 
highly selective, giving way to book-length studies on the subject for a more 
complete understanding of the ‘thought of thoughts’.^  Undoubtedly a large part of 
the problem in comprehending the ‘doctrine’ of Eternal Recurrence stems from 
Nietzsche’s refusal to present it in a unified and coherent manner. Adopting a 
strategy of resistance to conceptualisation, Nietzsche presents the doctrine as so 
many speculative thoughts and unanswered questions. When Nietzsche first 
presents the thought in published form, as the penultimate aphorism of the fourth 
book of The Gay Science (no. 341), it is communicated in the following form:
‘What if a demon crept up on you in your lonely solitude during the day or at night 
and said to you: “You will have to live this life, which you are now living and have 
lived, once more and countless times again . . .” ’(KSA 3 p. 570). Elsewhere, 
and especially in the NachlaB it is presented as a cosmological theory, with
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scientific ‘proofs’. There is the additional problem that Nietzsche is keen to express 
how inarticulable is the ‘thought of thoughts’. In one a note from the period of the 
composition of The Gay Science he introduces the idea that everything might 
recur, adding: ‘Beginning of August 1881 in Sils-Maria, 6,000 feet above sea level 
and much higher above all human things’ (KSA 9:11 [141] p. 494). In the section 
on Thus Spoke Zarathustra in Ecce Homo he refers to this note when he describe 
the genesis of the thought. He writes: ‘The founding conception of this work [i.e.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra ], the thought of Eternal Return, this highest formula of 
affirmation that can ever be attained, belongs to August 1881: it is cast onto a sheet 
with the subtitle: “6,000 feet beyond humanity and time” ’ (KSA 6 p. 335).
How should it be interpreted ? Is the doctrine a scientific theory (fully fur- f
nished with scientific proofs in the notes of the later 1880’s), or a speculative cos- f
mology, or a moral imperative ? In a sense it is all and none at the same time. As I 5
shall show, Nietzsche presents the doctrine in certain ways as part of his wider 
strategy of resistance to the philosophy of transcendence. Hence I shall dispute 
Heidegger’s reading^, which would place the doctrine at the core of Nietzsche’s 
thought, more fundamental even than his notion of will to power.
If we turn first to the scientific version of Nietzsche’s doctrine, we 
encounter a certain embarrassment. Nietzsche’s argument runs thus: ‘If the world 
may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite 
number of centres of force . . .  it follows that in the great dice game of existence, 
it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time every 
possible combination would at some time or other be reached; more, it would have 
been reached an infinite number times. And since between every combination and 
its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and 
each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the a
same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: 
the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and 
plays its game in infinitum’ (KSA 13: 14 [188] p. 376). We feel embarrassed not 
only because the argument is not particularly convincing (or rather about as con­
vincing as Zeno’s paradox of the arrow), but also because the manner of argumen­
tation and the premisses of the argument run counter to the nature of his work in 
1888, with its ever increasing hostility to the sciences and scientific thinking.
Fortunately we are spared the embarrassment since David Wood has re­
minded us^ that we need not interpret Nietzsche as actually being persuaded by his 
own argument. Instead, Wood maintains, Nietzsche is employing the language of 
contemporary sciences merely to demonstrate that his theory is as valid in scientific 
terms as the contemporary conception of time as a linear process, Nietzsche could 
be seen not as trying to prove the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence with a ‘scientific’
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proof, but rather as trying to demonstrate, to those for whom mechanistic science 
does constitute the valid model of understanding, that a notion of cyclical time is 
no less valid than one of linear time. Nietzsche’s own understanding is of course 
that the doctrine requires a level of comprehension far above that of everyday 
human thinking, yet given that this is not possible for all, he is obliged to present it 
in different terms.
The same can be said for his cosmological ‘proof’ of cyclical time, which as 
Wood observes mimics the language of Aristotelian thinking, A fragment from 
1885 addresses the understanding of time as linear in a manner analogous to the 
scientific ‘proof’, in other words by countering the teleological assumptions of 
Aristotelianism on its own terms: ‘If the world had a goal, it must have been 
reached. If there were an unintended final state for it, this too must have been 
reached. If it were at all capable of tarrying, of becoming fixed, of “Being”, if, 
amongst all its Becoming, it were capable just for one instant of “Being”, then all 
Becoming would long since have come to an end, similarly with all thinking, with I
all “spirit”. The fact of “spirit” as a Becoming proves that the world has no goal, no j
final state and is incapable of Being’ (KSA 11: 36 [15] p. 556).
Again Nietzsche is not trying to prove the veracity of his doctrine, rather he 
is bringing under scrutiny the implications of the Aristotelian assumption of linear 
time, leading towards a moment of apocalypse and subsequent redemption. He is 
cashing out in these terms what it would mean to maintain both a recognition of the 
dynamics of world history and belief in a telos which would amount to a 
transcendence above and beyond the world of Becoming. Implicit in this polemic is 
also an assault on Hegelian dialectics. For, Nietzsche is arguing, if spirit, or Geist, 
is defined as activity, and in Hegelian thinking its activity constitutes the unfolding 
of world history, the question as to why it should suddenly cease upon assumption 
to Absolute Knowledge remains unanswered. The fact that the telos of Hegelian 
Geist is stasis , final inactivity, calls us to re-examine the view of spirit as essential 
activity.
On this view then, we need not view the more scientific or cosmological as­
pects of Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence as troublesome aberrations. Rather, they 
are part of a polemic informed by an ad hominem approach to its targets, and it is 
this ad hominem (or feminam 1 ) approach which most graphically illustrates 
Nietzsche’s treatment of metaphysics as a textual practice, where the manner to 
undermine such practices is not to critique them in the name of some other, higher 
truth, but rather to assimilate oneself to the peculiarities of their discourse in order 
to dismantle them from within.
In his earlier work, most especially in the second of the Untimely Medita­
tions Nietzsche already expresses a concern with the problem of time, and particu- I
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larly with the authentic appropriation of time and history. He opens ‘On the Advan­
tage and Disadvantage of History for Life’ with a parable, drawing out the funda­
mental distinction between animal and human existence: ‘Look at the herd that 
grazes by you: it does not know what yesterday, what today is, it jumps around, 
eats, rests, digests, jumps around again, and so on from morning to night, from 
day to day, closely tied to its pleasure and displeasure . . .’ (KSA 1 p. 248).
Faced with this spectacle, the human asks the animal why it does not tell him of its 
happiness, and consequently ‘The animal wishes to answer him and say “that’s be­
cause I always forget what I was going to say” - but then it forgot even this answer 
and so remained silent , . (ibid.).
In contrast, human Being is weighed down with memory of the past, its es­
sential historicity being defined as a fundamental determinant of its character. As 
Nietzsche says, ‘He [i.e. the human] is surprised by his own inability to learn how 
to forget, and the fact that he constantly hangs on to the past: no matter how far and 
fast he might run, the chain runs with him’ (ibid.). Continuing further Nietzsche 
writes ‘In contrast the human stands up to the great and ever greater burden of the 
past: this presses down on him or makes him bend over, it hinders his path like a *{
dark and invisible weight . . .’ (ibid. p. 249).
Yet while memory is a primal determinant of the human condition, and Ni­
etzsche even offers elementary psychology on the basis of his understanding of the 
function of memory, humans are nevertheless caught in a terrible dilemma. For the 
precondition to any thought or deed is the ability to forget, and as we have seen it is 
this forgetting which lies at the root of metaphysics. Nietzsche says, ‘Imagine the 
most extreme example, a human who did not have any ability to forget, who would 
be condemned to seeing Becoming everywhere: such a person no longer believes in 
his own being, no longer believes in himself, sees everything flowing apart as ani­
mated points and loses himself in this stream of Becoming: like the true pupil of 
Heraclitus he will no longer dare to lift his finger’ (ibid. p. 250).
Formulating an embryonic perspectivism, Nietzsche insists on the necessity 
of a temporal horizon, in order to bring this overwhelming flux of time and history 
temporarily to a stand-still, writing that ‘every living thing can only be healthy, !
strong and fruitful within a certain horizon: if it is incapable of drawing a horizon 
about itself. . .  it will succumb, weakly or overhastily to a timely decay’ (ibid. p.
251), an observation which echoes his criticism in The Birth o f Tragedy of 
Modernity’s inability of think of itself except in purely historical terms.
Following this account, human existence seems to comprise a delicate 
balancing act between memory and amnesia, temporality and atemporality, Being 
and Becoming. Nietzsche’s concern is to establish a model of authentic re­
membrance which remains unburdened by time past, yet which does not seek
il
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merely to escape temporality, choosing oblivion and supreme self-dissolution. Al­
ready, in this awareness of the intricate dialectic of time and the timeless, Nietzsche 
is distancing himself from the Schopenhauerian, Wagnerian and ultimately Chris­
tian model of historical being. Where these interpretations of history centre around t|
the aspiration to simply forget the burden of human historicity, Nietzsche aims at 
the establishment of a structure which will acknowledge the immanence of human- f
ity to time, and it is with this that we are now moving towards the temporal aspect 
of his ‘immanentism’.
On the basis of this introductory sketch alone it will have become apparent 
why Nietzsche has so many reservations about what he terms ‘Critical history’. For 
here the critical historian uses his art ‘once again in the service of life. He must 
have and occasionally employ the capacity to break apart and dissolve the past, in 
order to be able to live: he achieves this by putting it on trial, painfully cross- 
examining it, and finally condemning it’ (ibid. p. 269). Yet critical history implies 
Nihilism, although Nietzsche does not use the term at this stage in his career, 
merely remarking instead that in its attempt to fight against the burden of the past, 
in its desire to condemn the past, critical history is then led to conclude that ‘
“Everything which comes to be deserves to wither away. Thus it would better if 
nothing ever came into being” ’ (ibid.). Moreover, despite this need for redemption 
from the past, human thinking is also motivated by the need for the ‘occasional an­
nihilation of this forgetfulness’ (ibid.).
Hence the sense of piety towards the past, embodied in the so-called 
‘Antiquarian history’, which lovingly preserves everything which belongs to the 
past, an attitude which Nietzsche sees repeated in the Hegelian dialectic. For, as 
Nietzsche notes, ‘These historical people believe that the meaning of existence will 
come ever more to light through the run of history, they therefore just look back­
wards, to understand the present by examining the process up until now . . . ’
(ibid. p. 255). It is a criticism which Nietzsche will continue to make in his later 
thinking, culminating perhaps in the section ‘On redemption’ in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra where Nietzsche writes ‘now cloud upon cloud rolled over the spirit, 
until eventually madness preached “Everything passes away, therefore everything 
is worth passing away” ’ (KSA 4 p. 180). Hence, by locating the meaning of Geist 
in historical activity, Hegel is firstly valuing change for its own sake, and also 
affirming everything as a necessary stage on Geist’s journey towards self­
completion in a paradoxical affirmation and negation of historicity.
The key to these complex problems Nietzsche sees in ‘Monumental’ his­
tory, which exercises a selective appropriation of the past, not in order merely to 
retain it for antiquarian interest, but in order to use those past moments for the pre­
sent, hence his use of the word ‘Historié’ in place of the more academic term
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‘Geschichte’ in order to offer inspiration for the future. And it is this repetition of 
certain past moments and events which provide a temporary arena within which ac­
tion can take place, without being burdened by the full weight of the past, and 
without simply trying to cast history into the oblivion of forgetfulness.
To understand this further, we must accept, first, that Nietzsche’s concep­
tion of history is essentially prosopographic. History is the history of great persons 
and deeds, or at least for Nietzsche’s monumental history these are the only events 
in the past that actually count in terms of its authentic appropriation. As Nietzsche 
notes, ‘History belongs above all to the active and the mighty one, who leads a 
great struggle, who requires models, teachers, consolers and cannot find them in 
the present’ (ibid. p. 258), and in keeping with Nietzsche’s anti-egalitarian politics, 
it is to the great of today that monumental history is important.
The choice of the word monumental is by no means accidental, suggesting 
the retrieving of something permanent from the past, something which will endure 
into the future. Nietzsche makes this all the more explicit when he expounds the 
aims and principles of the monumental historian: ‘whatever was once able to stretch 
out the concept “human” and replenish it more finely, that must be ready to hand 
for eternity, in order to facilitate this for eternity. That the great moments in the 
struggle of individuals form a chain, that in them is constituted a range of 
mountains through millenia, that for me the most elevated aspect of such a moment 
long past remain alive, bright and great - that is the fundamental thought in the 
belief in humanity which expresses itself in the demand for monumental history’
(ibid. p. 259).
Nietzsche’s monumental history seems to be attempting to overcome the I
paradox which besets the historicity of human being. On the one hand human being 
is incapable of forgetting the past through the curse of memory, i.e. forgetting is an 
active process which must be forced through, rather than a mere loss of that which 
has imprinted itself on the mind. On the other it is compelled towards escaping 
from temporality to initiate action in order to avoid paralysis when caught in the 
midst of the stream of time. It is an early version of the contrast later made 
forcefully by Nietzsche between the world as eternally self-consuming, self- 
constituting on the one hand, and the human need to regard it as stable, to posit 
presence, permanence, in short Being, an activity performed by interpretative will 
to power. As Nietzsche says in a note from 1886 / 7, ‘To stamp on Becoming the 
character of Being - that is the highest will to power’ (KSA 12: 7 [54] p. 312).
Nietzsche’s wish to exercise a selective appropriation of the past in ‘On the 
Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life’ in order to form an authentic hori- |
zon for human interpretation and agency within the flux of time is encapsulated in 
the letter from Goethe to Schiller he quotes in the introduction, that ‘In any case I
I
I
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find everything detestable which merely instructs, without increasing my activity, 
or at least animating it’ (ibid* p. 245). Encouraging an ethic of mimesis, i.e. the 
mimesis of past great events and their continued execution, Nietzsche is moving 
away from a purely linear view of history and time and towards a cyclical under- J
standing. Great action is facilitated by the repetition of selected past events, a repe­
tition which establishes a momentary permanence, freeing the agent from historical 
paralysis.5 In contrast, however. Modernity seems unable to liberate itself from its 
subjection to time past. Nietzsche writes ‘you no longer succeed in keeping hold of 
the sublime . . .  for art flies away whenever you stretch the canopy of history 4
over your deeds’ (ibid. p. 280), a sentence which reinforces the crucial role of time 
in Nietzsche’s understanding of the aesthetic, pitting art against Modernity on the 
basis of the temporal.®
From this account of we see that in many ways the thought of Eternal 
Recurrence is anticipated in Nietzsche’s asseverations on the function of history 
and the past in informing human agency. However, one must be wary of trying to A
eliminate the differences between Nietzsche’s earlier thinking and his later work, i
and we must now press on to examine the manner in which he explores the f
possible meanings of Eternal Recurrence.
I shall begin with the two most accessible ‘communications’ of Nietzsche’s 
‘thought of thoughts’, namely aphorism no. 341 in The Gay Science and no. 56 of 
Beyond Good and E v il. The form of the earlier aphorism is, as I have said previ­
ously, that of a question. Nietzsche asks ‘how would it be i f . . .’ In response to 
the question he asks how one might one respond. ‘Would you not cast yourself %
down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon that spoke in this manner ? Or 
have you ever experienced a monstrous moment when you would answer him “you 
are a god, and I have never heard anything more divine !” If that thought gained #
power over you, it would change you as you are, and perhaps crush you; the ques- |
tion with everything and anything “do you want this once more, and then countless 
times again ?” would lie in your hands like the greatest of burdens’ (KSA 3 p.
570).
Nietzsche is here not putting forward a statement concerning the nature of 
cosmological time. Unlike Schopenhauer’s distinction between objective, cyclical 
time and subjective linear time, Nietzsche’s thought of Eternal Recurrence is not 
attempting to assert an objective ‘truth’ about time, indeed would not be able to.
Rather, his interest is in how human behaviour would be affected if one accepted 
the thought of Return. Does one resign oneself to this ‘vicious circle’ of time, 
cursing the very demon that suggested the idea, or does one fully affirm and 
embrace the idea, the response Nietzsche terms amor fati ? This is the crucial aspect J
of the thought of Eternal Return, inasmuch as it has bearing upon the thought of re-
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demption and transcendence, and it is this aspect which Nietzsche discusses more 
explicitly in the aphorism from Beyond Good and Evil . For here, Nietzsche notes 
that whoever attempts to fully explore pessimism in all its world-denying manifes­
tations will also be open to ‘the ideal of the most high-spirited, animated and world- 
affirming human, who has not only come to terms with what was and is, and 
learned to endure it, but also desires to have it again, just as it was and is, for eter­
nity, crying out insatiably “da capo” ’ (KSA 5 p. 75). In this aphorism and in the 
earlier one from The Gay Science Nietzsche is concerned with communicating an 
idea of time which would undermine the structure of thinking that demands re­
demption from time.
Eternal Return would thus also form part of the strategy to develop a 
philosophy of immanence, a philosophy which would be constituted by a 
configuration of thoughts opposed to those such as ‘truth’, ‘redemption’,
‘teleology’ and so forth which make up the philosophical, religious and moral 
complex generated by metaphysics. The integral role Eternal Recurrence plays in 
Nietzsche’s wider strategy of immanence can be seen clearly in the unpublished 
note from the same time as The Gay Science quoted from earlier. For in this note 
Nietzsche describes the assimilation of the idea in strictly physiological terms, as 
‘incorporation’ [Einverleibung], thus reinforcing the notion of the immanent both s|
temporally and spatially.
Following this reading it becomes clear that Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Eternal Recurrence, for all its subtlety, to a certain extent misses the mark. On two 
counts, Heidegger’s view that Eternal Recurrence represents Nietzsche fundamental 
metaphysical position as regards the question of beings and their constitution, a 
metaphysical proposition which complements and supplements the notion of will to 
power, can be shown to be misplaced. First, given Nietzsche’s extensive criticisms 
of the delusions of logic, metaphysics and science, it is difficult to imagine him 
claiming Eternal Recurrence to be the objective ‘how’ of things. In this respect 
alone, the Heideggerian interpretation is now questionable because of Heidegger’s 
disconcerting tendency to see certain ideas as constituting Nietzsche’s ‘fundamental 
metaphysical position’.
While the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is undoubtedly important to Niet­
zsche, one must be careful of seeing it as an ontological theory. Heidegger’s con­
cern with temporality is with its function in determining Dasein’s understanding of 
Being, concluding in The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology that ‘if temporality 
makes possible the Dasein in its ontological constitution, then temporality must also 
be the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being and hence of the 
projection of being upon time.’’^ Naturally, the critical reader would feel uneasy at
j
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seeing that most metaphysical of words, ‘Being’, imposed upon Nietzsche’s doc­
trine of Eternal Recurrence.
Second, even if one were instead to see Nietzsche merely as giving the idea 
the same status as his claim that reality is a chaos, i.e. admitted it to be a ‘mere’ in­
terpretation, and this is the interpretation Joan Stambaugh offers of his doctrine too, 
this would still misconstrue the tenor of Nietzsche’s speculations. For in the 
manner he presents the idea, it is apparent that Nietzsche is not necessarily inter­
ested in offering an interpretation of time, i.e. one that would be more accurate than 
the governing Aristotelian notion. Once again, he is concerned with the ethical and 
cultural implications of seeing time in a new light, regardless of its ‘truthfulness’ or 
not. He is suggesting that by viewing time cyclically, one might conceive of human 
agency and social activity differently so as to avoid the onset of reactive or passive 
Nihilism to which the thought of and desire for transcendence will give rise .
If we turn to a more recent book, namely Mark Warren’s Nietzsche and 
Political Thought, we find Eternal Recurrence no longer interpreted as an ontologi­
cal doctrine, but instead as a statement about the objective truth of human be­
haviour. Warren is, of course, correct to see the question of selfhood and recur­
rence as inextricably linked, and rightly criticises Stambaugh for producing a 
polarity between ‘historicity’ and ‘subjectivity’. However, Warren has simply 
transferred the Heideggerian interpretation from the sphere of Being to that of Self.
Eternal Recurrence is now a theory concerning the nature of human historical exis­
tence and as such recalls Freud’s use of the notion in his speculations on the func­
tion of repetition in human psychology.
The mimetic theory of human behaviour, the understanding of language as a 
system of iterable signs, and the acceptance of the fact that experiences are struc- l|
tured by a common horizon so as to give them a quality of sameness, all these con­
siderations naturally draw us towards the idea of seeing Eternal Recurrence as a de­
scriptive analysis of the temporality of human being. Yet such an interpretation fails |
to take into account the fact that Nietzsche’s interest is in how ‘incorporation’ of the 
idea of Eternal Recurrence would change and alter human practices, not in 
whether it constitutes an adequate description. The thought is described as a burden 
[Schwergewicht] which threatens to crush [zermalmen] those to whom it is com­
municated. If the doctrine is intended merely in the manner Warren interprets it, one 
runs into difficulties trying to comprehend Nietzsche’s use of such language in re­
ferring to it. Why should a mere description of the mimetic aspects of human activ­
ity be seen as a crushing burden, and moreover what room does this leave for the 
dramatic term amor fati ? To understand this still further we must turn to Niet- i
zsche’s most difficult presentation of the doctrine, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra .
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Turning to the section in book II of Thus Spoke Zarathustra entitled ‘On 
Redemption’ we find further evidence that the Eternal Recurrence is not meant as a 
description of either cosmological time or subjective temporality. For in this 
passage Nietzsche quite explicitly identifies the impossibility of recuperating the 
past, the recognition that the past cannot be changed or restored to the present, as 
one of the principle causes for the human rage against time. All volitional acts have 
to accept the past as the absolute other of the present, as absolutely irrecoverable. 
He notes that ‘ “It was”: this is the name of the Will’s gnashing of teeth and most 
solitary affliction. Important towards what has been done - it is a malevolent specta­
tor of everything past’ (KSA 4 p. 180), and adds further on, ‘The fact that time 
does not flow backwards is the cause of its anger: “Whatever was” - this is the 
name of the stone that it cannot budge’ (ibid.). And it is this very fact which is the 
origin of the Will’s desire for revenge against the past, its condemnation of the ob­
ject beyond its power, and consequently, because of the historicity of human Be­
ing, its condemnation of life itself.
Earlier in the same section we find Zarathustra coming into contact with the 
‘inverse cripples’ of Modernity, those representatives of modem theoretical culture 
who suffer from hypertrophy of one particular organ, the most striking example 
being the strange creatures consisting of an ear on a stalk. The significance of this 
episode is all too clear: their hypertrophic mutation symbolises the incomplete and 
one-sided understanding of modem humanity, with its rigid and narrow interpreta­
tive perspective on the world. As Zarathustra says, ‘I am wandering amongst hu­
mans as if amongst the fragments and limbs of humans’ (ibid. p. 178), and it is this 
notion of fragmentariness which Nietzsche then returns to when describing the 
posture of the volitional agent toward time past: ‘All “it was” is a fragment, a puz­
zle, a fearful chance event - until the creative will says to it: “but that is how I 
wanted it ! that is how I shall want it !” ’ (ibid. p. 181). The ‘it was’ remains a 
fragment inasmuch as even the affirmation of the past must needs be opened up to 
the temporal horizons of present and future.
The obsession of theoretical culture with the ‘it was’, paralleling its more 
general fragmentary and incomplete interpretative attitude towards the world, lies at 
the root of that culture’s obsessive search for redemption from time and its con­
comitant yearning to transcend mundanity. The linear understanding of time dis­
plays an inability to understand the intertwining of past present and future, and con­
sequently in its feeling of frustration at the absolute heterogeneity of the present and 
the past. Because its graphic model of time necessarily portrays the past as ir­
recoverable, it develops the various kinds of ‘madness’ [Wahnsinn] which Niet­
zsche describes in this section. It can be the nostalgia for everything past, which re­
sults in the indiscriminate preservation of all history, an attitude which as I have
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suggested earlier, is given philosophical form in Hegel’s dialectic of the history of 
Geist. Alternatively it can lead to the desire to escape from time altogether, the chief 
example being Christian ideas of redemption, but also manifest in the Hegelian goal 
of Absolute Knowledge, indeed in all forms of teleological thinking.
If this is the case, what is Nietzsche offering in its place, and what function 
does ‘authentic’ art (that is in contrast to the metaphysical ‘non-art’ of Richard 
Wagner) have in this process ? The answer to the first question comes in the section W
of Zarathustra called ‘Of the vision and the riddle’. The answer to the second 
question will have to be temporarily postponed. Coming back to Zarathustra, as is 
well known, the eponymous hero approaches the gate called ‘Moment’, a gate lying 
at the point of convergence of the two paths of eternal past and eternal future.
How should this placing of the gate between these two paths, those of the 
eternally past and the eternally futural, be understood ? Obviously Nietzsche is here 
consciously splitting away from the Aristotelian view of time where the past is that 
which is no longer and the future is not yet, by virtue of his presenting all three A
temporal aspects, past, present and future as simultaneities converging on the one |
point. In so doing he is upsetting the scheme which has sustained them as different ; ;
aspects of time, on the lines drawn in Aristotle’s Physics , a scheme we have seen 
dependant on the equation of being with being present (and hence also not passing ||
away). But Nietzsche is not aspiring to transform how we think being, as if he 
were anticipating Heidegger, for he has already argued that the privileged locus 
accorded to being is the problem, not merely something requiring clarification.
Rather, he is trying to think through the consequences for thinking about time if we 
deprive being of its privilege. For if we abandon being in the name of becoming, |
life or even semiotics, we will have to abandon, too, the easy categorisation of the 
temporal into its three well-known aspects, a categorisation maintained on the basis 
of that which is now in question.
Nietzsche writes ‘Are not all things so tightly knotted together that this mo­
ment carries all things in its wake ? - - Thus itself in addition ?’ (KSA 4 p. 200). |
With this question we can read him as claiming that all moments of time bear the 
trace or the imprint of all others, in a scheme which stresses the intertwining of 
past, present and future. It is a manner of thinking time which forbids any 
unproblematic logical and artificial separation of time into ‘aspects’. This is surely 
what Nietzsche is exhorting us to imagine, temporality where each moment of the 
present belongs to the past and to the future, robbing it of any particular privilege in 
epistemological and ontological terms. In a move so reminiscent of Derrida’s 
thematics of the trace and différance (though not assimilable to them), Nietzsche is 
pulling us away from our attachment to an inert, unchanging being present, against 
which all other aspects of temporality are judged negatively.
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How does this recasting of the problem of time represent any kind of 
solution ? In a sense it solves it by virtue of the fact that time is no longer a 
problem as such . Stripping the present of its privilege nullifies the sense of the past 
as something that is no longer, that is lost, something which must either be yearned 
for by the melancholic delusions of Antiquarian history or denigrated by the 
metaphysical demand for sempiternity.* Advancing what is initially not a 
particularly original claim, namely that time should not be seen as a series of 
discrete points, radically heterogeneous, receding into the distance as soon as they 
appear on the horizon, Nietzsche is pushing an idea through as far as he can take it, 
linking Eternal Recurrence to his critique of Being.
Significantly, his overturning of the power of being-present to determine 
the value of the other aspects of temporal existence simultaneously fortifies his 
project of immanentism. For if the present is no longer given the function of 
determining the value and character of past and future, the entire superstructure of 
metaphysics for which it serves as a foundation, will similarly fall to pieces.
Yet if this is what Nietzsche is aiming at, how does this come to resolve the 
earlier problem we noted, namely that of reconciling the historicity of human being 
with the need for an atemporal interpretative horizon ? One can begin by noting that 
Nietzsche’s ‘deconstruction* of the three aspects of temporality does not necessarily 
place one into a dimensionless flux of pure Becoming. What brings about this 
deconstruction (if it may be described in this way) also unites the three moments of 
time, namely repetition, iteration (and here we see how Eternal Recurrence 
constitutes a temporalisation of Nietzsche’s early theory of language) - and it is this 
permanent inscription of the past in the present which in addition to undermining ^
the present’s function in metaphysics, introduces a universality of form into all 
temporal moments, without granting any special status to any particular aspect of 
time. Hence we can see the dual function of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, 
displacing the ‘metaphysics of the present’ while simultaneously introducing that 
necessary horizon of ahistoricity within the flux of history, or to put it in the words 
of Heidegger, enacting a ‘permanentising of Becoming’.
Yet this inscription of past in the present does not compel us to assume a 
weary fatalism, for what is being advanced is merely a formal structure, rather than 
any particular content. If we maintain the selectivity thesis of Klossowski, we can 
see Eternal Recurrence as presenting the totality of past inscriptions as a set of 
potentialities. This can become a crushing burden if we allow ourselves to be 
overwhelmed by the sheer range of potentialities, becoming, like Achilles in 
‘Homer’s Competition* I discussed in Chapter two, literally paralysed by the 
infinity of choices. Alternatively it can be an opportunity to exercise a certain 
selectivity, in choosing which marks we should allow to inscribe themselves on the
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future, which itself will eventually be our own past. We can choose which patterns 
should become recurrent, and change who we are, as individuals, and once again 
Klossowski sees the strong internal connection between Eternal Recurrence and 
identity.
The parallel with the Heideggerian model is all too clear, for Heidegger’s 
own analysis of authenticity is concerned with the temporal ekstases of Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world. Yet despite the surface similarities between the two thinkers, 
the unity of Eternal Recurrence should not be confused with the unified horizon of 
the three ekstases of Heideggerian temporality^. Heidegger’s initial treatment of the 
temporal structure of care stresses the equi-primordial role of past, present and fu­
ture, noting that ‘We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of 
having been, and the Present, the ekstases of temporality [Zeitlichkeit]. Tem­
porality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from itself ; its essence is #
a process of temporalising in the unity of the e k s t a s e s . I n  this he would be seen 
rightly as working against the common-sense ‘inauthentic’ view of time as an end- i
less linear succession of nows, ‘without beginning and without end’. ^
However Heidegger then reverts to the former model when he asserts that 
all three ekstases are determined by the future, an understanding of time no doubt 
governed by the importance of projection, intentionality and ‘anticipatory resolute­
ness’ in the argument of Being and Time . Heidegger writes, for example, that ‘we 
have always mentioned the future first . . .  to indicate that the future has a prior- $
ity in the ekstatical unity of primordial and authentic temporality’ {Being and Time |
p. 378), adding in a following section that ‘If the term “understanding” is taken in a 
way which is primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potential- 
ity-for-Being for the sake o f which any Dasein exists ’ (ibid. p. 385). In The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger continues this theme still further, articulat­
ing it ever more explicitly and thoroughly, until he actually equates understanding 
and futurality when he notes that ‘Understanding is primarily futural, for it comes 
towards itself from its chosen possibility of itself. In coming-towards-itself the 
Dasein has also already taken itself over as the being that it in each case already has 
been’ {Basic Problems p. 287). With the arc of intentionality governing Dasein’s 
relation to the world and the temporal foundations of its Being-in-the-world, both 
past and present gain their meaning from anticipation of future possibilities of 
being, what Heidegger terms ‘repetitive self-precedence’. In other words, Dasein is 
always going out beyond itself, projecting itself onto its own can-be, whence it re­
turns to exercise an authentic gathering up of its own present and past.
The significance of this aspect of Heidegger’s understanding of time lies in 
the fact that his concern with projection inevitably leads him back to the idea of 
transcendence, a key term in his existential analysis of Dasein. ^  For
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‘Transcendence’, as Heidegger notes, denotes a ‘stepping over’, and as such it is 
not objects that can be ‘transcendent’ but only ‘subjects’, which, grounded in the 
temporal structure of Dasein can step beyond themselves, indeed of necessity must, 
since it is this that facilitates comportment toward the world. Heidegger continues 
to explicitly reject any notion of immanence, stating that ‘Transcendence is even the 
pre-supposition for Dasein’s having the character of a self. The selfhood of Dasein 
is founded on its transcendence, and Dasein is not first an ego-self which then 
oversteps something or other’ (ibid. p. 300), an understanding which leads Hei­
degger to criticise Leibniz* monadological account of mental substances.
The importance of this excursus on Heidegger is to prise apart the two 
philosophers’ thoughts on time when they seem so similar. For the significant dif­
ference lies in Nietzsche’s refusal to grant special status to any of the three aspects 
of temporality. On a superficial level, the individual in Nietzsche, too, steps out be­
yond itself in the mere present, yet it steps out toward its own p a s t , fulfilling the 
possibility of a selective repetition and re-appropriation of its own past for the 
future. The individual is caught within the circle of his or her own history, with no 
possibility of stepping outside itself toward an absolute temporal other. It is this 
difference, too, with respect to the past, which makes Heidegger so much closer to 
Kant and metaphysics than Nietzsche. For Heidegger the primordial importance of 
projection entails that the ultimate act of Dasein’s self-transcendence is its relation to 
death and annihilation. As such death constitutes a given with the same significance 
we have seen it have for Kant and Schiller’s theories of the sublime, with the 
experience of the sublime providing the sternest test of one’s relation to one’s own |
mortality. Sharing no such morbid interest in death, Nietzsche is concerned with 
articulating an ethic that does not gain its primary meaning from the fact of human 
mortality. An ethic that therefore undercuts the claims of all moral and cultural 
practices devoted to a transcending of the present and the past, and of life itself.
Art
If we turn to the question of art and its relation to the problem of time, we 
encounter a complex set of arguments which link both Nietzsche’s early writing 
and his later thought. In The Birth o f Tragedy Nietzsche draws much of his 
account of beauty from Schopenhauer, where the beautiful is characterised as the 
permanent, hence the exclamation of the Apollinian dreamer, ‘It is a dream, I want 
to continue [my Italics] dreaming.’ Built into the structure of the beautiful is the 
will to permanence, and it exemplifies that deepest human drive for stability and 
ahistoricity, to which goal metaphysical will to power devotes all its interpretative 
energies. As Zarathustra sings, in the famous poem towards the end of the fourth
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book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra , ‘Pain speaks: Pass into decline ! /  Yet all desire 
wants eternity - / -  wants deep, deep eternity !’ (KSA 4 p. 404).
Yet the significance of the beautiful, and especially the work of art, is not to 
be derived solely from its tendency to produce permanence within the temporal 
flow of life or Becoming. This, in its most general form, would be common to art 
and to all human interpretative activity in general. Additionally, this will to form, 
this will to permanence at all time must not be confused with the task of antiquarian 
history, which in its desperate attempt to transcend time and history, seeks to 
literally bring time to a halt by the unselective preservation of everything past. The 
significance of art does not lie in this indiscriminate conservation of everything 
past. Rather, as will to power, as Becoming, in a manner analogous to Monumental 
History and Eternal Recurrence, it too represents a selective production of perma- i
nence, engendered by the rapture of the aesthetic state. Heidegger recognises this 
too when he entitles one of his chapters on Nietzsche ‘Rapture as Form- 
engendering Force’, and it is an understanding of Nietzsche’s aesthetics, already 
present in an embryonic state in The Birth o f Tragedy , which accounts for his later 
turn to what Adrian del Caro terms ‘Dionysian C l a s s i c i s m ’ . 12
Turning to Twilight o f the Idols , for example, we find a number of crucial 
aphorisms, most notably in the section entitled ‘Skirmishes of an Untimely One’ 
which make this selective affirmation all the more explicit. In the eighth aphorism *
Nietzsche writes that ‘The essential thing about rapture is the feeling of increased ;•
power and plenitude. From these powers one bestows upon things, one compels 
them to take from us, one violates them - this process is called Idealising . . .  A 
sweeping emphasis on the main features, so that the others disappear beyond them’
(KSA 6 p. 116). In the following aphorism Nietzsche begins: ‘In this state [i.e. the 
state of rapture or intoxication] one enriches everything out of one’s own plenitude: 
one sees what one wants to see, one sees it swollen, pressed, strong, overladen 
with power’ (ibid. pp. 116-7).
Art, for Nietzsche, affirms not through its symbolic representation of tran­
scendence, or through the transcendent redemption of the aesthetic state. Rather it 
transfigures through the production of the monumental. In the same way that Niet­
zsche imagines the thought of Eternal Recurrence capable of giving birth to an 
ethic of immanentism, so the selective recurrence and repetition of the strong, the 
great, serves to give birth to an aesthetic affirmative redemption, or better, transfig­
uration of the world. That horizon of ahistoricity required for human agency is 
brought about in art through its selective permanentising of a temporal world. In his 
notes from 1888 Nietzsche writes that ‘artists are not to see anything as it is, but 
more fully, but more simply, but more strongly: for this they must have a manner 
of eternal youth and spring, a type of permanent rapture in their body’ (KSA 13: 14
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[117] p. 295). Avoiding the Christian and metaphysical urge to transcend the tem­
porality of this world, either by preserving everything or negating everything, art 
reinforces human immanence in the world. Selectively preserving the past and pre­
senting it as a challenge for future action and understanding, art transfigures the 
world of immanence, a transfiguration which, Nietzsche hopes, will help move 
human thinking away fix>m its pressing desire for the beyond, both temporally and 'i
spatially.
Hence we can see how in Nietzsche’s writing art and the beautiful, as will 
to power, thematise the temporality of will to power, through the explicit produc­
tion of a permanent presence which nevertheless demands to be taken on its own 
terms, i.e. without reference to some external criteria of judgement. Nietzsche is If
here attempting to steer a course between a Formalist understanding of art and the 
moralising understanding of art against which Formalist aesthetics rebels. True, the S
work of art does exhibit a certain self-containedness, inasmuch as it produces a 
world which must be taken on its terms. Yet its significance lies in its status as an 
objectification of interpretative will to power. The work represents a putting-to- 
work of truth, though not in any Heideggerian sense of phrase, since truth must be 
seen as a function of the interpretative horizon opened by will to power.
Interpretative will to power, as a process of the continual accrual of power 
and mastery is frequently seen by Nietzsche as a process stimulated by the over­
coming of resistance, by the negation of the O t h e r . ^3 Nietzsche writes, for exam­
ple, that ‘will to power can only express itself against resistance; it searches for that 
which resists it’ (KSA 12: 9 [151] p. 424), a conviction which he repeats in a note 
from 1887-8, claiming that ‘All expansion, incorporation, growth is a striving 
against resistance, movement is essentially something bound up with states of dis­
pleasure’ (KSA 13: 11 [111] p. 52). It is perhaps on the basis of this view of will 
to power that we can better understand why tragedy occupies such a cardinal place 
in Nietzsche’s aesthetics, why tragedy should seem such a significant instantiation 
of the notion of art as an interpretative putting-to-work of truth. For the conjoining 
of Eternal Recurrence, Becoming and interpretative will to power which I am argu­
ing occurs in art, occurs to a heightened degree in the tragic work of art.
As I argued in my chapter on The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche employs the 
aesthetics of the sublime as formulated by Kant, Schiller and others as the basis of 
his reading of tragedy and art in general. The tragic drama performs a twofold 
function: through its mimesis of destruction and negation it draws out the limits of 
human knowing, overthrowing all attempts at making meaning. As such it 
represents a general articulation of the human existential predicament, undertaking 
to achieve, in dramatic terms, what Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics performs in 
philosophical discourse, namely the attempt to dispel the belief in the fixity of the
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order of signs. The second function, or what might be termed the positive moment 
of the dialectic, is then to overturn this negation of the belief in grammar and 
transform it into a challenge. A challenge both to open up a discursive space within 
which judgements concerning truth and falsity can be made, and also to accept the I
contingent nature of any such reconstructed interpretative horizon. In other words, 
the tragic work of art is a sensuous, artistic representation of the eternally present t
Becoming of interpretative will to power.
Hence while in many other ways he is explicitly opposed to the tradition of 
post-Kantian aesthetics, Nietzsche has here, perhaps unconsciously, appropriated a 
central element of the Idealist and Romantic philosophies of art in order to translate 
his most radical thoughts concerning truth, knowledge and time into the sphere of 
aesthetics. His reading of tragedy implies a certain way of understanding the 
meaning of truth and temporality, none of which is articulated fully at the time of |
the composition of The Birth o f Tragedy , yet which comes to be confirmed in his 
later work, according to the interpretation I have given here. Moreover it is not an 
understanding which he rejects. In both his preface to the second edition of 1886 
and in his commentary on the work in Ecce Homo Nietzsche claims his major in­
novation to be the introduction of the notion of the Dionysian, and here I read the 
words ‘Dionysian’ and ‘Dionysus’, as they appear in his later work, to be 
rhetorical figures, metonyms for the whole dialectic of tragic wisdom outlined 
above. In his later writings the dialectic of Dionysian and Apollinian becomes 
supplanted by the oppositional pairs Dionysus and Christ (or the Crucified) and 
Dionysus and Socrates. Both form the function of symbolising the conflict between 
a metaphysical and non-metaphysical world interpretation (one hesitates to use the 
word post-metaphysical since as a temporal designation, it singularly fails to 
account for the Greek world view).
Following such a reading, one would have no difficulty either in countering 
the criticism of the young Nietzsche made by Eugen Fink^^ that the Dionysian lacks 
conceptual clarity and is rather more intuited ‘mystically’. Quite simply, the 
Dionysian is not a concept which could somehow be translated into ‘clear’, 
determinate conceptual language. It functions more as a metonym for the 
specifically artistic overcoming of metaphysical thinking, without being given the 
status of some mystic intuition.
The Temporal Ontology of Art
We have observed how the work of art, as an accomplishment of will to power, as 
the creation of a world, thematises the temporal process of Becoming and Eternal 
Recurrence, by producing a non-metaphysical permanence, or presence, and in the
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tragic artwork, by producing a non-metaphysical world. In each of these aspects of 
art we find an implicit affirmation of immanence, a refusal to present a world that 
might transcend its own temporality, where human being is being-in-the-world and 
also being-in-time, and it is an evaluation which is affirmed. However, inasmuch 
as the temporality of the work of art represents an important weapon in Nietzsche’s 
war against the metaphysics of the transcendent, the temporal ontology of art 
presents terrain needing further exploration.
In laying out a temporal ontology of art I intend to focus on two key areas 
within the work of art itself, namely, art’s lack of interpretative finality and its the- 
matising of its own materiality. I shall deal with each in turn.
A crucial aspect of Kant’s Aesthetics is the notion that the aesthetic object is 
inhabited by an essential semantic ambiguity, and indeed it is this indeterminacy 
which in Kant makes aesthetic judgement into such an important vehicle for the free 
play of the imagination. Both in judgements of the beautiful and in judgements of 
the sublime the significant factor is the conceptual indeterminacy of the representa­
tion such that no objective finality can be imputed to it, for ‘in order to represent an 
objective finality in a thing we must first have a concept of what sort of thing it is to 
be’ (§ 15). This lack of a specific concept of what sort of thing the representation is 
meant to be, while usually seen as the distinguishing mark of free beauty (as op­
posed to dependent beauty) is extended in the Analytic of the Sublime to include 
both the sublime and the beautiful. Kant writes, ‘the beautiful seems to be regarded 
as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of understanding, the sublime as a 
presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason’ (§ 23).
In other words, the conceptual indeterminacy of the representation means 
that while the representation does seem to possess a certain internal finality, hence 
purposiveness, we can never truly establish with conviction what that purpose is.
The imagination can supply possible final ends to the representation, but will never 
be able to rest on a final purpose. It is a process which Kant sees as providing an 
enhancement of life, noting that ‘the beautiful is directly attended with a feeling of 
the furtherance of life, and is compatible with charms and a playful imagination’ 
adding that ‘the sublime is a pleasure . . . brought about by the feeling of a mo­
mentary check to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge all the more I
powerful’ (ibid.).
In the case of the sublime, what defeats the possibility of any conceptual fi­
nality is the magnitude of the representation, which so threatens to overwhelm the 
senses that we pay no attention to trying to form a concept of what sort of thing it 
is. Crowther writes, for example, ‘an animal of a definite species could be sublime.
It would have to be of so monstrous a size that, psychologically speaking, we are 
so engrossed in the act of trying perceptually to apprehend its enormity that we pay
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no attention to (indeed are wholly distracted from) the kind of animal it is. In this 
case the animal’s very size is “contra-final”.’^^
Significantly, Kant discusses art in the ‘Analytic of the Sublime’, rather 
than the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, since art, like the sublime, instead of merely 
producing a free play of the faculties, actually induces a tension between the imagi­
nation and understanding by the sensuous presentation of aesthetic ideas. Aesthetic 
ideas, i.e. those ideas of reason ‘which language . . . can never get quite on level 
terms with or render completely intelligible’ (§ 49) thus present an image in art 
which ‘surpasses nature*, able to ‘re-model imagination.’ Now this chapter is not 
intended to offer a further discussion the Kantian sublime per se, however the brief 
excursus above is intended to support my claim that once again, Nietzsche, for all 
his putative opposition to Kantian aesthetics, has in fact reinscribed a crucial ele­
ment of Kantian philosophy in the corpus of his own thinking. I shall elaborate 
further.
First, Kant’s central claim concerning the purposiveness without purpose of 
the beautiful, or the conceptual indeterminacy of the sublime and art leads to the no­
tion that the process of comprehending and apprehending the representation is 
never completed. More specifically, in cases of the mathematical sublime, for 
example, time would literally have to stand still for the subject to intuit the sublime 
in its limitless and infinite plenitude. Naturally this constitutes a paradox, since time 
is itself a form of intuition, and hence as a constituent of experience cannot be 
overcome. In other words the subject is caught in a temporal loop, robbed of any 
finality in its attempt to come to terms with the object of aesthetic judgement.
Second, Kant considers this to be an invigorating process, one which con­
stantly remodels experience, one which encourages the functioning of the mental 
faculties. Even in the case of the sublime, which one might consider to be an en­
tirely negative, because overwhelming, experience, Kant regards it as indirectly en­
hancing the cognitive faculties, causing an ever greater discharge of cognitive ener­
gies. This restructuring of experience which Kant accords to art introduces a theme 
repeated by Nietzsche, who claims in Human All-too human that ‘religion and art 
(metaphysical philosophy too) take pains to transform sensibility, partly through 
transformation of our judgements about our experiences . . . partly through the 
awakening of pleasure in pain, in emotion per se (whence the art of the tragic 
serves as their starting point’ (KSA 2 p. 107).
Focusing on these two particular aspects of Kant’s theory, we see how eas­
ily they translate into Nietzsche’s own philosophy of art. Most particularly in the 
notion of indeterminacy, which became a key element in both the art theories of the 
Romantics and in Hegel’s analysis of Romantic art. It is moreover an
■I
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understanding of art which mimics the paradigm of knowledge-as-interpretation in 
Nietzsche’s thought which I have emphasised throughout this thesis.
Ambiguity is a theme which runs throughout Nietzsche’s writings, and 
most particularly his writings on the Romantic and the Classical, as cultural and 
artistic typological classifications. However its importance for Nietzsche first ap­
pears in his response to the music of Wagner, and to Wagner’s compositional 
method, the so-called ‘unendliche Melodic’. In the second book of Human All-too 
human, written when he had already become disaffected with the work of Wagner, 
Nietzsche nevertheless recognises the significance of Wagner’s music. He notes, 
‘Perhaps this is the most essential of his innovations. His famous artistic means . 
. . strives at breaking all mathematical regularity of power and time [my italics] . 
. . and he is superabundant in the invention of such effects as sound to the older 
ear like rhythmical paradoxes and insults’ (KSA 2 p. 434-5). Of course Nietzsche’s 
assessment of Wagner’s ‘unendliche Melodic’ will subsequently change, seeing the 
sense of disorientation in Wagner’s as a sign of enfeebled will to power and lack of 
control. However, while Nietzsche might take exception to the paradoxes in the 
music of Wagner, in general he still imputes considerable importance to ambiguity 
in other art forms.
In the first volume of Human All-too human ascribes the effect of art to its 
lack of finality. He opens aphorism 178 with the title ‘Incompleteness as that which 
is effective [das Wirksame]’ (KSA 2 p. 161), and then elaborates how ‘relief fig­
ures work so strongly on the imagination that they are, as it were, on the point of 
stepping off from the wall and suddenly, hindered somehow, come to a halt: simi­
larly the relief-like representation of a thought, of a whole philosophy, is more ef­
fective than an exhaustive excursus’ (ibid.). It is an argument he repeats in apho­
rism 199 of the same book, describing ‘Incompleteness as an artistic stimulant’ 
KSA 2 p. 167), and claiming that ‘Incompleteness is frequently more effective than 
completeness’ (ibid.).
Indeed the entire section entitled ‘From the soul of artists and writers’ is lit­
tered with aphorisms which assert the importance of ambiguity and non-sense as an 
artistic stimulant. In § 213 he discusses the ‘Joy in nonsense [Unsinn]’ (KSA 2 p. 
174) claiming that the ‘overthrowing of experience into its opposite, of purposive­
ness into purposelessness . . . causes pleasure’ (ibid.). Although he may claim 
to be deliberately challenging Kant’s celebrated maxim of ‘purposiveness without 
purpose’, Nietzsche can here be seen rather to be merely pursuing to an extreme 
what is implicit in Kant’s Critique o f Judgement . It is a way of thinking which 
points towards the later view expressed in 1888 that ‘the aesthetic state has a su­
perabundance of means of communication . . .  it is the high point of communi- 
cability’ (KSA 13: 14 [119] p. 296). Here I take Nietzsche to be referring to the ex-
J
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cess of meaning in any particular work of art, for the aesthetic state ‘is the source of 
languages . . . languages of tone as well as the languages of gesturing and look­
ing’ (ibid., pp. 296-7). It is a claim which supports the idea of the aesthetic state 
(and hence the work of art) as the site of the creation of meaning, rather than merely |
replicating predetermined patterns of signification.
The notion of the fragmentary, whose importance to German Romanticism 
is well attested!^ remains a prime concern for Nietzsche, too. In The Gay Science , 
for example, he writes of ‘The stimulus of incompleteness’ noting that ‘I see here a 
poet who, like many a person, achieves a higher stimulus with his imperfections 
than with everything which is well-rounded and perfectly formed in his hands’
(KSA 3 p. 434). Continuing in this vein Nietzsche writes ‘His work never com­
pletely expresses what he would like to express, what he would like to have seen; it 
appears as if he has had the foretaste of a vision, not the vision itself’ (ibid.).
It is this adoption of a Kantian thematic which lies at the root of Nietzsche’s f
celebration of plurality and ambiguity, the ‘joy in uncertainty and polysemy’ (KSA 
5 p. 168) where ‘the spirit thereby enjoys its plurality of masks and its artfulness .
. . it feels best protected and concealed precisely through its Protean art’ (ibid.). It 
is a conviction retained by Nietzsche up until his final writings, claiming in 
Twilight o f the Idols that one is inevitably compromising oneself ‘whenever one is 
consistent. Whenever one goes in a straight line. Whenever one is less than 
quinquesemic [fünfdeutig]’ (KSA 6 p. 122).
Nietzsche is not making a claim concerning all artistic forms of expression, 
for as I suggested earlier, he makes a typological distinction between Romantic and 
Classical which can be read as a metaphor for his own complex clash with 
Modernity. A note from 1887 entitled ‘Aesthetica’, makes quite clear the manner in 
which the notion of ambiguity becomes translated in Nietzsche’s thinking into a 
specific problem for the modern. He argues, for example, that ‘the preference for 
questionable and terrible things is a symptom of strength’ (KSA 12: 10 [168] p.
556), repeating his claim later when he writes ‘It is a sign of the feeling of power 
and well-being how much one can ascribe to things their terrifying, their 
questionable character; and whether one at all needs “resolutions” at the end’
(ibid.).
Hence we conclude the ‘strong’ work of art refuses to produce any finality 
of meaning, instead affirming its own ambiguities, the ambiguities of the world it 
has created. As such it is bound up to the temporal structure of Eternal Return. The 
work of art, and here Nietzsche is still thinking primarily of tragedy, refuses to 
offer some final moment of resolution which would produce a moment of stasis. It 
thematises the lack of interpretative finality of the world in general, and hence we 
see all the more the connection between the world and the text, viewing the world
. J
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as a text, art as the world, an understanding which I have drawn on in the first 
chapter and which is corroborated in the reading of N e h e m a s . ^ ^
In stressing the significance of the incomplete, the fragmentary, the 
ambiguous in Nietzsche’s aesthetics, I have also brought to prominence a problem 
in Nietzsche’s work. For this does not appear to allow room for his so-called %
Dionysian classicism. An additional problem in this regard is brought to our 
attention by what Nietzsche writes further on in the 1887 NachlaB note I have just 
quoted. He writes as follows; ‘the artists of decadence, who at bottom stand ni­
hilistically towards life, take refuge in the beauty of form . . .  in the select things 
where nature became perfect [ . . . ] the “love of beauty” can thus be something 
other than the faculty of seeing the beautiful, of creating the beautiful: it can also be 
the expression of inability’ (ibid. p. 557).
With these remarks Nietzsche seems to have overturned his prior schematic 
opposition of Romantic and Classic, or modern and amodern (I resist using the 
word post-modern because of the connotations already accruing to it). Previously 
the modem, or the décadent, bore the mark of disorganisation, lack of form and so 
forth, whereas in contrast the Classical is admired precisely because it represents a i
putting-to-work of will to power, an ability to control and master, a phenomenon I 
shall discuss in greater depth in the next chapter. Now the characteristics seem to be 
reversed. Additionally Nietzsche sees strength manifest not only in the beautiful but 
also in the ugly. In one of the NachlaB notes of 1888 he argues, ‘There is no pes­
simistic art . . .  art affirms. Job affirms. But 2k)la ? de Concourt ? The things 
they show are ugly, but that they show them comes from joy in the ugly . .  . it’s 
no good ! you are fooling yourselves if you claim otherwise. How liberating Dos­
toyevsky is !’ (KSA 13:14 [47].
Need this be an insoluble problem ? An easy answer would be to deny the 
necessity of having to ‘resolve’ the difficulty, most especially in the context of the 
present chapter. However if we are attempting to understand why Nietzsche creates 
the problem for himself such an answer will seem less than satisfactory. Instead we 
may perhaps resolve the difficulty by turning to the ambiguous character of a wide 
variety of Nietzschean themes such as Nihilism, art, truth and so forth.
As I have previously argued. Nihilism is a bi-valent notion, implying both a 
reactive and an active response towards the death of God, i.e. the legitimacy crisis 
of Modernity. So too, if we extend his argument we can see this bi-valency operat­
ing in Nietzsche’s critical aesthetics. The love of destruction, or of the terrible, for 
example can equally be the product of two very different attitudes. In The Gay Sci­
ence Nietzsche observes ‘The longing for destruction, change. Becoming can be 
the expression of a superabundant power pregnant with the future (my term for 
that, as is known, is “Dionysian”); but it can also be the hate of thé ill-constituted.
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the disinherited, the underprivileged, who destroys, has to destroy, because that 
which is permanent, indeed all permanence, all Being itself, provokes it and 
arouses indignation’ (KSA 3 p. 621). Likewise, in the same aphorism, Nietzsche 
claims that the will to eternalisation can be both a sign of strength, and here he 
gives the examples of Rubens, Goethe, Hafiz and Homer, and also of weakness, 
of ressentiment, symptomatic of which he finds Wagner and Schopenhauer.
By issuing such a disclaimer, is Nietzsche simply refusing to deal with the 
full difficulties of the problem ? Initially this does seem to be the case, but on closer 
inspection, perhaps he can be defended from such a criticism. For once again to 
understand the meaning of Dionysian classicism, the active will to eternalisation 
and also to destruction, we have to return to the original scheme of The Birth o f 
Tragedy and the dialectical interplay of affirmation and negation.
To recall, in The Birth o f Tragedy the artistic process is constituted by a 
double movement of negation and affirmation. The Apollinian will to eternity must 
be disrupted by the negation of the Dionysian, which in turn must be mollified once 
again by the presentification of some form of permanence, no matter how 
contingent. In other words, it is a matter of recognising the necessity of some inter­
pretative horizon, which must be affirmed, but whose contingency and hence im­
permanence , must also be affirmed. The horizon of interpretation must be affirmed 
together with its own negation in the dialectic of the contingent. It is a problem, the 
temporal aspect of which Nietzsche first broaches in ‘On the Advantage and Disad­
vantage of History for Life’.
I have already argued earlier in this chapter that Nietzsche employs the term 
‘Dionysian’ in his later work as a metonym for the dialectic of Dionysian and 
Apollinian, of the simultaneous affirmation and negation of mundane semiosis. 
Given this reading, his Dionysian classicism is not merely a re-working of the 
Apollinian will to form, recast in the thematics of will to power. Rather, it is a will 
to form which is also a will to the dissolution of that particular formal configuration 
just achieved, as a necessary moment of tragic wisdom. What distinguishes 
Dionysian classicism from the classicism of the Modem is that the Modem seeks 
refuge in the form thus achieved, in a process that might be termed an ‘ideology of 
the permanent’. In contrast, for Dionysian classicism, that sense of organisation, of 
harmony achieved does not function as some kind of therapy, or a redemptive 
turning away from Becoming. For it is permanence always-already waiting to be 
dissolved and re-figured, and in this way art can be said to be both creating 
perfection [Vollkommenheit] yet also functioning through its essential imperfection 
[Unvollkommenheit], and incompleteness [Unvollstandigkeit].
Nietzsche’s immanentism is fortified further in his philosophy of art by the 
attention he devotes to the artist’s thematisation of the material constituting the
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artwork. Generalising what is commonly regarded as the specific characteristic of 
artistic modernism, Nietzsche sees the preoccupation with the means of the artwork 
as an ahistorical feature of all genuinely artistic creativity, though without wanting 
to reduce art to a self-contained, autonomous praxis, or to read aesthetic rapture as 
a concern merely with the configuration of the formal elements of the work in a 
Kantian manner. He writes in 1888, for example, that ‘the artist gradually comes to 
love the means whereby the states of rapture makes itself known for their own 
sake: the extreme subtlety and splendour of colour, the clarity of line, nuances of I
tone: the distinct, where elsewhere, normally, all distinction is lacking -: all distinct 
things, all nuances, inasmuch as they recall the extreme increases in strength that 
rapture produces’ (KSA 13: 14 [47] p. 241).
In other words, rather than presenting the work of art as a self-effacing 
world-image, as a fiction which points beyond itself to some other, transcendent 
truth, the work foregrounds its own status as a work of human artifice, constituted 
by materials such as paint, stone, wood, or by a structure such as language or the 
tonic scale, as in music. As such this foregrounding of the material aspects of the 
work again emphasises the ‘things of this world’, to borrow Goethe’s phrase 
which Nietzsche himself quotes. Nietzsche writes, ‘To strive for desensualisation, 
that seems to me to be a misunderstanding or an illness or a cure, where it is not 
mere hypocrisy and self-deception’ (KSA 11: 37 [12] p. 587), adding that ‘it is a 
sign of having turned out well [Wohlgerathenheit] when one clings with ever more 
joy and warmheartedness to “the things of the world” - such that one holds fast to 
the great conception of the human, that the human becomes the transfigurer of 
existence, once he has leamt to transfigure himself’ (ibid. pp. 587-8).
With this we are brought back by a circuitous route to Kant’s aesthetics and 
perhaps, too, to Hegel. We recall that Kant attributed art’s semantic indeterminacy 
to its embodiment of aesthetic ideas, these ideas being such that by their very nature 
they do not permit of adequate representation in forms wholly accessible to the con­
cepts of the Understanding. In contrast, however, Nietzsche is committing himself 
to a claim that clashes sharply with Kant’s view. No longer attempting to overcome 
the sensuous material of the work, treating it as if it were a hindrance, the artist 
draws attention to the material, consciously playing with its forms. Ultimately, of 
course, Nietzsche will arrive at a conclusion similar to that of Kant, and as I have 
suggested before, of Hegel too, most especially in the latter’s treatment of 
Romantic art, namely that the work of art lacks determinate meaning. His reasons 
for coming to this conclusion, however, are notably different from either of the two 
earlier thinkers, as is clear from the foregoing discussion.
The significance of this brings us back to the question of immanence, for 
not only does this foregrounding of the material emphasise the sensuous, and bring ;:|
In this chapter I have developed the discussion of Nietzsche’s philosophy of art 
from his concern with the possibility of meaning articulated in The Birth of Tragedy 
to discussing the way art forms part of his more mature critique of metaphysics. In 
other words, whereas Nietzsche recognises the problem in The Birth of Tragedy, 
and sees tragedy as a manner of formulating a response to that problem, in his later 
work we see more specific ways whereby art undermines metaphysics. In 
particular I have outlined the complex of ideas concerning time, analysing how they 
challenge the redemptive structure of metaphysical thinking, and then seeing how 
they coalesce in the tragic work of art.
In particular, Nietzsche’s criticism of the metaphysical notion of time as a 
linear succession of discrete points suggests an alternative idea of temporality to 
provide the basis for a more life-affirming, ‘authentic’ understanding of human be­
ing in the world. This involves coming to grips with the problem of the historicity 
of human existence and simultaneous need for amnesia, or ahistoricity, in order to 
be able to function as a moral agent and a thinking being.
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our attention to the actual fictional world created in such and such a fashion. It also 
draws attention to the process of artistic creation. Art as a self-conscious process of 
fictionalisation, art as a self-conscious manipulation of certain materials following 
specific techniques, both these features resist the notion of some spontaneous ma­
terial embodiment of a transcendent truth, and rather bring to the fore art’s status as 
work . As early as the first volume of Human All-too human (§ 162) Nietzsche 
had criticised the ideology of the genius, for precisely this reason, that it promotes ^
the illusion of spontaneity, a quality praised at the expense of activity and work. As 
Nietzsche says, ‘everything that is ready, perfect is admired, everything in the pro­
cess of becoming is undervalued . . . The perfected art of representation dis­
misses all thought of Becoming, it tyrannises as present perfection’ (KSA 2 p.
152).
I am not thereby claiming that Nietzsche attaches particular importance to |
work as a category of analysis in the Marxian fashion. A foregrounding of the 
nature of the work of art as a product of human artifice, however, as a something 
which takes place during a length of time, as opposed to the Enlightenment and |
Romantic ideologies of genius, can be seen as apparent in Nietzsche’s writing. In 
this regard we can see too, then, the importance of the incomplete in art, as a means 
of foregrounding art as a process of Becoming, indeed as a means of fore­
grounding immanent Becoming per se.
Conclusion
I
,î
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Although Nietzsche here seems to have set off on a course which bears little 
relation to what has gone before, there is a strong internal unity between the ques­
tions of time, the dialectic of interpretation and sublimity. As we saw in the first 
two chapters, Nietzsche employs the dialectic of will to power to give shape to his 4
theory of interpretation. The dialectic of interpretation provides for the non-cu- |
mulative increase of perspectives in a process which mimics the Hegelian path to 
Self-Consciousness, though without assuming the possibility of some telos. This 
process of interpretation, where each perspective is dissolved as soon as it comes 4
into being, where useless perspectives are discarded and others preserved, is what I 
take Eternal Recurrence to be. As a model which has no place for the anagogy of 
metaphysics, the interpretative circle presents the possibility of infinite interpretivity 
- the world can be interpreted in an infinite number of ways, because as Nehemas ?
says, it is always possible to produce different interpretations.
If we transpose this scheme to the sphere to art, then we see that the circle q
of interpretation finds its purest expression in art, thanks to the sublime, once 
more. In his mature writings Nietzsche has preserved the sublime in his 
understanding of art, but without the humanist and metaphysical trappings which 
accompanied the account in The Birth o f Tragedy. For the sublime negation of the 
quotidian system of signs we identified as earlier taking place in the tragic 
annihilation of the hero is now manifest in the lack of interpretative finality of the 
artwork, a situation mirroring the idea that the aesthetic state is that state where the 
production of meaning (and hence the disruption of the previous web of meaning) à
takes place. Once again, though reluctant to admit it, Nietzsche has employed the 
conceptual resources of the tradition of aesthetics, more specifically of Kant, in 
order to formulate a supremely counter-metaphysical theory.
Having dealt with the relation of art to Nietzsche’s rethinking of temporality 
we must now turn to that other key area where art plays a crucial role in rejecting 
redemptive thinking, namely in Nietzsche’s physiology of art. In a manner parallel 
to the adoption of Eternal Recurrence as a counter-redemptive strategy, so too Niet­
zsche makes extensive use of physiological language to fortify his project, a turn 
which will bring together explicitly the questions of art and of will to power. It is to 
this topic that I now proceed.
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Contra Kant: Art and Physiology
In my last chapter I explored Nietzsche’s pre-occupation with models of time as 
tools in his wider counter-metaphysical, counter-redemptive strategy of thinking. 
As such we might say that he develops the temporal aspect of the ‘immanent’. The 
notion of transcendence, however, is one which has both a temporal and a spatial 
dimension, and the concept consequently depends on extensive use of spatial and 
temporal metaphors for its exposition. This has become apparent from the 
discourse of the sublime, which in the eighteenth century relied heavily on the 
metaphor of transport, itself derived from the vocabulary of Longinus. We can see 
this, too, for example, in Heidegger’s analysis of ekstasis, where Dasein not only 
projects itself forward into its own futural horizon, but also goes beyond itself - as 
if Dasein could physically leave its current embodied location and survey its own 
possibilities from some non-locatable Archimedean point. ^
It is this aspect of transcendence, as a spatial remove from mundanity (and 
the double meaning of ‘mundane’ as ‘earthly’ and also ‘trivial, average, 
unexceptional’ indicates the negative value attached to worldhood) which we shall 
see Nietzsche criticising in this chapter. Once again it will fall to art to act as the site 
where the individual is brought back to earth and rooted firmly in the world, and 
more specifically it will be the relation of art and the body which will achieve this 
goal.
Erie Blondel, in his magisterial book on Nietzsche and the body2 has ex­
haustively analysed the linguistic structure of Nietzsche’s texts, pointing out not 
only the metaphors of the body that Nietzsche uses extensively, but also his pur­
poseful lack of any uniform style, his frequent refusal to present logical proposi­
tions (see, for example, paragraph § 125 of The Gay Science which presents the 
reader with some thirty one unanswered questions in the space of two pages), his 
use of active substantive verbs instead of nominal abstract terms, and finally his re­
fusal to present clear, unambiguous ‘concepts’ (such as the notoriously difficult 
‘Eternal Recurrence’ or his claim that ‘Truth is a woman’). Hence Blondel helps us 
to understand the significance of, for example, Nietzsche’s frequently employed 
metaphor of interpretation as a gastric or digestive process^. The weakness in 
Blondel’s book, however, lies in his interpretation that the hidden referent of all of 
Nietzsche’s rhetorical strategies is the body tout court. Blondel is right to criticise 
those who would see the stylistic diversity in Nietzsche as a joyful affirmation of 
textual play and little else, accusing such readings of resulting in a fetish of the 
text.^  ^However, by setting the body outside the economy of signification in this 
manner, Blondel runs the danger of reaffirming what Nietzsche with his various
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strategies is trying to undercut, namely the notion of a transcendent signified, albeit 
paradoxically characterised as human embodiment. Additionally, given Nietzsche’s 
awareness of the all pervasive grip of language on human thinking, one would have 
to object that for Nietzsche the body is itself already a codified entity, reified by the 
process of its articulation in language. Thus when Blondel sees the Nietzschean 
body (and Blondel is here implying the ‘Leib’ rather than the more biological 
‘Korper’) as a descendant of the Kantian transcendental subject, with 
Schopenhauer as the mediator, there are strong grounds for disagreement. Rather, 
one should see Nietzsche’s emphasis on the body as one more strategy designed to 
guide us away from the metaphysical goal of transcendence and towards an 
understanding of the immanence of human being in the world. Thus the body is 
important to Nietzsche not as an end in itself, but as a means to ground human 
thinking thoroughly in the world of the ‘Here and Now’, the ‘Diesseits’ both 
temporally and spatially, rather than being oriented toward the Beyond, the 
‘Jenseits’, and as I have argued in chapter four it is this concern with the immanent 
which is the cause of his break with Wagner.
I have already indicated in chapter two the ways in which Nietzsche literally 
deconstructs the metaphysical concept of subjecthood, by first pulling apart the 
atomic Cartesian subject and then substituting an alternative, less constricted model 
of selfhood. In the process a key role is given to the recognition of the body as a 
determinant of thinking, an interpretation which must have been informed to some 
extent by Nietzsche’s reception of Lange’s History o f Materialism in 1866, a way 
of thinking which may well have been influenced, too, by some of Schopenhauer’s 
pronouncements on the body.^ In The World as Will and Representation Schopen­
hauer expounds a physiologism so crass as to appear satiric of contemporary bio­
logical and medical science noting, for example, that people engaged in intellectual 
argument are frequently no longer capable of movement, since ‘as soon as their 
brain has to link a few ideas together, it no longer has as much force left over as is 
required to keep the legs in motion through the motor nerves. . . ’& Naturally while 
for Schopenhauer the body is the problem to be overcome, it nevertheless does rep­
resent an awareness of the importance of the body which Nietzsche takes over 
when he exhorts the reader in Ecce Homo to ‘Sit as little as possible; give no cre­
dence to any thought that was not born outdoors while one moved about freely - in 
which the muscles are not celebrating a feast, too. All prejudices come from the in­
testines’ (KSA 6 p. 281). In the same section of Ecce Homo Nietzsche writes that 
‘genius is determined by dry air, by clear skies - that is by a rapid metabolism, by
the possibility of drawing again and again on great, even tremendous quantities of
Istrength’ (KSA 6 p. 282), a sentiment that finds itself repeated in the more pithy 1
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claim in Beyond Good and Evil that ‘The abdomen is the reason why a person 
does not take himself too easily for a god’ (KSA 5 p. 97).
Of course it is more than a little misleading to compare Nietzsche’s interest 
in physiology with Schopenhauer’s thinking on the body for the reason given 
above. While Schopenhauer acknowledges its potency, he is still concerned to free 
the mind from its effects, regarding it quite clearly as a hindrance to the process of 
thinking. In contrast Nietzsche sees the body as one of the many determinants of 
thinking, and as such is what makes thought what it is, indeed facilitates it. Far 
from seeking to exclude it from serious consideration, he mentions it at every avail­
able opportunity, describing most cultural phenomena in physiological or neurolog­
ical terms. Richard Brown^ has recently listed some 20 different applications of the 'Iterm ‘physiology’ and ‘physiological’ in Nietzsche’s analysis of contemporary ?
culture and thought, including his view of Wagnerian theatre as a product of |
‘physiological degeneration’ (KSA 6 p. 27), his definition of Modernity as a I
‘physiological contradiction’ (KSA 6 p. 143) and his claim that ascetic priests are |f
‘physiologically inhibited’ (KSA 5 p. 383).
In addition to the cases Brown lists there is of course Nietzsche’s general 
description of Nihilism as a symptom and a medical condition. Earlier I outlined 
one of Nietzsche’s explanations for the onset of Nihilism, namely the misreading of 
the nature of signs. Yet the genealogy of Nihilism must go back further beyond this 
phenomenon of misinterpretation and analyse the physiology of the organism 
which has so easily taken the semiotic universe for something more. Nietzsche’s 
genealogical analysis of Christian morality, of the ascetic ideal is well known for 
uncovering that decadent form of life which bestowed a particular meaning on the 
terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’. However, the notion of morality as a symptom, or ‘sign- 
language’ [Zeichensprache] of a specific physiological condition predates the 
Genealogy o f Morals . In The Dawn Nietzsche claims moral judgements to be 
derived from feelings of pleasure and displeasure, when he writes ‘Is not the origin 
of all moral judgement to be found in heinous little conclusions: “whatever harms 
me is something evil (harmful in itself); whatever aids me is something good 
(beneficial and useful in itself) . . .” ’ (KSA 3 p. 90). In The Gay Science he 
makes the clear connection between morality and physiology all the more explicit 
saying that ‘Whoever intends to now conduct a study of moral affairs is opening up 
for themselves an immense field of work. All kinds of passion will have to be 
individually considered. . . Are we acquainted with the moral effects of means of 
nourishment ? is there a philosophy of nutrition ?’ (KSA 3 p. 379). If we accept 
Richard Schacht’s reading^ the core of The Gay Science is constituted by the fifth 
book, which amounts to a physiological anthropology of Man after the death of 
God, aiming to write both a ‘natural history’ of modern humanity and on this basis
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to effect a transformation not just of the values which were so dependent on the 
belief in God, but also of the natural constitution of the organism which required 
such values in the first place. This represents an understanding of the origins of 
value which pervades Nietzsche’s thought until his last, unpublished, notes, from 
his claim in Beyond Good and Evil that ‘in short morals are merely a sign 
language of the affects’ (KSA 5 p. 107) to the list from the summer of 1888 which 
includes ‘Inartistic conditions: consumption, impoverishment, evacuation - will to 
nothing. Christian, Buddhist, Nihilist. Impoverished body* (KSA 13: 17 [9] p. 
530). Hence Nietzsche’s note from 1886 which sums up ‘My attempt to understand 
moral judgements as symptoms and sign languages, where the processes of 
physiological success or decline betray themselves’ (KSA 12: 2 [165] p. 149). 
Ultimately, too, it is possible to trace this path of thought back to its origins in The 
Birth o f Tragedy , where Nietzsche pointedly explains Socrates’ behaviour as the 
product of a certain instinct (I say pointedly because of course Socrates and Plato 
were determined to eliminate instinct and the passions from any acts of cognition 
and judgement).
Given this general strategy of understanding values and morality in terms of 
the body, it is clear that Nietzsche will interpret the particular, contemporary, crisis 
of Nihilism in exactly the same terms as his more universal understanding of the 
formation of value. Accordingly he interprets Modernity from this perspective, and 
in his later work treats Wagner the Romantic as a case study of the wider 
physiological and psychological disorder of the modern age.^ This modern 
neurosis finds its most powerful artistic expression in Wagner’s work. As 
Nietzsche says, ‘The art of Wagner is sick. The problems he brings on stage - 
problems of pure hysterics - his convulsive affectivity, his hyperstimulated 
sensibility . . . not least his choice of heroes and heroines, looked at as 
physiological types (a gallery of invalids ! - ): all this together presents an image of 
sickness which leaves no room for doubt. Wagner est une névrose’ (KSA 6 p. 22).
With this diagnosis of Wagner’s work Nietzsche clears the way for the ap­
proach which he deems necessary for an understanding of Wagner’s, and his own, 
culture. Nihilism, or at least what Nietzsche terms ‘passive’ Nihilism, is bom when 
two contradictory impulses collide head on. On the one hand there is the desire for 
truth and certainty as fostered by morality, the faith in science’s achievements, the 
philosophers’ faith in logic, while on the other there is the recognition that the insti­
tutions which have guaranteed us that sense of stability in the world may not have 
the legitimacy that has been invested in them. The recognition of the latter clashes 
with the desire for the former, and hence the feeling of disarray and conflict which 
follows, a condition which Nietzsche see as the ‘logic of our great values and ideals 
when thought through to their end’ (KSA 12: 11 [411] p. 190). This crisis is one
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which we are all part of, in Nietzsche’s reading, and following his physiological 
interpretation of value, implies we are all somehow physiologically defective. In the 
epilogue to The Case o f Wagner he observes that ‘Unknowingly, against our will, 
we all have values, words, formulae, morals of contradictory bodily origins - con­
sidered physiologically, we are false . . .  A diagnosis of the modern soul - where 
would it begin ? . . .  with a vivisection conducted on its most instructive case’ 
(KSA 6 p. 53).
Following this brief account it becomes clear that Nietzsche’s use of 
medical imagery in his treatment of modern culture forms a central component of 
his cultural critique, and is not, as Heidegger argues, an unfortunate aberration. On 
the question of the body, Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche betray a not 
inconsiderable desire to underplay the significance of the corporeal in the latter's 
thinking, as Michel Haar has recently noted. Heidegger writes, for example, that 
‘When Nietzsche says “physiology” he does mean to emphasise the bodily state; 
but the latter is in itself always already something psychical,’ thereby converting 
the Nietzschean body into the ‘psycho-physiological body’ [Leib] of 
phenomenology. The extent of this difference between the two thinkers becomes 
most apparent when we find Heidegger admitting that he finds it ‘strange and 
almost incomprehensible’ that Nietzsche should want ‘to make his conception of 
the aesthetic state accessible . . .  by speaking the language of physiology and 
biology’ {Nietzsche Ip . 113) as if this were to be interpreted as an embarrassing 
‘mistake’ on Nietzsche’s part, rather than a central element of his entire 
understanding of the aesthetic experience.
The motivation for Heidegger’s interpretation is clear, for it is borne of the 
desire to interpret Nietzsche within the horizon of fundamental ontology, which in­
volves the paradox of assimilating Nietzsche to the metaphysical tradition, yet also 
of appropriating his work such that Nietzsche can be seen to be concerned with the 
same questions as Heidegger, principally, of course, the question of the meaning of 
Being. Hence within the narrower sphere of the aesthetic we notice that far from 
being rooted in bodily processes, the Nietzschean aesthetic state becomes, in Hei­
degger’s reading, an attunement [Gestimmtheit] to the beautiful, or a mood 
[Stimmung], both being key words in the Heideggerian project from Being and 
Time onwards, and both involving a subjection of human Dasein to the prior dis­
closure of Being. 12
The Nietzschean state of intoxication here becomes an ek-static dissolution 
of subjectivity through the appearance of the beautiful, 12 in a move which works 
hard at identifying the thought of Nietzsche with that of Heidegger’s recently com­
pleted lecture on ‘The Origin of the Work of Art.’ In this respect it is important to 
recall, as does Haar, that in the first, unpublished, version of the lecture on the ori-
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gin of the work of art Heidegger explicitly dissociates pleasure [Genuss] from the 
idea of any authentic aesthetic experience, referring to it instead as an overheating 
of the system [Erhitzung]. In this Heidegger has wandered far from the 
Nietzschean position which refers to ‘the pleasurable state which is known as 
rapture* (KSA 13: 14 [117] p. 294), and one which declares that ‘a Raphael is 
unthinkable without a certain overheating of the sexual system* (ibid. p. 295).
On the surface, Heidegger*s observations, first that Nietzsche is trying to 
describe the physis of the whole Man with the word ‘physiology*, second that the 
affective state is not one that could be reduced to the ontic science of physiology, 
and third that ‘ontic* physiology cannot explain the sublimation of bodily drives 
into the positing of aesthetic values, admittedly deserve attention. However if one 
were consequently to downplay the ‘biological* elements within Nietzsche’s oeuvre 
one might be guilty of misunderstanding the strategic nature of Nietzsche’s turn to 
the body. Additionally, Heidegger’s objections to the use of the vocabulary of biol­
ogy must moreover be set within the context of his wider tendency to avoid ques­
tions concerning the body. As with the question of time, so too with the question of 
the body, Heidegger’s opposition to the ‘metaphysical* conception of the self, 
which he sees as largely bound up with the Christian tradition, undercuts its own 
claims through his desire to fight shy of human embodiment.
Heidegger’s explicit target in his analysis of Dasein is the Cartesian world- 
less subject, manifest in Descartes’ concept of ‘consciousness as such*, which Hei­
degger terms a ‘fanciful idealisation* (Being and Time , p. 272). Yet having de­
clared his opposition to the tradition of mind - body dualism, he then attempts to 
cover up the one element which would serve to bind the subject most closely to the 
world. Analysing the spatiality of Dasein, Heidegger carefully avoids relating the 
experience of space to human embodied being, claiming that ‘Bringing-close is not 
oriented towards the I-thing encumbered with a body,’ and adding that ‘Dasein’s |
spatiality is not to be defined by citing the position at which some corporeal thing is |
present-at-hand* (ibid., p. 142). Likewise in the Nietzsche lectures Heidegger at- j
tempts to overcome the physiological body, spatial embodiment, in every way pos- IIsible. Admittedly, he remarks that the body is not some hulk with which the soul is |
burdened, yet at the same time he refers to the understanding of the body as a natu- -I
ral body as a ‘ misinterpretation *, seeing the bodily state as something which, in the 4
1work of art, ‘is to be restrained, overcome and surpassed* (Nietzsche I p. 129). :|1Hence we find in Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche a certain disregard of 1
the physiological, to such an extent that on occasion the meaning of the Nietzschean -ij
text is strained to the limit, as can be seen when Heidegger notes, ‘That Nietzsche I
conceives of the beautiful “biologically” is indisputable. Yet the question remains |
what “biological,” bios , “life,” mean here. In spite of appearances created by the I
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words, they do not mean what biology understands them to be’ (ibid., p. 114). In 
other words Heidegger would have us believe that ‘biology’ does not actually mean 
what it means.
On the basis of this brief analysis we can therefore identify a tension be­
tween the Heideggerian ‘Leib’ and the Nietzschean physiological ‘body’. If Hei­
degger establishes Stimmung as prior to the body, and in Being and Time he iden­
tifies Stimmung as an existentiale adding in the Nietzsche lecture, for example, that 
Stimmung ‘determines from the outset the implicative investment of the body in our 
Dasein’ (ibid., p. 99), then in contrast Nietzsche looks for the origin of thinking in 
the organic processes of the body. In examining Nietzschean thinking on the body, 
and this will apply to the analysis of rapture in Nietzsche’s aesthetics, we are going 
to have to distance ourselves from the Heideggerian interpretation. By keeping 
faithful to Heidegger we would have to express a certain incomprehension and even 
embarrassment at much of Nietzsche’s rhetoric, a rhetoric which far from being an 
unfortunate distraction from the ‘meaning’ of his philosophy may well turn out to 
be a key element in its construction.
On the other hand, however there is nevertheless a sense in which the perti­
nence of some of Heidegger’s objections has to be recognised. It is true, for exam­
ple, that Nietzsche’s scorn for the claims made on behalf of the ‘knowledge’ of the 
natural sciences is hard to reconcile with his pronounced use of the language of 
medicine and biology in his cultural criticism. Second, Nietzsche’s perspectivism 
rules out the possibility of attributing everything to the body. Not only is the body 
not exhausted by its constitution in the discourse of medical science, but also, and 
here we offer another criticism of Blondel’s book on the Nietzschean body, Niet­
zsche would be untrue to himself if he were to pursue a reductivist or purely mate­
rialist interpretation of culture and value. As if one could posit a simple relation of 
cause and effect between certain physiological conditions and corresponding cul­
tural phenomena. As if the perspective of the body were the only perspective one 
could adopt in the analysis of value and thinking. Nietzsche himself is too canny to 
want to make such errors, and as early as The Dawn he recognises that a crude 
materialist understanding cannot hope to exhaust the complexity of the positing of 
values. In § 34 he claims that moral concepts are merely to be seen as a post hoc ra­
tionalisation of the actions we have undertaken on the basis of our moral feelings 
(KSA 3 p. 43). As such Nietzsche is emphasising the constitutive role of the in­
stinctual in the formation of values. However, the aphorism following the one just 
quoted consists of a qualification of that earlier position when Nietzsche claims that 
‘feelings are nothing final, original; behind feelings there are judgements, valua­
tions, which have been passed on to us in the form of feelings (inclinations, disin­
clinations). The inspiration which originates in a feeling is the grandchild of a
1I
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judgement - and often a false one !’ (KSA 3 p. 43-4). In other words Nietzsche is 
satisfied with neither a simple dualism of mind and body, nor any attempt to reduce 
the one to the other; each turns out to be both a function and a determinant of the 
other.
Nietzsche’s apparently inconsistent positions on the matter of the body pre­
sent us with a problem if we read him as trying to express an objective truth con- %
ceming the production of concepts or cultural formations. However, if we read him 
as turning to the body as a rhetorical strategy the significance of his biological vo­
cabulary is altered and the reservations of Heidegger are in many respects by­
passed. The choice of physiology as a perspective on culture can be seen, as I have 
noted, as a strategy aimed at overcoming the world-denying aspects of meta­
physics, Christian religious feeling and contemporary morality. In addition, how­
ever, Nietzsche’s use of physiology performs a further function when dealing with 
the question of art and aesthetics. For if art is going to be the type of practice which 
is to serve as an interpretative foundation for post-metaphysical culture, and we 
have seen this clearly to be the case in The Birth of Tragedy and also in my discus­
sion of the relation of art and Eternal Recurrence, Nietzsche is going to have to 
challenge the prevailing orthodoxies regarding the meaning of art and artists. Since, 
as I shall be arguing, the aesthetic tradition can be seen to have acted in complicity 
with metaphysics, Nietzsche will first have to release art from its appropriation by 
metaphysics in order then to suggest how it can take on the enormous burden of 
importance he attaches to it. We have seen the indications of this function in the last 
chapter, where certain artistic forms embody a counter-metaphysical temporal 
structure, indeed constitute the arena where Eternal Recurrence and interpretative 
will to power come together. In a like manner, the physiology of art will indicate 
ways in which art can be thought differently, and more importantly, non-metaphys- 
ically. For Nietzsche develops his ‘physiology of art’ as a specific response to the 
notion of disinterestedness and aesthetic experience from Kant onwards, and it is to 
this aspect of his work that we must now turn our attention.
The Physiology of Aesthetic Experience
Much of Nietzsche’s mature writing on art, artists and aesthetics gains its identity 
from the tradition of thought it sets out to oppose, and this affects his physiology of 
art in particular. For he mobilises the metaphor of the body, he utilises the vocabu­
lary of medicine as part of a wider strategy to overcome a variety of modes of 
thinking about art, from the ‘decadent’ aesthetics of Richard Wagner to the ever 
growing movement within aesthetic Modernism which fosters the belief in art for 
art’s sake, I’art pour Fart.
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In terms of actual practising artists, Nietzsche singles out Wagner and Vic­
tor Hugo as targets of attack, while the one philosopher who, for Nietzsche, em­
bodies all the worst aspects in the history of philosophical aesthetics, is seen to be 
Kant. In the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche accuses Kant of 
possessing the ‘naiveté of a country parson’ (KSA 5 p. 347) when it comes to un­
derstanding aesthetic experience. In The Antichrist § 11 Nietzsche observes that 
‘Kant became an idiot’ adding that Kant represents a ‘mistaken instinct in every­
thing and anything, the counter-natural as instinct, German decadence as philoso­
phy’ (KSA 6 p. 177-8). In his private notes he is no less uncharitable to the great 
‘Chinaman of Konigsberg’ accusing him of ‘clumsy pedantry and petty bourgeois 
manners’ (KSA 11: 26 [96] p. 175), and concluding that the Critique of Pure Rea­
son is ‘already the pre-existent form of cretinism’ (KSA 13: 16 [55] p. 504).
This hostile position towards Kant forms one of the paradoxes in Niet­
zsche’s thought, of course. For I have already shown in previous chapters the ex­
tent to which Nietzsche’s thinking on art derives either directly or indirectly from 
Kant himself. It is an ambiguous relation which Nietzsche tries all the more to hide 
by the virulence of his denunciations of Kant, and specifically of the latter’s aes­
thetic theory. Kant has not been without his defenders against the polemic of Niet­
zsche. Most notably, of course, Heidegger is anxious to defend Kant against the 
criticism levelled against him, claiming instead that Nietzsche is reading Kant 
through the interpretation of Schopenhauer, which is itself a highly partial misun­
derstanding of the latter’s aesthetics. More recently, other scholars such as Mi- 
hailo Djuric and Urs Heftrich have taken a similar line, both defending Kant and 
then arguing that in any case his criticisms are more relevant to the aesthetics of 
Schopenhauer than to those of Kant h im se lf.In  many ways these objections can­
not be faulted, and as Heftrich demonstrates, many of Nietzsche’s criticisms of no­
tions such as disinterestedness and subjective universality are based on, at best, a 
careless reading of Kant, and almost certainly one that is shaped by the mediating 
figure of Schopenhauer.
I do not intend to discuss those precise areas where Nietzsche misreads 
Kant’s Critique o f judgement, for this would be to duplicate the studies of Heftrich 
and Djuric. Moreover such a detailed and in depth analysis is, it might be claimed, 
missing the mark. If we ask ourselves why Nietzsche is so vehement in his criti­
cisms of Kant’s aesthetic theory, we might find an answer in the fact that the name 
‘Kant’ in many ways performs a metonymic function, standing as an abbreviated 
sign for what Nietzsche perceives as the tradition of aesthetics from Kant onwards.
The significance of Kant lies in his having overturned the tradition of Wolff and 
Baumgarten, transforming aesthetics from being a discipline subordinate to the . |
more masculine rigour of logic, to the core element within the architectonic of the
%
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Critical project, giving art a cognitive function previously denied it. Rightly consid­
ered the founder of modem aesthetics, Kant relocated the discipline at the heart of 
philosophical thinking, and in many respects shaped the course of all subsequent 
enquiry into the subject up to the present day.
By naming Kant as the target of his polemic, Nietzsche is in effect conduct­
ing a genealogy of aesthetics, bringing to prominence those elements within Kant 
which were to be central to subsequent thinking in the realm of the aesthetic. Hence 
by reading Kant through Schopenhauer, Nietzsche need not be seen as simply mis­
reading him, though that also does happen to be true of the latter’s reading. Rather 
he can be seen as focusing on precisely those aspects of Kant which were important 
to Schopenhauer, and hence to Wagner, and also to the aesthetic of I’art pour I’art.
Implicit in this, too, is an attempt to distance himself from his own earlier writing, 
which, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, he recognised as still labouring 
under the burden of Kantian and Idealist vocabulary. As in all aspects of his work,
Nietzsche is not so much concerned with the past per se as with the manner in 
which it has shaped the present.
If we wish to analyse the specific areas where Nietzsche chooses to take is­
sue with Kant, it becomes clear that a major confrontation occurs over the notion of 
disinterestedness. Significantly for the present chapter, Nietzsche forms a critique «
of the notion of disinterested aesthetic experience (and its concomitant notion of a 
disinterested aesthetic subject) in the name of physiology. Deriving aesthetic 
judgement from the physiology of the human organism, Nietzsche thus occupies a 
position which proves hostile to any theory which will attempt to separate out ques­
tions of beauty from those of desire^^. Before I outline in greater detail Nietzsche’s 
specific criticism of disinterestedness, however, I shall first describe briefly the ge­
nealogy of the idea which Nietzsche is attacking.
If we turn to the notion of disinterestedness, we have to distinguish 
between its initial formulation in Kant and subsequent reception by the Romantics,
Schopenhauer and so forth. When Kant says that ‘Taste is the faculty of estimating 
an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from 
any interest’ he is asserting that our concern with the aesthetic object is not one 
based on an interest in whether or not it actually exists. In other words he is not 
claiming that we do have any interest per se in the beautiful object, for in a later 
section (§ 42) of the Third Critique, he indicates the presence of a kind of interest in 
the object which he terms ‘intellectual interest’, however this interest does not focus 
on the existence of the object, which would be the province of desire, but rather on 
its purely formal properties. This aspect of the judgement of taste is central to Kan­
t’s project, since it is linked to his contention both that the beauty of an object is not 
related to an end (the third moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful) and that the
«v ■ j ■ V  1 i*-> ■«w •_ . s .  . .-I
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beautiful object pleases apart from any concept of what it is or should be (fourth 
moment). Both of these latter claims, together with the notion of disinterestedness 
serve to dissociate the aesthetic object from considerations of means and ends, in 
other words, distinguish the aesthetic experience of the object from the experience 
of it as something to be utilised. As a symbol of morality, the beautiful does engage 
our interest on one level, yet this ‘intellectual’ interest is to be distinguished from 
the interest in the object as a means to self-preservation or advancement. It is a dis­
tinction which allows us to understand why we can allow fictional events or objects 
to affect us while we know they do not actually exist, without having to resort to 
contemporary theories of make-believe, such as in Kendall Walton’s book. Mime­
sis as Make-believe , which proposes the curious notion that fiction is a game of 
make-believe into which the spectator knowingly enters, and that emotional re­
sponses to what are known to be fictional events are in fact ‘pretend’ responses.
By drawing a distinction, however, between the aesthetic object (and this is 
increasingly equated with the work of art in writers after Kant) on the one hand and 
the realm of the practical (i.e. of desire) on the other, Kant is laying himself open to 
the kind of appropriation which Schopenhauer makes of his work, once the latter 
has transformed desire, or the Will, into a metaphysical principle. The subtle dis­
tinction between intellectual interest and desire is ignored in favour of a more 
simple opposition in Schopenhauer between willing and non-willing. The aesthetic 
experience is one devoid of all volition or interest in Schopenhauer, and hence an 
experience which is given a metaphysical significance in Schopenhauer’s system it 
did not possess in Kant. Likewise the beautiful object, by virtue of its belonging to 
a sphere independent of the realm of utility, appeals to the Romantics as a site of re­
sistance to the encroachment of the (conceptually bound) kingdom of means and 
ends, and from here we can follow the path leading to Modernism and the Avant- 
Garde where art, as a site of resistance to modern culture, becomes increasingly 
self-absorbed and purely self-critical, a characteristic feature to which Peter Burger, 
amongst others, has drawn attention.^^
If we restrict our analysis of this development to the nineteenth century, i.e. 
to that which would have been known to Nietzsche, we find the idea of the auton­
omy of art pursued to its most extreme conclusion in formalist writings of the Ger­
man musicologist Eduard Hanslick, and more prominently, the poets of I’art pour 
Tart such as Gautier and symbolists such as Mallarmé in France, who empty art of 
the moral content which even the Romantics had accorded it, instead transforming it 
into an enclosed sphere of self-reference^®. Attempting to free art from morality, 
such writers have, for Nietzsche, trivialised art, and it is Kant he criticises for es­
sentially proposing the idea of aesthetic experience without interest. In On the Ge­
nealogy o f Morals he mocks the contemporary (pseudo-Kantian) belief in disinter­
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estedness asserting that Tf our aestheticians never tire of claiming, in Kant’s 
favour, that spellbound by beauty one can even view of undraped female statues 
“without interest”, then one can laugh a little at their expense . . .  in any case 
Pygmalion was not an “anaesthetic human” ‘ (KSA 5 p. 347). Further in the same 
section he notes Schopenhauer’s indebtedness to this same idea, challenging the 
notion of willless aesthetic experience with the observation that far from displaying 
no interest in the aesthetic experience, Schopenhauer was greatly interested in it, in­
deed positively craved it as a release from the blind mechanism of the Will. In Niet­
zsche’s eyes Schopenhauer’s subscription to the idea of a willless aesthetic experi­
ence is self-defeating, since the aesthetic is invested with a particular function or 
use value which enmeshes it within the system of means and ends, in short, the 
economy of desire, and thus brings it close to Stendhal’s idea of an art that contains 
‘une promesse de bonheur.’ It is this weakness in the entire notion of willless 
aesthetic experience in Schopenhauer’s philosophy which leads Nietzsche to 
demand, in Beyond Good and Evil that ‘the aesthetics of “contemplation devoid of 
all interest” which is used today as a seductive guise for the emasculation of art’, an 
aesthetics which he equates with the Christian ethic of self-sacrifice, ‘be questioned 
mercilessly and put on trial’ (KSA 5 p. 52).
In Twilight o f the Idols he devotes a substantial passage to a critique of the 
Modernism of I’art pour I’art, countering the desire of those to free art from moral­
ity and hence render it ‘purposeless, goalless, senseless’ with the following series 
of rhetorical questions: ‘what does all art do ? does it not praise ? does it not glorify 
? does it not select out ? does it not bring to prominence ? With all this it 
strengthens or weakens certain judgements of value . . .  is this incidental ? a 
coincidence ?’ (KSA 6 p. 127).
Far from occupying a completely autonomous sphere of self-reference, art, 
in Nietzsche’s thought, refers beyond itself to the world, in as much as it consti­
tutes the material expression of a certain relation towards the world. As Nietzsche 
says, ‘Art is the great stimulant to life: how could one conceive of it as without pur­
pose, as goalless, as I’art pour Tart ?’ (ibid.). Yet although the specific opposition 
to Tart pour Tart is a product of Nietzsche’s mature thought, brought about by his 
linking of art and will to power, the development of his theory after The Birth o f 
Tragedy can be traced without difficulty. Already in the first volume of Human 
All-too Human the notion of art as a means of coming to terms with the world, of 
rendering it bearable, is being transformed into that of art as an affirmation of the 
world. In the section entitled ‘From the Soul of the Artists and Writers’ he writes 
that art has ‘taught us for thousands of years to look upon life in every shape with 
interest and desire and to bring our feelings to the point where we finally shout:
“however it is, life is good” ‘ (KSA 2 p. 185). In the second book of The Gay
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Science Nietzsche offers a lengthy discussion of the origin of poetic metre and 
rhythm, which stands in clear opposition to the view of, say, Mallarmé, who pro­
claims that ‘language speaks itself (la langue se parle). Nietzsche claims that the 
use of rhythm in poetry originates in the ancient conviction that its use could enable 
humans to exercise some power over the gods. For it had long been recognised that 
music has ‘the power to unload the affects, to purify the soul, to mollify the ferocia 
animi - and especially through the rhythmical in music’ (KSA 3 pp. 440-1), and it 
was assumed that it would effect the gods in the same fashion. Hence poetry finds 
its origin in invocations to the gods, attempting ‘to compel them through rhythm 
and exercise a power over them* (ibid.).
Now the significance of this interpretation does not lie in Nietzsche’s obser­
vation that rhythm has a certain power over the human affects, for he freely admits 
that Pythagoras (not to mention Plato) had already understood this, and he would 
not be saying anything very interesting. Instead, what deserves our attention is his 
claim, no matter how incorrect from an anthropological and historical point of 
view, that early humans used this awareness in order to try to control the gods, and %
hence by implication the natural environment. In other words, rhythm was utilised 
as a means of controlling the world, getting a purchase on it, and hence is 
intimately bound up to questions of means and ends, utility and desire.
As Pütz puts it,2i art finds its ground in life, and although will to power has 
not yet been articulated in Nietzsche’s work at this stage, art in the form of poetic 
rhythm is clearly motivated by will to power. It is a claim supported in the 
aphorism following the discussion of poetry, which discusses the beautiful. In this 
aphorism he asserts that ‘Artists are always elevating - they do not do anything else 
- and moreover all those situations and things which are reputed to make a person ^
feel good or great or drunk or merry or well and wise. These select things . . . 
are the objects of the artist’ (ibid. pp. 442-3). The states of being which the artist 
promotes are precisely those states which are engendered by will to power, and the 
emphasis which Nietzsche lays on the selectivity of the artist will have important 
consequences for articulating the relation between will to power and Nietzsche’s 
later aesthetic norm of Dionysian Classicism.
The notion of I’art pour Part, stemming in Nietzsche’s view from the Kan­
tian idea of disinterestedness, functions as the corollary to ‘that dangerous old con­
ceptual fable, which has posited a “pure willless, painless, atemporal subject of 
cognition” ’ (KSA 5 p. 365). Here we see Nietzsche confirming the genealogy of 
I’art pour Tart I sketched above, seeing it as a descendant of the Kantian conception 
of the disinterested aesthetic subject. Naturally, Nietzsche’s understanding of self­
hood rules out accepting either the Kantian aesthetic subject or the derivative notion 
of artistic autonomy. His grounding of all acts of cognition or interpretation in will
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to power and the perspectivism of human physiology cannot permit the formulation 
of aesthetic experience on Kantian lines. The physiology of art plays a crucial func­
tion in this regard, for it serves to bind the notion of art, artistic creativity and aes­
thetic experience firmly to desire and willing. In other words, the relation between 
art and will to power, which in the middle works is left for the reader to construct, 
is made explicit in his mature thinking through their common grounding in the 
physiological.
The notebooks of 1887 and 1888, together with late works such as Twilight 
of the Idols and the essays on Wagner are abundant with references to beauty as a 
purely physiological phenomenon: the pleasure in beautiful objects is a sexual plea­
sure, artistic creativity is a process of procreation, ‘all a r t . . . inflames desire’
(KSA 13: 14 [119] p. 296), ‘Art reminds us of states of animal vigour; on the one 
hand it is an excess and outflow of blooming corporeality into the world of pictures 
and desires; on the other a stimulation of animal functions through pictures of and 
desire for heightened life’ (KSA 12: 9 [102] p. 394). However the link to will to 
power only becomes transparent if we recall that the notion of interpretative will to 
power is not limited in Nietzsche to the activity of just human subjects attempting to 
construct a meaningful environment within which to live, indeed within which liv­
ing is rendered possible.
We have already observed how Nietzsche seeks to outline the extent to 
which ‘knowing’ (i.e. interpreting) is shaped by the organic processes of the body.
As Nietzsche says, ‘It seems to me that what is generally attributed to the mind 
characterises the being of the organic: and in the highest functions of the mind I 
find merely a sublime type of organic function’ (KSA 11: 25 [356] p. 106). 
Additionally, however, interpretative will to power can be seen, for Nietzsche, to 
be functioning at even the lowest level of organic life. As early as the first volume 
of Human All-too Human (§ 18) Nietzsche discusses the manner in which the 
plant interprets its environment in order to enhance its own life (KSA 2 p. 39). As I 
have demonstrated before, Nietzsche views conscious interpretation as a merely a 
sophisticated variety of this basic organic interpretative will to power. Organisms, 
no matter how primitive, organise their environment, such that Nietzsche can claim 
that ‘propagation amongst amoebae seems to be throwing off ballast, a pure 
advantage. The excretion of useless material’ (KSA 12:10 [13] p. 461).
On the basis of such an understanding of the organic as always-already in­
terpreting, organising in order to further will to power, it is clear that art, as a 
physiological activity, must also be motivated not just by desire, but rather by inter­
pretative desire for power. The beautiful is, quite simply, that which enhances the 
feeling of power, as that which best interprets and organises the world. In a note 
from early 1887, Nietzsche writes ‘ “Beauty” is for the artist something outside all
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orders of rank, because in beauty opposites are tamed; the highest sign of power, 
namely power over opposites; moreover, without tension: - that violence is no 
longer needed; that everything follows, obeys, so easily and so pleasantly - that is 
what delights the artist’s will to power’ (KSA 12: 7 [3] p. 258). Here we find 
cashed out in concrete terms how it is that the beautiful promotes, or delights will 
to power. It is because the beautiful represents a supreme act of organisation and 
control over its elements, an act of mastery driven by will to mastery. Hence the 
meaning of Nietzsche’s remarks on ‘The artwork, where it appears without artist, 
e.g. as body, as organisation (Prussian officer corps, Jesuit order)’ (KSA 12: 2 
[114] p. 118) becomes much clearer. The organisational perfection of both of these 
bodies inspires the goal of the interpretative process to gain ever increasing control 
over and organisation of its environment.
Nietzsche’s understanding of beauty as an exemplification of interpretative 
will to power almost inevitably leads to a preference for classical taste, which we 
see in Nietzsche’s so called ‘Dionysian Classicism’, and in his antipathy towards 
Romanticism. For Romanticism is characterised in Nietzsche’s eyes by a lack of 
organisation and discipline; it is a product of feeble spirits unable to exercise control 
over either themselves or their material, whereas the Classical (and by this Niet­
zsche frequently means the neo-Classicism of Poussin or of the eighteenth century 
rather than just Classical Antiquity) is the product of a strong organisational 
drive
As early as the second volume of Human All-too Human Nietzsche makes 
a distinction between Classicism and Romanticism with the idea of strength as a 
distinguishing criterion when he writes that ‘Both classically and romantically 
minded spirits . . . .  contemplate a vision of the future: but the former do it on the 
basis of the strengths of their time, and the latter on the basis of its weakness’
(KSA 2 p. 652).
In the fifth book of The Gay Science (§ 370) Nietzsche offers a fuller dis­
tinction between an active and a reactive creative principle, once again on the basis 
of whether an enfeebled reactive desire for absolution motivates the artistic drive, or 
whether it is instead animated by an active superabundant power. Nietzsche claims,
‘Every art, every philosophy can be seen as a means to healing and help in the ser- |
vice of growing, struggling, life: they always presuppose suffering and sufferers.
Yet there are two kinds of sufferers, on the one hand those who suffer from super­
abundance of life . . .  and on the other those who suffer from an impoverishment 
of life . . . who seek peace, calm . . . redemption from themselves through art’
(KSA 3 p. 621). Art can serve as a means to revenge against life, and hence the 
mimesis of suffering only goes towards strengthening Romantic pessimism, but it I
can also represent suffering in order to overcome it, subsequently to affirm suffer-
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ing and the world in general, as is the case with Greek tragedy. Hence the artistic 
representation of suffering is an ambivalent praxis, which, like Nihilism, can be 
employed in both an active and reactive sense. As active it can be the work of ‘the 
forward striving spirit’ (KSA 12: 9 [166] p. 434), where will to power interprets 
and gathers up ever more, where ‘opposites are tamed’, and yet where the contin- |
gent nature of that interpretation is recognised and in addition celebrated. As reac­
tive it can be the product of the ‘disinherited’ spirit, whose faith in the ‘tree of 
knowledge’ (KSA 5 p. 99) has been shattered, yet refuses to face up to the task of 
accepting responsibility for the creation of new values, either clinging to a residual 
faith in the notion of an autonomous, objective truth to the world, or seeking to an­
nihilate all values. In these responses art is used either to confirm the belief in an 
objective ‘order of things’, and as Vattimo notes^^ we can observe this process at 
work in the mid-nineteenth century fascination with popular poetry, or as a means 
to transcend, and ultimately escape from, the terrifying abyss of nothingness.
In his later notes from 1887, Nietzsche explicitly equates the difference 
between active and reactive with the difference between the Classical and Romantic 
styles, with, once again, the function of will to power as organisation acting as the 
criterion for distinguishing the two. In a note from Autumn 1887 he asks whether 
‘the opposition between active and reactive does not lie hidden behind the opposi­
tion of Classical and Romantic’ (KSA 12: 9 [112] p. 400), and in a later note enti­
tled ‘Aesthetica’ from the same notebook he writes ‘In order to be Classical one 
must possess all the strong, apparently contradictory gifts and desires: but such 
that they go together beneath the one yoke’ (KSA 12: 9 [166] p. 433). In contrast 
one of Nietzsche’s main criticisms of Romanticism in his symptomatological anal­
ysis of Modernity, is its lack of organising power. In Romanticism he observes 
‘the will to unity . . .  but the inability to let it exercise tyranny in the most important 
thing, namely with regard to the work itself’ (KSA 13: 11 [312] p. 132), and it is a 
criticism which Nietzsche repeats in his attacks on Wagner in The Case o f Wagner 
diagnosing the latter’s music as an ‘anarchy of atoms . . . hostility and chaos’
(KSA 6 p. 27), adding later in the second postscript that Wagner displays ‘the de­
cline of organisational power’ (ibid. p. 47). In other words, Romanticism is a sign 
of enfeebled will to power.
Nietzsche’s physiological critique of Kantian disinterestedness may be 
flawed inasmuch as it addresses issues which are not to be found in the text of Kant 
himself, but its significance lies in laying the groundwork for his own attempt to lo­
cate art firmly within the network of interests which go to characterise organic life’s 
engagement with the world. As Nietzsche says, ‘At bottom, Man reflects himself in 
things, he considers everything to be beautiful that throws back his own image’
(KSA 6 p. 123).
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the question of the physiological in Nietzsche’s 
work as it relates to the themes of immanence, transcendence and the aesthetic. As 
such Nietzsche’s turn to the physiological accomplishes a number of tasks. First it 
serves to further his general offensive against the metaphysical orientation towards 
transcendence by grounding cognitive and evaluative processes in the physiology 
of the human organism. This is not to imply that Nietzsche supports some form of 
organicist thinking, but rather to argue that he is using the metaphor of physiology 
to undercut the idea of a subjective existence outside the constraints of the body. In­
terpretation is not reducible to the body, but neither is it possible without the body 
and hence Nietzsche is moving ever further from the metaphysics of the sublime 
which suggest just that possibility.
Second Nietzsche is using the biological to understanding aesthetic experi­
ence, a move which challenges the tradition from Kant onwards of the disinterested 
aesthetic subject. As I have suggested, Nietzsche’s primary target in this regard is 
not necessarily Kant per se, but rather the contemporary doctrine of I’art pour I’art.
The importance of choosing this doctrine for censure will become apparent in my 
final chapter, where I shall be showing how for Nietzsche I’art pour I’art has per­
mitted art to be relegated to the margins of modem society, precisely through its be­
lief in the irrelevance of art to anything beyond itself. Nietzsche’s physiology of 
aesthetic experience also works against a metaphysical understanding of aesthetic 4
rapture as a moment of transcendence. In other words the initial position of The 
Birth of Tragedy , which constitutes a response to the sublime, is becoming modi­
fied through the altered understanding of the meaning of rapture. In that early work 
the sentiment of Idealism is still powerful, with all its attendant metaphysical 
connotations. Having recognised this weakness in his earlier writing Nietzsche is 
trying to reformulate an understanding of art which will make it a meaningful 
practice (i.e. one which evade the vacuous play of aesthetic Modernism), yet one 
which will not become assimilable to the Idealist or Romantic interpretation of art as 
offering a moment of self-transcendence.
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The Raging Discordance of Art and Truth
In the previous chapter I outlined how Nietzsche uses the vocabulary of physiology |
to engage on a sustained against the aesthetic Modernism of Tart pour Tart and the 
metaphysical structure of thinking which supports it. As such, this physiology of 
art functions as a complement to the rethinking of time under the sign of Eternal 
Recurrence which I discussed in the fifth chapter. Both Eternal Recurrence and the 
turn to physiology constitute the central weapons in Nietzsche’s critique of the tran- 
scendentism of metaphysics and in both lines of criticism art appears to be the cul­
tural phenomenon where the anti-metaphysical occurs to a heightened degree. In the 
turn to the physiology of art we see Nietzsche undertaking something which has 
previously not been a feature of his writing on art. Namely a critique of the 
aesthetic tradition. When I note this has not occurred previously I am not indicating 
that there at some time in his career a shift in thinking, but simply that the themes I 
have hitherto treated have not involved an explicit critique of inherited modes of 
thinking about art. Indeed both the thematics of The Birth o f Tragedy and those of 
artistic meaning and temporality I discussed relied heavily on elements of Kant’s 
Critique o f Judgement.
If Nietzsche is to use art as a palliative to the theoretical culture of 
Modernity, however, it will not be sufficient to merely point out potentialities 
within the work which undermine the dominant metaphysical regime of truth. For 
as we have seen in the case of The Birth o f Tragedy art can nevertheless be 
assimilated to the inherited discourse, as Nietzsche discovered with Wagner. To 
give support to his argument Nietzsche has to criticise the inherited aesthetic 
discourse, in order to free art from its ‘ misappropriation ’ (and denigration) by 
theoretical culture. Once old pre-conceptions are abolished, then the significance of 
Nietzsche’s writing on art will become clearer, we have seen this process of 
criticism at work in the last chapter, where Nietzsche’s turn to physiology facilitates 
a critique of the understanding of aesthetic judgement which has permitted art to 
become a trivial pastime, rather than the central cultural activity Nietzsche intends it 
to be.
The notion of disinterestedness, however, only constitutes one of the key 
misunderstandings of art for Nietzsche. In this chapter I shall discuss two other 
central themes which it is necessary for Nietzsche to criticise in order for his project j
of aesthetic cultural renewal to be credible. In particular Nietzsche sets out to criti­
cise the idea, first, that art can be equated with the truth, whether the truth of the in- i
finite, as the Romantics contend, or the truth of the objective empirical world, as ^
,,i
157
maintained by the Realists. Second Nietzsche criticises the traditional idea that the ?
essential aspect of the aesthetic experience revolve around the spectator’s (or listen­
er’s) response to the beautiful object, whether it be the beautiful object of nature or 
the finished work of art. Both themes can be traced back to Kant, and hence 
Nietzsche’s critique of them follows on from his critique of the notion of disinter­
estedness and of the ideas which grew out of that notion. I shall deal with each 
theme in turn.
The Truth of Art
In a note from 1886, Nietzsche makes the following comment concerning patterns 
of thinking in aesthetics hitherto:
‘NB
1) Attempt to bring Aesthetics closer to unegoistic Ethics (as a preparation for it) through the 
elimination of the “I”.
2) Attempt to bring it closer to knowledge (pure subject, “pure reflection o f the object”)
- against this: the object, when viewed aesthetically, falsified through and through 
“pure, willless, painless timeless subject of knowing”
- by no means “knowledge” !'
(KSA 12: 5[99] p. 226)
As Urs Heftrich notes^ the evident object of Nietzsche’s criticism here is 
Schopenhauer’s interpretation of Kant. The notion of disinterestedness, which in 
Kant, though a prerequisite of any aesthetic judgement, laid no claim to a truth 4
content, has become in Schopenhauer a means to overcome the limitations of the 
principle of sufficient reason. In other words, willless aesthetic contemplation of­
fers a disclosure of the noumenal reality of the world, which is beyond the reach of 
everyday, rational cognition. Schopenhauer has thus overturned the Platonic order 
of things, where art becomes the mere mimesis of the material world, itself a poor 
copy of the true world of the forms, in short where art somehow covers up the 
truth.
Accomplishing this reversal, Schopenhauer thus goes much further than 
Kant was prepared to in delineating the capacities and limits of aesthetic judgement.
Admittedly Kant does see the beautiful as a symbol of the good, and the semantic 
indeterminacy of the aesthetic object does allow the Imagination unrestricted free­
dom. Admittedly, too, Kant does insist that the judgement of taste, though subjec­
tive, is also universal, thereby creating a parallelism between knowing and judging.
However these assertions are far less ambitious than the claims made on behalf of 
aesthetic judgement by Schopenhauer. Moreover Schopenhauer was not the only 
thinker to employ themes from Kant’s Critique o f Judgement in order to make
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much grander claims for art. The early German Romantics, for example, and 
Schelling and Holderlin in particular, transform Kant’s idea that the aesthetic expe­
rience is conceptually indeterminate into a claim that the Absolute reveals itself in 
the Beautiful, which, once again transcends the limitations of conceptual thinking. 
Finding inspiration in a different aspect of the Kantian system, the Romantics thus 
reach a conclusion similar to Schopenhauer as to the cognitive capacities of 
aesthetic experience and, ultimately, of works of art.
This (mis-)reading of Kant’s aesthetics is not, however, merely limited to 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Heidegger too, though he points out the 
shortcomings of Schopenhauer’s understanding of Kant, then interprets Kant as ar­
guing that the Beautiful is, in some sense, world-disclosive. In The Will to Power 
as Art he writes: ‘in order to find something beautiful, we must let what encoun­
ters us, purely as it is itself, come before us in its own statue and worth . . . 
Comportment toward the beautiful as such, says Kant, is unconstrained favouring 
. We must release what encounters us as such to its way to be; we must allow and 
grant it what belongs to it and what it brings to us.’^  It is a reading of Kant, which, 
of course, harmonises with the alethic function allotted to art in The Origin o f the 
Work o f Art , and distorts the Kantian text just as much as does his reading of 
Nietzsche. For the latter, too, the relation of art and truth are central concerns, and 
Heidegger is correct to recognise this in his analysis. For Nietzsche, equally, art 
has a higher worth than ‘truth’, hence his hostility to any idea that for us art is a 
thing of the past. Yet such superficial similarity with the Romantics should not 
mislead us into failing to recognise the deep and fundamental differences which 
separate his thinking from theirs.
If we follow Heidegger’s analysis of ‘the raging discord between art and 
truth’, the difference will consist in their mutual relation toward the problem of 
Becoming and Being. Returning repeatedly to Nietzsche’s comment that ‘to stamp 
Becoming with the mark of Being - that is the supreme will to power’ (KSA 12: 
7[54] p. 312), Heidegger characterises Nietzsche’s understanding of truth as a 
function of the desire for permanence. As such Heidegger notes, ‘truth is any given 
fixed apparition that allows life to rest firmly on a particular perspective and to pre­
serve itself, as such fixation, “truth” is an immobilising of life, and hence its inhibi­
tion and dissolution’ (Nietzsche I p. 216). In contrast art allows the real (i.e. 
Becoming) to reveal itself as Becoming, without being fixed in one perspective. 
Heidegger writes, ‘in order for the real to remain real, it must on the other hand 
simultaneously transfigure itself by going out beyond itself, surpassing itself in the 
scintillation of what is created in art’ (ibid., p. 217). In other words, art is a dy­
namic process of constant self-overcoming which thereby reveals the ‘reality’ of the 
world, namely Becoming.
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Heidegger’s interpretation is persuasive because it provides a framework 
which will accommodate both his later analysis of Eternal Return and also creates a 
parallel between the artist and the constantly self-renewing Übermensch, a parallel 
which, of course, Nietzsche himself frequently draws. However, there are serious 
grounds for faulting Heidegger’s reading, grounds which relate to the manner in 
which Nietzsche’s thinking can be considered to surpass the fundamental ontology 
of the former.
In his analysis of the notion of ‘truth’ in Nietzsche, Heidegger seems to be 
imputing to Nietzsche two notions of truth. The first, which we can term ‘truth’, is 
the idea of truth as the product of a particular, human, perspective. It is that particu­
lar ‘falsehood’ without which (human) life would not be possible. The second, un­
declared notion, which I shall capitalise as ‘Truth’, assumes there to be a higher, 
objective reality, transcending the limitations of any particular perspective. In 
Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche regards art as worth more than ‘truth’ because it re­
veals the higher ‘Truth’ of reality, namely Becoming as the foundation of the 
world.
According to Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche views art as world-disclosive t
in a manner similar to Schopenhauer and the Romantics, and, in anticipation of The 
Origin o f the Work of A r t , is not limited to the fixed representation of mere beings 
seen from a particular perspective. Yet an awareness of Nietzsche’s anti-founda- 
tionalism makes such a reading highly improbable. ‘Truth’ simply cannot have any 
place in Nietzsche’s project as I have outlined it, except as a target for polemic. As 
we have seen, Nietzsche’s polemic has two kinds of misunderstanding as its target.
The first misunderstanding is when ‘truth’ is taken to be identical to ‘Truth’, and, 
broadly speaking, it is the Realist assumptions of the sciences together with that 
brand of ‘dogmatic’ metaphysics that even Kant had criticised, which make this 
mistake. The second misconception arises when ‘truth’ is accepted to be a pecu­
liarly human construct, but yet is seen as nevertheless concealing the higher 
‘Truth’, and Nietzsche’s target in this regard is the dualism of Kant and the 
Idealists. Heidegger is attempting to assimilate Nietzsche’s thinking to this view, 
despite Nietzsche’s objection to any such form of dualist thinking.^
At first sight it might seem plausible to read The Birth o f Tragedy as sup­
porting such dualist tendencies, with its appropriation of Kantian and 
Schopenhauerian vocabulary. However as I have pointed out, there are also strong 
reasons for emphasising the thematic continuity between Nietzsche’s early and 
later work, rather than neatly dividing his work into distinct ‘periods’. Though we 
should be aware of the pitfalls in referring to authorial intention, Nietzsche’s retro­
spective comments about that early work do seem to confirm its affinity with his 
later writings.
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If we turn to Nietzsche’s other writings which concern art, we find none of 
the ambiguities which inhere in The Birth o f Tragedy . The pages of both volumes 
of Human All-too Human are littered with aphorisms which strive to dissociate art 
from truth. Moreover Nietzsche is not attempting to pit art against ‘truth’ in the 
name of some higher, transcendent ‘Truth’. Rather, he seeks to avoid any and ev­
ery suggestion that art discloses some prior state of affairs, whether it be imagined 
to be the merely empirical world or a noumenal world usually concealed by the 
limiting categories of conceptual thinking.
The section of Human All-too Human entitled ‘From the soul of artists and 
authors’ contains a number of aphorisms which argue against any mimetic view of 
art. Instead, Nietzsche argues, we should recognise the importance of play, fan­
tasy, and of simple deception in understanding art. In § 146, entitled ‘The artist’s 
sense of truth’, Nietzsche writes ‘The artist has, with regard to the cognition of 
truths, a weaker ethic than the thinker. . . he . . considers the continuation of his 
style of creation more important than scientific devotion to the true, in any form’ 
(KSA 2 p. 142). In § 154 he writes of artists that ‘They do not deceive themselves, 
yet they intentionally surround life with a game of lies. Simonides advised his com­
patriots to treat life as a game’ (ibid. p. 146).
At this point one might object that the conscious intent of the artist says 
nothing about the objective significance of the work of art itself, yet here, too, 
Nietzsche is keen to stress that art does not merely reproduce a given reality. In the 
same section he concludes that ‘Art renders the sight of life bearable by laying over 
it the veil of impure thinking’ (ibid. p. 144), a conclusion which not only repeats 
the understanding of tragedy in The Birth of Tragedy but modifies it by explicitly 
equating such ‘rendering bearable’ with ‘falsifying’. Far from disclosing any form 
of truth, art functions precisely through its capacity to deceive, such that we learn 
‘to look upon life in every shape and form with interest and desire, to carry our 
feelings so far that we finally exclaim “however it is, life is good” ‘ (ibid. p. 185). 
It is a conviction which Nietzsche retains, arguing for it many times over, starting 
with the second volume of Human All-too Human , where he writes of ‘The 
Muses as Liars. - “We are excellent at telling many lies” - thus sang the Muses 
once, when they revealed themselves to Hesiod. - Grasping the artist as a deceiver 
leads to essential discoveries’ (ibid. p. 462), It is moreover this awareness of the 
deceptive nature of art which leads the Greeks, the last truly aesthetic culture in 
Nietzsche’s eyes, to admire Odysseus’ ‘ability to tell lies’ (KSA 3 p. 224). ‘The 
poet sees in the liar his foster brother [lit. “milk-brother”]’ writes Nietzsche in The 
Gay Science ‘whose milk he has drunk’ (ibid. p. 510).
With this emphasis on the mendacity of all artistic practice Nietzsche is 
paradoxically employing a philosopheme, the ancestry of which is well known. He
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is not, however, criticising the Romantic and Idealist belief in the truthfulness of art 
in order to reinstate some Platonic distinction between the true and its copy. His 
critique of metaphysics cannot allow such an idea to enter into the game. Hence his 
use of the Platonic notion of art as a form of lie does not serve to discredit art, but 
rather to add weight to his general argument which brings into question the belief in 
truth per se. Art is not mendacious because of some deficiency in art, but because 
there is no truth of which it could be the mimesis.
Given Nietzsche’s frequent assertion that art is a form of lie, a claim which 
serves primarily as a rhetorical device to aggravate the raging discord between art 
and the truth, it is clear that he will have no time for either Idealist theories of 
tragedy or for the positivist pretensions of Realism. It is significant that in his mid­
dle works, supposedly sympathetic to a positivist understanding of truth, Nietzsche 
is critical of the Realist movement in the arts, which would function as an artistic 
analogue to the scientific positivism of the nineteenth century. Amongst the verses 
of ‘Jest, Cunning and Revenge’ preceding the main text of The Gay Science he 
writes the following;
‘The realistic painter
“Nature is true and complete !” - How does he begin:
When would Nature ever be represented in his picture ?
Infinite is the smallest portion of the world ! -
In the end he paints of it what he likes.
And what does he like ? Whatever he can paint I ’
(ibid. p. 365)
On the basis of this rather charmless verse alone, we can observe that Nietzsche’s 
work of the so-called middle period consists of more than a mere overturning of the 
super-sensualism of Plato into a purely sensualist Positivism. For not only is 
Nietzsche challenging the idea that nature can simply be ‘reproduced’ in its entirety 
through art, he is also challenging the idea of nature as a simple given. Referring 
implicitly to Perspectivism, nature is instead seen as an infinity, which cannot be 
depicted as an empirical totality. It is a criticism we see repeated in notes from 
1884, where the object this time is Flaubert and photography. Here Nietzsche 
observes that ‘The “will-to-be-objective” e.g. in Flaubert is a modern 
misunderstanding . . . Gentlemen, there is no “thing-in-itself ’ ! What they 
achieve is scientism or photography, i.e. description without perspective, a type of 
Chinese painting, pure foreground and everything full to bursting’ (KSA 11: 25 
[164] p. 57). The attempt at self-transcendence on the part of the Realist author or 
painter is, quite simply, a delusion. The desire by the author to efface himself, to 
submerse himself completely in the objective world being described is to ignore the
■   .
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role of the author in constituting that world, in having access to only certain per­
spectives on the world and not others. In describing that world and not another. As 
if continuing his criticism of the same delusion, Nietzsche writes some three years 
later, ‘It is not possible to remain objective or to suspend the interpretative, addi­
tive, supplementing, poetising power ( - which latter forges the chain that affirms 
the Beautiful)’ (KSA 12:10 [167] p. 555).
Clearly, when Nietzsche later comes to claim, in Nietzsche contra Wagner, 
that ‘Aesthetics is indeed nothing but applied physiology’ (KSA 6 p. 418), and to 
argue in a note from 1887 that ‘The desire for art and beauty is an indirect desire for 
the ecstasies of the sexual drive, which it communicates to the cerebrum’ (KSA 12:
8 [1] pp. 325-6), he is consolidating on his earlier goal of driving a wedge between 4
art and any notion of revealed truth. By describing art in terms of physiology,
Nietzsche is bringing it within the broader compass of his project of immanence, a 
wider strategy which embraces both Nietzsche’s physiologically based perspec­
tivism and his doctrine of Eternal Return.
Art ‘discloses’ neither the truth of the sensuous world nor that of some su- 
persensuous realm. In fact it ‘discloses’ nothing at all. Art creates a world. It car­
ries out a selective, world-constitutive, operation in a manner analogous to the in­
terpretative process of will to power, an insight which causes Nietzsche to speak of 
the ‘states in which we plant [“legen” - the root of the verb “hineinlegen” which 
Nietzsche employs to describe the process of scientific ‘discovery] a transfiguration 
and plenitude into things . . . until they reflect back our own plenitude and joy in 
life’ (KSA 12: 9 [102] p. 393). Beauty and art are less a matter of truth than one of 
strength. As Nietzsche says, ‘It is a question of power (of an individual or of a 
people), whether and where [the] judgement “beautiful” is given . . .  the feel­
ing of power even passes the judgement “beautiful” on things and states of affairs 
which the impotent instinct can only estimate as being hateful, as “ugly” ‘ (KSA 12:
10 [168] pp. 555-6). With this assertion of the unity of the question of art and that 
of power we see, too, the unity of Nietzsche’s critique of disinterestedness in the 
name of physiology, and the critique of artistic truth in the name of lying. For both 
features reveal the status of art as a form of interpretative will to power.
Giving Room to the Artist
In the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche remarks of Kant that 
‘like all philosophers, instead of gauging the aesthetic problem on the basis of the 
experience of the artist (the creator) [he] pondered art and the Beautiful solely from 
the point of view of the spectator, and thereby imperceptibly let the “spectator” into 
the concept “beautiful” itself’ (KSA 5 p. 346).
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Nietzsche is here making two, not unrelated, claims. The first is that Kant 
neglects the artist. The second is that consequently questions of ‘beauty’, 
‘sublimity’, even ‘ugliness’ only have meaning when related to a passive, contem­
plative viewer, listener, reader and so forth. As interpretations of Kant the first is 
partially incorrect, while the second is partially correct.
As regards the first criticism, Nietzsche displays either neglect or sloppy 
reading of the extensive passages of the Critique o f Judgement which Kant de­
votes to the creativity of the artist^. If his criticism is simply that Kant’s talk of 
‘Genius’ merely perpetuates the cult of genius, a concept, which Gadamer, too, 
contends is ‘basically conceived from the position of the spectator,then he is in­
correct here as well. Far from submitting to the contemporary cult of the genius in­
herited from the “Sturm und Drang” movement of the 1770’s and 80’s, Kant is 
rather attempting to counterbalance such wild notions by stressing the extent to 
which creative genius (which he prefers to term merely a “talent”) is guided by 
technique and rules of artistic production, hence his disdain for what he terms 
‘original nonsense’, in other words artistic creativity which is determined solely by 
the inner subjective feeling of the artist.^
As regards the second criticism, Nietzsche is partially correct when he sees 
the Kantian spectator as the determining ground of any judgement of Beauty. I say 
partially correct because Kant resists any conclusion that taste is just a matter of 
subjective preferences through his recourse to the notion of subjective universality, 
and in addition suggests that certain kinds of formal, objective qualities, e.g. par- 
ergonal ornamentation, may be inappropriate objects of any judgement of taste. 
Furthermore Nietzsche is only partially correct since the “subjectification” of 
Aesthetics in Kant does not occur “imperceptibly” [“unvermerkt”] but quite con­
sciously, since it occupies a central place in the architectonics of the Critical project.
Having defended Kant against these criticisms we must turn to a more fun­
damental issue: namely, why does Nietzsche consider the “subjective turn” in 
Kant’s aesthetic theory remiss ? What is the virtue of an aesthetic of the artist over 
and against the womanly aesthetics [“Weibs-Aesthetik”] of the spectator, of the re­
cipient ? Nietzsche writes that we ‘should not demand of the artist who gives, that 
he become a woman - that he “receives” ’ (KSA 13: 14 [170] p. 357). Yet why 
should we be interested in the artist in any case ?
The answer to the question cannot be seen as an attempt on the part of 
Nietzsche to counteract an imbalance of perspectives in Kant, for in practice 
Nietzsche devotes considerable space and time to arguing for the constitutive role of 
the spectator in the determination of the Beautiful. Without being reducible to the 
Kantian ‘subjectivist’ aesthetic, Nietzsche’s physiology of beauty does present 
many parallels with Kant’s account of aesthetic judgement. Hence we shall run into
'I
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difficulties if we allow an answer to the question to be based around the issue of the 
putative one-sidedness of Kant’s thinking.
If we change the way in which the issue is examined, however, we may of­
fer a more adequate answer to the initial question. For I would argue that 4
Nietzsche’s dissatisfaction with the ‘womanly aesthetics’ practised hitherto is not 
guided by an objection to the orientation of aesthetics per se, but rather is connected 
to the way in which such a ‘passive’ aesthetics serves to fortify the delusory belief 
in art as a world-disclosive praxis.
Although it has been demonstrated that Kant does devote attention to the 
genesis of the work of art, one must also concede that Nietzsche is correct when he 
asserts that the experience of the artist is neglected. Kant devotes adequate space to 
discussing the artist’s use of rules and precedents, yet the account of aesthetic ex­
perience itself is discussed exclusively with reference to the reaction of the spectator 
to the finished aesthetic object, whether it be an object of nature or product of hu­
man artifice. In other words, the cognitive ‘quickening’ which is the central ele- 4
ment of aesthetic experience is induced by the finished aesthetic object that, in the 
case of art, presents the world in a certain way.
Hence in the cases of the beautiful as the symbol of morality in Kant, poetry 
as the symbol of the Absolute in Romanticism, or music as the unmediated image 
of the Will in Schopenhauer, the aesthetic object is seen as a specific mode of repre­
sentation facilitating a cognition that exceeds the normal bounds of reason. Thus 
any orientation toward the experience of the spectator cannot but help tend to view 4
beauty as a form of revelation or disclosure, a doctrine which diverges considerably 
from Nietzsche’s own understanding of the understanding of the aesthetic. As I 
have already indicated, it would naturally be absurd to suggest that Nietzsche 
denies the power of the aesthetic object over the spectator. Like Kant he emphasises 
the ‘quickening’ effect of such experience (though it is more physiological than 
cognitive) claiming, for example, that art ‘works tonically, increases strength, 
inflames desire’ (KSA 13: 14 [119] p. 296). In Human All-too Human he 
describes the manner in which art brings about a restructuring of experience, 
claiming that it aims ‘to alter one’s sensibilities, partly by modifying our 
judgements on our experiences . . . partly by arousing a desire for pain, for 
emotion in general’ (KSA 2 p. 106). However, Nietzsche nevertheless attaches 
more importance to the analysis of the artist’s experience for two important 
reasons.
First, unlike Kant, Nietzsche tends to equate Aesthetics with the philosophy 
of art rather than beauty. The aesthetic object becomes the work of art, and 
Nietzsche is less interested in the finished artwork than in the way it functions as a 
sign or symptom of varying attitudes towards the world. Art is conceived of pri-
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marily as an activity rather than as an assembly of objects which can be collec­
tively termed ‘works* of art.
In making such a claim I am not pretending that Nietzsche ceases to refer to 
works of art, or asserting that he denies their existence as objects. Such a claim 
would be absurd since he discusses individual works throughout his career, from 
Boccaccio’s ‘D ecam eronto Wagner’s ‘Parsifal’^  and Cervantes’ ‘Don Quixote’.^
What I am arguing, though, is that the significance of works of art lies less in the 
effect they have on the spectator, reader or listener qua static, finished totalities, 
than in their shaping of human affectivity as dynamic creations or achievements of 
the artist. In other words they count less as self-contained totalities (and here we 
see another manner in which Nietzsche departs from Kant and from Formalist 4
aesthetics) than as the products of a particular impulse, in short, as the <!
achievements of interpretative will to power sublimated into the aesthetic drive. As 
Nietzsche argues in Human All-too human, ‘so-called art proper, that of artworks, 
is just an appendage’ (KSA 2 p. 454).
In dealing with the definition of the term ‘Kunst’ in Nietzsche an added 
confusion occurs in Nietzsche’s willingness to use the word to describe not only 
products of the aesthetic drive but also those objects which are institutionally 
defined as art, yet which Nietzsche regards as fundamentally non-aesthetic. The 
most obvious example is opera, which he considers to be an essentially inartistic 
phenomenon (cf. The Birth o f Tragedy § 19 ff.). So too in Human All-too human |
§ 220 there is a curious discussion of ‘The Beyond in Art’ which notes the 
existence of art forms which promote a sense of the transcendent, then concludes 
‘A stirring saga will emerge from this, that there once existed such an art, such an 
artistic belief’ (KSA 2 p. 180). Nietzsche’s conclusion thus suggests that he terms 
these works ‘art’ out of deference to common consent rather than any personal 4
approval of their content.^®
Despite this difficulty one can nevertheless argue that for Nietzsche art and 
the power of formal organisation which characterises the beautiful work of art 
count less for themselves than for their significance as exemplifications of the will 
to power which pervades all life processes. Hence he is trying to bridge the gap 
which he sees as having sprung up, separating art from life, the beautiful from the 
interests it serves. A gap which originates in a sundering of the interest in artistic 
form from the more general interest in furthering the process of life.
Second, examining the question of art from the position of the artist, with 
its emphasis on the process of creation, serves to lure us away from any idea of art 
as revealing, as disclosing a pre-existent truth and towards the recognition of art as 
a world-constitutive activity, a recognition that could be summed up in the words of 4
Paul Klee that ‘Art does not replicate the visible, it makes visible [my Italics].
j
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In the later works, and especially in the unpublished notes of the late 
1880’s, the question of beauty and the question of art become synonymous, the 
numerous passages entitled ‘Aesthetica’ invariably turn to the issue of ‘Kunst’
[art]. Not because Nietzsche is succumbing to the traditional identification of art 
and beauty, but because he sees the activity of perceiving beauty and that of 
producing art as joined at root by a shared way of seeing the world. Of beauty 
Nietzsche writes ‘In beauty man sets himself up as the measure of perfection’
(KSA 6 p. 123), adding later that ‘His feeling of power, his will to power, his 
courage, his pride - that falls with the ugly, that grows with the beautiful’ (Ibid. p.
124). Of art he claims that it is a ‘compulsion-to-transform to perfection’ (Ibid. p.
117), claiming further that ‘Man enjoys himself in art as perfection’ (Ibid.).
As will to power, art represents a mode of seeing-as, of seeing the world as 
perfect, as simplified as organised in a certain way. It is driven by a compulsion to 
transform [ ‘ Verwandeln-müssen’] the world, and as such, Nietzsche is interested 
more in the figure that puts this seeing-as into artistic praxis, namely the artist him­
self. Now although Nietzsche can admire the artistic qualities of something as im­
personal as the Jesuit order or the Prussian officer corps, it is also the case that on 
the whole, art is dependent in Nietzsche on a specific kind of individual. As 
Nietzsche says, the work of art is only the culmination of a process, and in many 
respect the process is more important.
So is Nietzsche claiming that the artist is merely attempting to express in 
material terms a pre-determined idea of the world, like the Platonic craftsman who 
always works with the Form of his object in mind ? No, because the artist figure, 
important though he is, is in many respects a cipher. Nietzsche writes that ‘The 
phenomenon “artist” is still the most transparent: - to see through it to the basic in­
stincts of power, nature etc. Religion and morality too !’ (KSA 12: 2 [130] p. 129).
Here, too, the origins of artistic creativity are located firmly within the realm 
of the physiological. Not necessarily because Nietzsche would deny the importance 
of the conscious activity of the artist, but in order to rule out any idealist notion of 
artistic vision and also to counteract the cult of genius, and of course more specifi­
cally the cult of WagnePs genius. Hence we see a link with Nietzsche’s discussion 
of Wagner as a medical case. The ‘case’ of Wagner thus gains its meaning from 4
both Nietzsche’s attempt to perceive culture as a whole in terms of physiology and 
also from an attempt to resist any idealist, genius-oriented notions of artistic ere- |
ativity.
The artistic vision, the ‘making perfect’ so characteristic of artistic praxis is 
not guided by some transcendent ideal, but rather should be seen in terms of a 
transfigurative immanence which opposes any tendency to ‘desensualisation’. In a 
note from June or July 1885, Nietzsche writes, ‘As regards the main thing I agree
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more with the artists than with any philosophers hitherto: they have not lost the 
great track life goes along, they have loved the things “of this world” . . .  it is a 
sign of having turned out well [Wohlgerathenheit] when one, like Goethe, clings 
with ever more joy and warmheartedness to “the things of the world” ‘ (KSA 11:
37 [12] pp. 587-8). Nietzsche’s physiology of the artist thus fortifies the notion of 
art as being concerned with the things ‘of the world’ by its refusal to seek for the 
source of the work of art beyond the immediately apparent.
If we turn to the second aspect, namely the idea of art as world-wa^mg 
rather than world-disclosing, the connection with the broader framework of trans- 
figurative immanence should be all too transparent. The combination of Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism and his resistance to ideas of transcendence, in short, his ‘immanent 
perspectivism’ to borrow Nehemas’ phrase^^, rules out both forms of world-dis- 
closure discussed so far. His immanent perspectivism rules out any view of art as 
mimetically disclosive of the sensual world. At best one might say that it discloses a 
particular perspective of the world, but then one is forced to admit the work repre- -4
sents a choice of a certain perspective over another, which of course undermines 
the Realist ideal of a work completely immersed in the objective world ‘as it really 
is’. His immanent pQTspoctivism therefore compels us to rule out talk of art either as 
a revelation of some higher, supersensuous truth or as a reproduction of the 
objective visible world (as if such a thing existed)
At the same time his immanent perspectivism draws us inevitably towards a 
notion of art as world-making. As a perspectival practice art involves a choice, a 
choice of seeing the world in various ways. As a process of transfigurative imma­
nence art forces us to conclude that since there is no ‘real’, determinable world to j
which each choice can be related, each choice represents the creation of a particular 
world. The physiology of art further strengthens this insight by relating the de­
mands for any particular world to immanent needs, i.e. those of the organism, 
rather than to transcendent values.
There is, in addition, perhaps one final reason why Nietzsche calls for a 
turn to the ‘masculine’ aesthetics of the artist, and it is one suggested by Jacques 
Derrida in his book Spurs. For what is significant about Nietzsche’s call is not just 
his plea for a re-orientation to the aesthetics of the artist, but also the fact that he 
couches it in such gender specific terms. The artist adopts, so Nietzsche has ar­
gued, a masculine standpoint of giving, whereas, by implication, that of the 
woman, the feminine position is one of passive acceptance. As Derrida has pointed 
out, Nietzsche is here ‘dealing with a very old philosopheme of production ’ (p.
77), whereby masculinity has always been regarded as the productive gender 
against the sterility of the feminine. It is notable, too, that Nietzsche sees the rela­
tion between the sexes as based on the process of giving and taking we have seen
beautiful and the sublime along similar lines. Yet if we follow this Nietzschean
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elucidated above, from his claim that the foundation of all love is desire for appro­
priation (KSA 3 pp. 386-7) to his comparison of feminine and masculine love, 
where the former is characterised as a desire ‘to be taken, to be accepted as a pos- i
session’ (ibid. p. 611) and the latter as a desire to possess; ‘the woman gives her­
self away, the man appropriates’ (ibid.).
With this move to the (masculine) aesthetics of the artist, Nietzsche is doing 
a number of things. First he is drawing attention to the long tradition within meta­
physics of comparing the relation of certain oppositional pairs to that between the 
sexes. Most especially within the sphere of aesthetics not least to be taken into con- i
sidération is the eighteenth century tradition of seeing aesthetics as a feminine dis­
cipline in contrast to the masculine rigours, and also the distinction between the !Î
thematic through, it becomes clear that the ‘masculine’ aesthetics of the artist is not |
. :merely an act of assimilation to the tradition, most especially because it is in the 
name of this new attention to ‘masculine’ art that he is criticising traditional aesthet- 4
ics. For we must note that in the aphorism on love from The Gay Science quoted !
above, the relation between the two sexes, while still based on the paradigm of ap­
propriation and giving, has inverted the usual relation, inasmuch as it is the woman 
who gives herself, and the man who receives, or even reaches out and seizes for 
himself, a relation repeated in Beyond Good and Evil where he writes that ‘Man .
. . has to conceive of woman as possession, as property which can be locked 
away’ (KSA 5 p. 175). Now this inversion would not be so significant except for 
the fact that Nietzsche also sees women as closer to the artistic temperament than #
men (‘woman is so artistic’ [KSA 3 p. 609] ), in their suspicion of truth and their :f
tendency for dissimulation, culminating in his claim that ‘From the very first noth­
ing has been more alien, more repugnant, more hostile to woman than truth - her 1
great art is the lie, her highest concern is appearance and beauty’ (ibid. p. 171).
We have to be careful, then, in seeing Nietzsche merely as replicating the 
discourse of traditional aesthetics. Rather, by his deliberating playing with the in­
herited discourse he should be seen as bringing together, on another level, the aes­
thetic and the erotic, a move we have already seen previously in his claim that aes­
thetic and sexual pleasure are synonymous, and that ‘a Raphael is unthinkable 
without a certain overheating of the sexual system’ (KSA 13:14 [117] p. 295). The 
collusion of erotics and aesthetics serves, as a strategy, to further dissociate the 
question of art from the metaphysical understanding of truth, which in turn will 
thus add force to the severance of art as Nietzsche understands it, from the idea of 
art as revelation of truth, either positivist or transcendent.
Second, Nietzsche’s turn to the masculine aesthetic of the artist explicitly 
pits the artist against truthfulness inasmuch as the latter is frequently described as a
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woman in Nietzsche, an observation Derrida makes. It is a further example of 
Nietzsche exacerbating the discord between truth and art by occasionally casting 
their relation in the terms of the opposition of the genders. It is an opposition which 
points towards a third problem, which I can only briefly discuss here.
What paradoxically unites the masculine aesthetic of the' artist with the 
woman is their common pre-disposition to giving. Nietzsche writes that we ‘should 
not demand of the artist who gives, that he become a woman - that he “receives” ’ 
(KSA 13: 14 [170] p. 357). Yet as I have already suggested, he seems less con­
cerned with the femininity of aesthetics than with its passivity, for which the 
woman, on this occasion, stands as a cipher, following the traditional discourse of 
production. It is moreover this aspect of the problem which I shall be dealing with.
As Derrida points out, Nietzsche’s use of the metaphors of appropriation 
and donation is far from being one of pure contingency, for the metaphysical con­
ception of truth has always been based on the paradigm of appropriation. Truth is 
always something to be ‘attained’ or ‘grasped’, a feature which we see most 
strongly in Heidegger’s concern with the proper [‘eigen’ - derived from the old 
Germanic verb meaning ‘to have’] in its various forms, whether it be the differen­
tiation between authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] and inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit], 
the concern with Dasein’s ownmost [eigenste] possibilities of being, or with truth 
as an event [Ereignis]. This notion of truth as something to be possessed, of appro­
priation as prior to truth, is by no means limited to Heidegger, but is rather a gen­
eral feature of all metaphysical thinking, and is set off well against Nietzsche’s 
metaphor of truth as a woman, who, hiding behind a veil of dissimulation, always 
resists that masculine desire to be her master and possessor. It is a desire for mas­
tery which never be satisfied (and here we see a parallel with the inability of will to 
power to exhaust its possibilities) for, as Nietzsche says, ‘Are there not grounds 
for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists [i.e. meta­
physicians], have been inexpert about women ? That the gruesome earnestness, the 
clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have hitherto usually approached truth were 
awkward and very improper means for winning over a woman for oneself ?’ (KSA 
5 p. 11).
With this speculation Nietzsche is not merely engaging in a whimsical play, 
which would relate also to his claim that as spawned by the ascetic ideal, meta­
physicians avoid women and the body (and that Socrates only married out of a 
wicked sense of irony). For he is also challenging the notion that truth is something 
waiting to be appropriated, a challenge which brings us back to his turn to the aes­
thetics of the artist as he who gives. For the artist who gives, in common with the 
woman who gives herself, serves to dissociate aesthetics from metaphysics by 
overturning the topos of appropriation and thereby of course takes us ever further
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away from the notion of art as either covering up or revealing the truth. For art is 
closely bound up with the philosopheme of production, one which of course brings 
us into proximity with Nietzsche’s theory of interpretation as a transformational ac­
tivity.
Gary Shapiro has recently indicated the importance to Nietzsche of the 
topos of gift-giving^^, and like Derrida, he sets it against the metaphysical model of 
truth as possession. However it is important to see this not as necessarily involving 
us in an economic metaphor of exchange and expenditure so much as in one of 
production and creation. It is moreover within Nietzsche’s discussion of the 4
aesthetics that, I would argue, this process occurs, and it reminds us of the central 
place which the question of art occupies in Nietzsche’s critical assault on 
metaphysics. It is within the turn to the aesthetics of the artist that the various 
themes of appropriation, giving, woman, dissimulation, truth and creation are 
brought into a meaningful relation.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have continued discussing Nietzsche’s critical reception of the tra­
ditional aesthetics following on from the exploration undertaken in the last chapter 
of the central role which the physiological (and above all the erotic) plays in 
Nietzsche’s understanding of art. As such I have offered a reading in many respects 
designed to counterbalance the Heideggerian interpretation, one which has in the 
past been highly influential.
In this chapter I examined those two areas of conflict between Nietzsche 
and the ‘tradition’, which centre on the issues of the truth content of art and the 
status within aesthetics of the spectator. In both areas I have examined Nietzsche’s 
critique of traditional ways of conceiving these themes in order to pave the way for 
the radical re-orientation of culture towards art which he is attempting to achieve.
This re-orientation can only be properly recognised once the discourse of aesthetics 
has been freed from its subordination to the episteme of metaphysics. The key 
relation which is cast into question is the relation of art and truth, and Nietzsche’s 
insistence on the untruthfulness of art, on the priority of the artist over the 
spectator, together his view of art as a physiological activity which I discussed in 
the pervious chapter all combine to put forward the notion of art as an immanent 
transformational interpretative practice. It is the immanence of the interpretative 
practice together with its status as a transformational activity (artistic interpretation 
as creating rather than merely reproducing) which points towards the way in which 
art can communicate the play of necessity and the lawfulness of chance, and thus 
continue the dialectic of the contingent. It is this solution which I shall be
J
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discussing in the final chapter, relating it to the particular problem of art and ç
Modernity.
Notes;
 ^ Urs Heftrich, ‘Nietzsche’s Auseinandersetzung mit der “Kritik der Urteilskraft” Nietzsche 
Studien 10 (1991) p. 257.
 ^Heidegger, Nietzsche Vol. I, p. 109.
 ^Most obviously, of course in Twilight o f the Idols , ‘How the “true world” eventually became a 
fable’ (KSA 6 pp. 80-81).
4 Heftrich has made a similar point. Cf. Heftrich, op. cit., p. 259 ff.
 ^Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit m d  Methode (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag 1965) p. 88.
 ^See especially §§46 and 47 of The Critique o f Judgement on the relation of genius to rules.
7 KSA 7: 7 [9] p. 138
8 E.g. KSA 5 p. 242 ff,
“Don Quixote” is one of the most harmful of books’ (KSA 8: 8 [7] p. 130).
^^Nietzsche’s willingness to apply the word ‘Kunst’ both to what might be called authentic art 
and also to those trivial works of contemporary art such as opera which he considers as unaesthetic #
may well lie behind Behler’s confusion as regards the significance attached to the notion of play in 
Nietzsche. As I noted in the previous chapter (n. 16) Behler ascribes to Nietzsche an attitude which 
would lead him ot condone I’art pour I’art as a mode of understanding art. My own interpretation ?|
differs somewhat.
^ ‘^Die Kunst gibt nicht das Sichtbare wieder, sie macht sichtbar’. Quoted in Manfred Frank, op. 
cit., p. 18.
1^1 am referring to the title o f Alexander Nehemas’ paper, ‘Immanent and Transcendent 
Perspectivism in Nietzsche’.
l^See, for example, Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin o f  our Ideas of the Sublime 4
and the Beautiful or Kant’s pre-critical Observations on the Feeling o f the Beautiful and Sublime 
which devotes a whole section to the analogy between the relation of the sexes and that of the 
beautiful and the sublime.
^4oary Shapiro, Alcyone. Nietzsche on Gifts, Noise and Women (New York: State University of 
New York, 1991)
Art contra Nihilism: Modernity and Beyond
During the course of this study I have undertaken a thematic discussion of the 
problem of art in Nietzsche’s philosophy, all of the themes revolving around the 
goal of inscribing some form of normativity at the level of the immanent. This is 
what I have taken Nietzsche’s desire to push through the paralysis of reactive 
Nihilism onwards the affirmative, active Nihilism to be, and in particular I have 
taken it to be the main function of art to facilitate this completion of Nihilism. For as 
we have seen, overturning reactive entails overturning the conception of what 
Nihilism is. In Nietzsche’s work Nihilism is transformed from being a mere 
renunciation of all forms of understanding to a joyful embracing of the ability of the 
individual to create a new interpretative framework, one disburdened of the 
crushing weight of guilt and the demands of the moral law which so characterised 
the ‘old law tables’ of metaphysics. Implicit in this accomplishment of Nihilism is a 
political attitude resistant to the egalitarian demands of a pure subjectivism or 
relativism, which some have wanted to construe him as supporting.
Central to this accomplishment of Nihilism is the adoption of art as an 
attitude towards the world and its interpretation which should displace the 
metaphysical understanding of our environment (both natural and political) and our 
relation towards that environment. This has become apparent through the 
examination of Nietzsche’s manipulation of the discourse on the sublime in his 
discussion of tragedy, his sexualisation of aesthetics through the physiology of art 
and his adoption of a temporal structure inimical to the transcendent ideals of 
metaphysics, a structure he sees embodied in certain aspects of authentically artistic 
art, such as those of fragmentariness and ambiguity.
Now hitherto in this thesis I have tended to speak of art and the question of 
aesthetics in a markedly unhistorical way. I have written as if Nietzsche’s critical 
reaction to Kantian aesthetics and the subsequent tradition were in the name of some 
higher, timeless truth, or least interpretation. If this held true of Nietzsche’s writing 
he would be merely replicating the Kantian discourse, positing an alternative 
aesthetic theory which itself made the same error as metaphysics, namely a neglect 
or wilful disregard of time, history and Becoming. That such a reading ill suits the 
author of the Untimely Meditations , the author, who was so sure of his own un­
timeliness that he looked forward to posthumous fame only, who was so sure that 
his time was yet to come, should be quite evident. Hence in this concluding chapter 
I shall be gathering up the themes I have discussed in previous chapters and shall 
also be qualifying them by relating them to the problem of Modernity. Since
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Nietzsche’s concern is with how to become an accomplished Nihilist (Vattimo’s 
‘nichilista compiuto’), and since the crisis of Nihilism is so characteristic for him of 
Modernity in general, we have to ask a number of question pertaining to his critical 
aesthetics.
First, how does Nietzsche’s own ‘aesthetic turn’ as one commentator has 
termed it  ^ relate to the Modernist aesthetic turn which was already occurring in 
Nietzsche’s own lifetime. In other words, given that Nietzsche shares with early 
Modernism the conviction that Modernity is the problem to be overcome through 
some form of aesthetic practice, how does his attitude compare to that of the 
Modern movement in general ? Second, given that art is part of the cure to 
Modernity, does Nietzsche’s notion of a post-Modern aesthetics culture bear any 
resemblance to the set of discourses and practices which we group together as being #
Post-modern ? Finally we have to ask whether Nietzsche’s challenge to 
metaphysical culture in the name of an aesthetic education actually permits us to 
continue talking about art without questioning the traditional boundaries separating 
art off from other cultural practices, a problem I have intimated earlier. As is well 
known, the category of the aesthetic can be traced back to its origin in the 
Enlightenment, where human cultural activity was divided into the discrete areas of 
morality, epistemology and aesthetics. If this division, so well exemplified in 
Kant’s three Critiques, can no longer be sustained unproblematically (and 
Nietzsche’s assault on epistemology and morality cast this into doubt) we will have 
to ask ourselves whether he is advocating an elision of the three, as seems to be a J
central feature of the Post-modern. I shall deal with each issue in turn.
Art in / against Modernity
Nietzsche’s first philosophical work. The Birth o f Tragedy , while ostensibly 
concerned with an analysis of ancient Athenian tragedy, is permeated with a sense 
of the present. In my third chapter which dealt with that book, I suggested the 
extent to which Nietzsche is indebted to Kantian and Romantic theories of the 
sublime in his account of tragic culture and the aesthetic state of rapture. However, 
unlike Kant, Schopenhauer and perhaps even Heidegger, Nietzsche is not interested 
in formulating some ahistorical theory of the sublime or of aesthetic experience in 
general. This can be said for two reasons.
First, the influence of Schiller, Hegel and the early Romantics on nineteenth 
century thinking effectively made it impossible to ignore the historical relevance of 
the aesthetic; the famous Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes had been conducted 
almost entirely on the terrain of aesthetic theory and literary criticism. Although 
Hegel himself was not particularly party to this dispute, his own massive
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contribution to the understanding of art and the aesthetic similarly located the 
question of art firmly within the domain of history. His Lectures on Aesthetics 
render the notion of a timeless object of aesthetic experience and a timeless norm of 
beauty problematic to say the least, most especially with his startling thesis that for 
us art is a thing of the past. As will have become clear during the argument, 
however, Nietzsche’s thinking about art is directed towards an overturning of this 
thesis, even if this remains an implicit goal only.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Nietzsche’s thinking on art in The 
Birth of Tragedy is historicised to the extent that the book is written as a specific 
response to the more general crisis of faith in contemporary culture for which he 
will later reserve the term Nihilism. If the early Romantics, and in particular 
Novalis, were critical of the embryonic development of industrial society and 
instrumental reason, Nietzsche’s work is very much an attempt to articulate the 
feeling that this culture of scientific reason has been at last revealed itself as 
bankrupt. He comments of Goethe’s Faust that it reveals the degree to which ‘the 
modern person is beginning to discern the limits of that Socratic desire to know, 
and from the wide, barren sea of knowledge longs for the coast’ (KSA 1 p. 116). 
The Birth o f Tragedy thus undertakes two tasks. The first is a proto-genealogical 
investigation into the roots of modern scientific culture, through an examination of 
the rise of Socrates. Although the notion of genealogy will only be properly 
articulated some fifteen years later, quite clearly Nietzsche is here attempting to 
understanding the origin of the obsessive desire in the culture of scientific reason to 
render everything intelligible, to leave no room for doubt. His answer is, of course, 
that this culture originates in Socrates’ inability to accept either the ritual annihilation 
of the tragic hero or the fundamental sense of ambiguity and uncertainty which 
tragedy produces. Quite clearly this analysis remains constant throughout 
Nietzsche’s writings, from his insistence on Plato’s role as originator of the crisis 
of modern culture to his claim that metaphysics is merely a sublimated form of the 
desire of the weak for certainty and redemption, rather than facing up to the 
violence and uncertainty of tragic culture. In the ‘Attempt at a Self-criticism’ of 
1886, Nietzsche confirms this, asking ‘And science itself, our science - yes what 
does all science mean, when viewed as a symptom of life ? Whither, worse still, 
whence - all science ? What ? Is scientificity just a fear of and flight from 
pessimism? A fine weapon against - the truth ? And in moral terms something like 
cowardice and falsity ?’ (ibid. p. 12-3).
The second task of The Birth o f Tragedy would then be to propose a form 
of cultural renewal, which Nietzsche mistakenly believes to be occurring in the 
work of Richard Wagner, and here we are reminded of Strong’s claim I noted in 
chapter four that Nietzsche was initially attracted to Wagner because of the political
1
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significance the latter attached to art. Once again, although he later repudiates 
Wagner, and eventually identifies his music with the most decadent forms of 
contemporary culture, his commitment to a cultural renewal remains unchanged.
Moreover the basis of this renewal will be art, even in Nietzsche’s later works, and 
is a response to the problem Nietzsche observes in The Birth o f Tragedy that 
‘There has never been any period of art in which so-called education [ B i l d u n g ] ^  and 4
authentic [eigentlich] art stood as alienated and disinclined towards one another as 
we can see in the present. We understand why such a sickly education hates true 
art; for it fears its own downfall at the latter’s hands’ (ibid. p. 130-1). In other 
words, modem Socratic culture is built on very poor foundations indeed, and if it is 
confronted by a critical artistic praxis, those foundations may very easily be swept 
away. In this sense, then, Nietzsche can be considered to be very much part of the 
Modern movement (and heir to Schiller) seeking cultural enlightenment and 
transformation through certain forms of artistic production, although this is a claim 
which will need substantial qualification. Perhaps at present we should content 
ourselves merely by seeing Nietzsche as a Modernist inasmuch as for him 
Modernity presents a moment of crisis.
By drawing on those aspects of The Birth of Tragedy which are specifically 
addressed to the problem of Modernity, I am placing the question of value and 
evaluation at the core of Nietzsche’s discussion of art, and this coheres well with 
the relentless polemic Nietzsche reserves for those formalists who in their efforts to 
free art from the trivialising morality of the 18th and 19th centuries have simply 
reacted against such appropriation of art, by declaring the autonomy of art in effect 
denuding it of any extrinsic worth.
Nietzsche repeatedly stresses the extent to which modern culture is 
fundamentally hostile to art and the aesthetic understanding. In The Birth o f 
Tragedy the passage I earlier quoted, which criticises the lack of aesthetic 
sensibility currently sustained by modern ‘Bildung’, is confirmed by Nietzsche’s 
recurrent attacks on opera. If we recall, opera, which Nietzsche interprets as the 
characteristic art form of the modern age since the Renaissance, is driven by a non- 
aesthetic drive. It is not simply a matter of the Apollinian displacing the Dionysian 
through the dominance of the text and intelligibility. Rather both Dionysian and 
Apollinian drives have been displaced by the Socratic desire to know, and which 
has put forward its claim to govern the production of all so-called works of art. His 
account of opera runs as follows. Opera was born out of a Socratic culture, 
paradoxically as the result of an attempt to rehabilitate Greek tragedy. In its 
combination of drama and music the work of the Florentine composers was 
attempting to imitate what they knew to have been the formal characteristic of Greek 
drama. However, because it was produced by a theoretical culture, i.e. one that
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%
176
J
demanded ‘knowledge’ rather than tragic ‘wisdom’ the attempt was doomed to 
failure. As Nietzsche notes, ‘Answering to the wish of the listener to understand 
the words being sung the singer speaks rather than sings and increases the 
expressive pathos of the words with this half-singing: through this increase in the 
pathos he facilitates the comprehension of the words and overcomes that remaining 
half, the music’ (KSA 1 p. 121).
Hence opera presents itself as a paradoxical musical form, one whose goal :$
is to reduce to a minimum the musical element for the sake of clarity. Yet the 
significance of such an artistic form is not that it merely gives priority to the 
intelligibility of the text at the expense of the music. The preference for the text 
signifies for Nietzsche an exclusion of the aesthetic per se, not just a mistaken 
aesthetic praxis. For ‘Opera is the progeny of theoretical Man, of the critical 
layperson, not of the artist: one of the most alienating facts in the history of all the ;
arts. It was the demand of truly unmusical listeners to understand the word above 
all’ (KSA 1 p. 123).
Nietzsche’s account of opera and of its concomitant displacement of the 
aesthetic drive becomes extended in other works to encompass a general theory of 
the alienation and marginalisation of art in Modernity. Amongst his earlier works 
perhaps one of the most striking analyses appears in section § 170 of ‘The 
Wanderer and his Shadow’ in Human All-too human , entitled ‘Art in the Time of 
Work’. Here Nietzsche observes how ‘We have the conscience of an industrious 
epoch: this does not permit us to give our best times and mornings over to art, even 
if this art were itself the greatest and most worthy. It counts for us as a matter of 
leisure, of relaxation: we dedicate the remainder of our time, our energies, to it’
(KSA 2 p. 623). This trivialisation of the function of art has in turn led to a 
trivialisation of the content of art, for ‘even the artists of great art promise 
relaxation, diversion, they too address themselves to the exhausted, they too ask 
him for the hours in the evening of the working day’ (ibid. p. 624).
Set against this disenfranchisement of art the motive behind Nietzsche’s 
polemic against formalist aesthetics becomes all the clearer. Quite simply, in 
attempting to free art from the trivial moralising to which it was subjected, they 
have merely confirmed the prevailing ideology of modern society, which has 
relegated art to the status of entertainment. Rather than supporting Nietzsche’s 
insight that art ‘is the great facilitator of life, the great seductress towards life, the 
great stimulus to life’ (KSA 13: 11 [415] p. 194), they have rather managed to 
concur with Hegel’s judgement that art has been superseded as a serious concern by 
other cultural formations. It is a criticism of formalism which in many respects 
parallels the early Marxist critique of formalist ideologies, though without sharing 
their commitment to class struggle or any form of liberating utopianism.
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A further difference between Nietzsche and Marxist critiques of such a 
trivialising of art lies in the fact that overshadowing all of Nietzsche’s critique of 
Modernity is the advent of Nihilism. Less concerned with social justice than with 
cultural well-being, Nietzsche’s main concern in his critique of Modernity is with 
the manner in which Western culture since Socrates has projected itself on a 
trajectory which can only have one result, namely a descent into Nihilism. In 
addition, whereas Marxist critiques would accord a secondary function to art, i.e. 
less effecting than being affected by a transformation of social relations, for 
Nietzsche it is art itself, or rather particular kinds of art, which will effect that 
cultural change which will then transform all political structures.
Returning to Nihilism we recall that, as Nietzsche says, it is a consequence 
of the fact that ‘the highest values devalue themselves’ (KSA 12: 9 [35] p. 350). 
More specifically it is a result of the loss of certainty set against the expectation of 
certainty promoted by the interpretative horizon of metaphysics, Christianity and 
science, in short, the whole complex of Western culture. Loss of faith in the ‘true’ 
transcendent world leads to a refusal to accept the legitimation of any values, a 
refusal to accept the tradition which has sustained such beliefs, and as Nietzsche 
notes in the opening of The Antichrist, modern man is plunged into a state of 
neurosis: ‘ “I know neither my way in nor out; I am everything that knows neither 
in nor out” laments the modern human’ (KSA 6 p. 169). Modernity is characterised 
for Nietzsche by a sense of loss and confusion, a feeling which threatens to plunge 
into the abyss of Nihilism. Yet Nihilism is ‘ambiguous’ (KSA 12: 9 [35] p. 350), 
and the responses to the crisis of Modernity are various.
I have already commented in previous chapters on the distinction made by 
Nietzsche and subsequent commentators between active and reactive Nihilism. 
Reactive Nihilism is that sense of pessimism generated by the weak, in other words 
those who still cling to the ideal of some transcendent, unchanging truth, while at 
the same time confronted by the loss of legitimacy of any of those values cherished 
hitherto. The sense of mourning at the loss of such certain truths is accompanied by 
the conviction of the worthlessness of all existence, since it cannot be justified by 
some higher authority. Reactive Nihilism gives birth to the desire for revenge, for 
destruction, and with this we are reminded of Nietzsche’s typological classification 
of the Romantic [die Romantik] in The Gay Science , as a destructive condition 
characterised by precisely that feeling of lack: ‘The longing for destruction, change. 
Becoming can be the expression of a superabundant power pregnant with the future 
(my term for that, as is known, is “Dionysian”); but it can also be the hate of the ill- 
constituted, the disinherited, the underprivileged, who destroys, has to destroy, be­
cause that which is permanent, indeed all permanence, all Being itself, provokes it 
and arouses indignation’ (KSA 3 p. 621).
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One notes here that although superficially such reactive Nihilism seems to 
have turned against the order and hierarchy of tradition, it is in fact still bound 
closely to it, and to metaphysics in general, by the spirit of ressentiment, by the 
desire to wreak revenge. It is merely a modern form of the same spirit of 
ressentiment which Nietzsche discerns motivating Christianity in On the Genealogy 
of Morals when he quotes the obvious relish Thomas Aquinas takes in imagining 
the future sufferings of those non-believers: ‘ “Beati in regno coelesti” he says, 
meek as a lamb, “videbunt poenas damnatorum, ut beatitudo illis magis complaceat” 
[the blessed in the kingdom of heaven will see the punishments of the damned in 
order that their bliss will be more delightful for them]’ (KSA 5 p. 284). In the case 
of metaphysics the mark is the constant rancour of philosophers against change and 
sensuality, and I outlined the ways in which Nietzsche employs temporal and 
physiological rhetoric to counter such tendencies. In the case of the reactive 
Nihilists (and Nietzsche regards the growing anarchist movement of his own time 
as an example of this [KSA 3 p. 622] ), energies are turned against the permanent 
instead. This spirit of revenge which unites the two marks them out as two partners 
of a self-consuming dialectic. As an analysis of social conditions, Nietzsche’s 
interpretation can be applied to German history after his death as an explanation of 
the alarming ease with which the Weimar Republic was transformed into the 
thousand year Reich of National Socialism. According to Nietzsche’s position, 
such a change was eminently possible, since the apparent liberalism of the Weimar 
Republic can now be seen as merely a reactive response to the loss of the political 
and social certainties of Willhelminian Germany, a reaction which could easily be 
overturned into its other - the restoration of tradition and certainty, albeit of a brutal 
and distorted kind.^
Against this can be set active Nihilism, whose character will now be clear 
on the basis of the analyses of interpretation and temporality in the preceding 
chapters. Active Nihilism is that sense of freedom brought about by awareness of 
the contingency of all interpretative horizons, an acceptance of the historicity of all 
knowledge. It is a recognition of knowledge as the dialectic of interpretative will to 
power, with everything which that entails.
Having sketched out briefly how Nietzsche characterises the response to the 
crisis of Modernity (and for him Modernity is synonymous with crisis), it is now 
necessary to turn to the relation of art to Nihilism, and I shall begin by analysing 
further what Nietzsche means by the word ‘art’. The term ‘art’ seems to designate 
many things for Nietzsche, many of which are in conflict. As I claimed in my last 
chapter, it is important to keep in mind that art, for Nietzsche, consists less of 
empirical objects than in the state of artistic creativity, and hence his stress on the 
aesthetics of the artist. Art, considered thus, can be equated with the ‘aesthetic
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attitude’, a reading which makes more plausible Nietzsche’s claim that art is the 
‘counter-movement to Nihilism’.
As I have pointed out previously, though, art also seems to designate those 
objects which Nietzsche considers products of the genuine aesthetic drive and, and 
those fundamentally non-aesthetic objects which modern society still terms works 
of art. Implicit in this analysis is a notion of authenticity, a word which reminds us 
of Nietzsche’s observation in The Birth o f Tragedy that a yawning gap has 
appeared in modem society between ‘Bildung’ and ‘authentic’ art. Although the 
mature writings do not make use of the notion of authenticity explicitly, I am 
claiming that implicit in Nietzsche’s account of art, as well as in his more general 
interpretation of Modernity, authenticity is nevertheless a central idea, around which 
much of the argument revolves. This will become clear as I further examine 
Nietzsche’s discussion of art and Modernity.
In his work on Modernity Nietzsche frequently employs the opposition of 
Classical and Romantic, as artistic metaphors for the active /  reactive dichotomy of 
Nihilism. However they are meant as rather more than just metaphors. The manner 
in which the problem of Modernity is confronted in art can be regarded as central to 
understanding the crisis facing contemporary society, and the Classical artistic 
response, in the form of Dionysian Classicism, should be understood as providing 
the key to the overcoming of reactive Nihilism in all other spheres of social being. 
In other words Nietzsche is using the practice of Dionysian Classicism as a device 
for leading the way, for communicating how one might imagine living in a post­
metaphysical, post-Modern society^. It is a practice which diverges considerably, 
however, from the actual artistic responses of Modernism.
Turning our attention to those artistic responses to Modernity which were 
known to Nietzsche we see two movements being singled out for censure, namely 
Realism and Romanticism (which latter should be distinguished from the more 
general typological category of ‘die Romantik’). Both movements are the products 
of Modernity, though they deal with the dissolution of the authority of tradition in 
very different ways. I shall deal with each in turn, beginning with Romanticism.
One of the principle features of Romanticism for Nietzsche is its status as a 
neurotic condition. I have indicated previously how Nietzsche describes the 
decadence of Modernity in medical terms, as a neurosis which needs curing, and 
his description of Romanticism is no different. Concerning Delacroix, for example, 
he quotes with approval a passage from the novel Manette Salomon by the 
Concourt brothers which observes that Delacroix ‘is the . . . image of the 
décadence of our time, the spoilt one, confusion . .  . the passions, the nerves, the 
faiblesses of our time, modem torment’ (KSA 11: 25 [141] p. 51), adding a further 
comment at the end that ‘Delacroix a kind of Wagner’ (ibid.). A second note in the
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Nachlafi quotes another passage from the same novel, half translated and half in 
French, once again with regard to Delacroix; ‘Delacroix - he promised everything, 
announced everything. His pictures ? Aborted masterpieces; the person who, après i
tout, will arouse the passions comme tout grand incomplet, a feverish life in all he
creates, une agitation de lunettes, un dessin fou’ (ibid. 25 [142] p. 51). In Beyond g
Good and Evil Nietzsche devotes a lengthy aphorism (§ 256) to the discussion of 
the late Romantics of France and Richard Wagner. He writes, ‘all of them fanatics 
of expression “at any price” - 1 emphasise Delacroix, the most closely related to 
Wagner - all of them great discoverers in the realm of the sublime . . . even 
greater discoverers as regards effects, display . . . born enemies of logic and ?
straight lines, lusting after the alien, the exotic, the monstrous, the crooked, the ?
contradictory; Tantaluses of the will as human beings, successful plebeians who - j
knew themselves to be incapable of a respectable tempo, a lento in their work and 
creativity . . . unbridled workers, near self-destroyers in their work, antinomians 
and rebels against custom, ambitious and insatiable without balance and enjoyment, 
all of them eventually breaking down and sinking down before the cross (and that 
with right and reason: for who of them would have been sufficiently profound and 
original for a philosophy of the Antichrist ?)’(KSA 5 pp. 202-3). In his final 
analyses of Wagner he goes even further. Wagner does not aim merely to rebel 
against tradition and custom, rather he panders to the weak; ‘Revenge against life 
itself - the most voluptuous kind of rapture for such impoverished ones ! . .
Wagner just as much as Schopenhauer answers the double requirement of these 
latter - they deny life, they defame it, thus they are my antipodes’ (KSA 6 p. 425).
In The Case o f Wagner Nietzsche once again uses medical imagery, asking ‘Is 
Wagner even a human ? Is he not rather a disease ? He makes everything he touches 
sickly - he has made music sickly’ ibid. p. 21).
What is significant about all these discussion is the sense of Romanticism as 
a neurotic condition permeated by confusion. Most especially in the passages on 
Delacroix, one can see how the reaction against tradition and custom has led to the 
unleashing of self-destructive energies. It is a confusion accompanied by 
prolonged, dangerous and decadent introspection, with the emphasis constantly on 
subjective expression ‘at any price’. I say dangerous because the extreme self­
absorption which Nietzsche here comments on parallels the birth of asceticism he 
outlines in On the Genealogy o f morals . If we recall, asceticism was seen to be 
dangerous cultural manifestation because it represents a turning of energies, more 
specifically will to power, against themselves, rather than directing them outwards.
Asceticism thus constitutes a fetishism of the process which first generated 
subjectivity. As Nietzsche writes, ‘The whole inner world, originally thin as if 4
stretched between two membranes, extended and expanded, acquired depth,
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breadth and height in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited’ (KSA 
5 p. 332).
Romantic repressive self-absorption is a state which is to be found in 
Nietzsche’s more general description of modern humanity in The Antichrist, 
stemming from the fact that while the false strictures of custom have been rejected, 4
the transcendent foundation of their authority, which Nietzsche introduces by 
mentioning the cross, still remains as an object of desire. All the Romantics 
eventually sink down ‘before the Cross’, an indication that they too are caught up in 
the reactive moment of the dialectic of Nihilism. It is an interpretation which 
suggests that behind their antinomian production there still lies the hope for 
redemption through some form of restoration of transcendent values, a hope whose 
lack of fulfilment leads inevitably to despair.
If we consider Realism, we find that in many respects this constitutes the 
other partner in the dialectic of reactive Nihilism, indeed Nietzsche explicitly refers 
to Flaubert in Twilight o f the Idols in such terms; ‘On ne peut penser et écrire 
qu’assis (G. Flaubert). With that I have you. Nihilist !’ (KSA 6 p. 64). I have 
earlier given the grounds for Nietzsche’s criticism of Realism, together with the 
positivism of which it is the product. The criticisms are two-fold. The first is the 
criticism of the notion that it is possible to produce a non-perspectival 
representation, and the second is of the notion that there is an objective order of 
things to be merely reproduced through mimesis. The second objection hardly 
needs any further treatment, but I shall develop Nietzsche’s first critique beyond 
what I have said previously. As regards the first aspect of Realist myth, Nietzsche 
is quite clear about the impossibility of the author’s transcending his own subjective 
perspective. In a note from the NachlaB of 1884 he writes, ‘People have regarded 
as “impersonal” what was the expression of the most powerful persons . . . But 
the gentlemen would love to hide and be rid of themselves, e.g. Flaubert’ (KSA 11:
25 [117] p. 44). Moreover Nietzsche interprets such putative self-transcendence on 
the part of the artist as an expression of decadence, a denigration of the self which 
mirrors the Romantic denigration of the objective. In a note from the same notebook 
Nietzsche says ‘It is a self-denigration amongst the modems, that they would like to 
“be rid of themselves” in art, just like Schopenhauer - to take refuge in the object,
“deny” themselves’ (ibid.: 25 [164] p. 57). It is a criticism which he does not 
retract, noting in Nietzsche contra Wagner , that ‘In Goethe, for example, 
superabundance was creative, in Flaubert hate: . . . “Flaubert est toujours 
haïssable, l ’homme n’est rien, l ’œuvre est tout” . . .  he tortured himself 
whenever he composed poetry, just as Pascal tortured himself whenever he thought 
- they both had “unegoistic” sensibilities - the principle of décadence’ (KSA 6 pp.
426-7).
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Realism, too, turns out to be a reactive response to the loss of tradition and 
the legitimacy of traditional values. This time, however, unlike Romanticism, it 
does not resort to a destructive and self-destructive ressentiment against the world, 
but rather takes refuge in a new alternative order of things, at the same time wiping 
out the subject who might put the legitimacy of that order in doubt once again. It is 
a rejection of tradition in the name of a higher objective truth, uncritically 
reinscribing those values which sustained tradition into a new scheme of values, a 
phenomenon to which I alluded in the previous chapter.
We can see this process at work if we observe the political issues at stake.
As the heir to the values of Saint-Simon, and implicated in the values of socialism^, 
the Realist movement quite consciously espoused a particular political programme, 4
one which consciously chose certain material, and privileged certain subjects over I
others, yet always this process occurred in the name of some ‘truth’, be it social, 
political or artistic. As one commentator has observed, ‘the term “Realism” merely 
betrays an illusion peculiar to the mid-nineteenth century - the illusion that it had 
found a key to what really is’.^
Nietzsche’s critique of Realism can be extended to that branch of socially- 
committed Modernism which strives towards political enlightenment. Not that 
Nietzsche need be seen as a political reactionary merely by his opposition to the 
political goals of Realism, for his critique is merely pointing out that the values 
which Realism and other forms of artistic enlightenment are seeking to overcome 
are merely reinscribed within the programme of progressive Modernism. It is a 4
criticism which has been taken up by Karl Ldwith^ who sees the enlightenment i
project of Modernity as merely a secularised version of the redemptive Messianism 
of Christianity and the values it is striving to repudiate, Blumenberg’s defence of 
Modernity^, namely that the so-called redemptive Messianism of Christianity 
neither began with Christianity nor is reducible to it actually plays into the hands of 
the Nietzschean critique, though Lôwith himself fails to notice this in his reply.^
For Nietzsche’s critique is claiming not that Christianity is the originator of the 
desire for redemptive transcendence, but rather that it is just one of the more marked 
and influential manifestations of such a desire, a desire of the weak spirit. Moder­
nity and Christianity, on this view, are merely alternative types of the same 
discursive formation. Blumenberg’s defence would be more tenable if it were not 
for the fact that arch-Modernists and Enlighteners, most especially Jürgen 
Habermas, still argue in terms of some redemptive goal, even if it is admitted that 
‘the chances for this today are not very good.’ ®^ Habermas writes that subsequent 4
to the modem differentiation of reason into the spheres of science, morality and art 
as institutionalised in Kant’s three Critiques, the project of Modernity is ultimately 
to reintegrate the specialised knowledge of these spheres into the life world, ‘a
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differentiated relinking of modem culture with an everyday p r a x i s I n  other 
words, Habermas is explicitly aiming at that redemptive utopianism so criticised by 
Nietzsche and Lôwith.
If we trace the genealogy of artistic Modernism back to the Querelle des 
Anciens et des Modernes we can see how Nietzsche’s awareness of the historicity 
of the question of art penetrates even further than that of those rebels against 
tradition of late 18th century Germany. For those advocates of Sturm und Drang 
such as Lenz, Klinger or the young Goethe and Schiller, and the early Romantics 
who inveigled against the ossification of culture by tradition and rationalisation, 
failed to realise that the problem did not lie in the particulars of the tradition they 
were seeking to overcome, but rather in the idea of a normative, atemporal set of 
values per se. The difference between Nietzsche and Romanticism can be seen at its 
most apparent in their different uses of the figure of Dionysus. For the Schlegel 
brothers writing in the Athenaum Dionysus represents the tme god, who will come 
to replace Christ once the veil of the Maya has been lifted. For Nietzsche, the 
Dionysian, as I have suggested before, is a metaphor for the dialectic of the tragic, 
which can have no recourse to some objective ‘tmth’ in the world. It is this 
difference which makes Nietzsche sceptical of revolutionary movements of 
enlightenment, for, as he observes, ‘the hate against Becoming, against the careful 
contemplation of Becoming is common to all morality and revolution’ (KSA 13: 15 
[53] p. 444).
Nietzsche’s critique of Realism and Romanticism opens a way to 
understanding the grounds for a distinction between authentic and inauthentic art.
The inauthentic art of Modernism lacks authenticity because, like opera, it is not the 
product of the aesthetic creative urge. Rather, although common consent designates 
the works of Flaubert, Wagner and Delacroix as works of art, they are 
fundamentally metaphysical, as products of reactive Nihilism, a Nihilism that is 
unable to think beyond the constraints of metaphysics.
Against this inauthentic art we must place authentic art, which in 
Nietzsche’s thought will be characterised as tragic art. The only proper aesthetic 
category is that of the tragic, and as such it is also the only proper means of 
overcoming metaphysics, as an expression of active Nihilism. As will become 
clear, there is a high degree of congruence between tragedy as first outlined in The 
Birth o f Tragedy and those salient aspects of art in Nietzsche’s later thought which |
I have discussed in the preceding chapters.
If we recall, the crucial process at work in tragedy is the dialectic of the 
Apollinian and the Dionysian, which sets up a discursive order only to then 
annihilate that selfsame structure of meaning. It is a process which symbolises, in 
artistic terms, the paradox of human interpretation, for Nietzsche says, ‘The f
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Dionysian truth takes over the whole realm of myth as a symbolism of its insight, 
and expresses it partly in the cult of tragedy, partly in the secret perpetuation of 
dramatic mystery festivals’ (KSA 1 p. 73). This paradox lies in the simultaneous 
necessity of both preserving some form of atemporality in order to form a 
meaningful horizon of action, as Nietzsche perceived in the second of the Untimely 
Meditations , and also of giving full recognition to the temporality of Becoming, 
which characterises interpretative will to power, i.e. that process whereby a given 
perspective or horizon of interpretation is constituted. As Josef Simon notes, ‘
“Tragic” irony, released from the earnestness of a belief in fixed symbols, 
characterises Nietzsche’s concept of t r u t h . it is the dialectic of contingency and 
necessity, temporality and atemporality I have discussed throughout this study, a 
dialectic which cannot ever be resolved, and as such is symbolised in the drama of 
the sacrifice of the tragic hero who is then expelled from the community in order to 
facilitate the reconstruction of a new episteme after his /  her tragic fate has been 
fulfilled.
This interpretation of tragedy becomes generalised as a model for 
understanding art per se, and as I have suggested in the previous two chapters, this 
becomes manifest in such aspects of art as its ambiguity, its fragmentariness, its ■:
temporal structure, and in Nietzsche’s preference for Dionysian classicism, a style 
which couples the temporal structure of the tragic to a thematisation of art as will to 
power, as the ‘compulsion-to-transform-into-perfection’ [Verwandelnmüssen ins 
Vollkommene]. Through both its temporal aspects and its thematic presentation of 
‘will-to-power-at-work’, as a ‘setting-to-work-of-truth’ (in the Nietzschean sense 
of the word ‘truth’), as it were, art carries out that function which I have earlier 
pointed towards in Nietzsche’s thinking, namely of projecting immanence and at the 
same rejecting any values or notions which betray any suggestion of transcendence 
or metaphysical truth. Its rejection of beyondness [das Jenseits], its sensual 
foregrounding of the here and now [Diesseitigkeit] (e.g. KSA 11: 37 [12] pp. 587- 
8), its tendency to draw both artist and spectator into the temporal loop of Eternal 
Recurrence in the affirmation of the moment, serve to perform in artistic terms what 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of ‘immanence’ aims at through his manipulation of the 
discourse of metaphysics. As Nietzsche says, ‘The beautiful, the ugly etc. is the 
more ancient judgement. As soon as it makes a claim to absolute truth, aesthetic 
judgement is overturned into moral demands. As soon as we deny absolute truth, 
we give up any absolute demand and return to aesthetic judgement. This is the task 
- to create an abundance of aesthetic, equally valid evaluations’ (KSA 9:11 [79] p.
471).
It is this near schizoid coupling of contingency and necessity, ephemerality 
and permanence, renewal and tradition which Nietzsche sees as the sign of the
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strong spirit, the free spirit who is able to confront this constant ambiguity and 
questionableness. As he notes in a NachlaB fragment from 1887, ‘the preference for 
questionable and terrible things is a symptom of strength: while the taste for the 
pretty and the dainty belongs to the weak, the delicate’ (KSA 12:10 [168] p. 556). 
Far from being a mask to hide the meaningless nature of life, as Young 
m a i n t a i n s , art acts as provocation to will to power precisely through its 
presentation of annihilation and destruction, as an interpretative obstacle to will to 
power. It is in this sense that art is the ‘great facilitator of life, the great seductress 
towards life, the great stimulus to life’ (KSA 13: 11 [415] p. 194). For life, in 
Nietzsche, is not a process of preservation, of stability, but rather one of growth, as 
his frequent polemics against Darwin testify. Contrary to popular understanding of 
the tragic, tragic culture is not, for Nietzsche, one that is self-absorbed and self- 
pitying, caught up in a decadent obsession with its own fortunes and misfortunes. 
Rather it is marked by a singular boldness and affirmativity of all that is contingent, 
all that is double-sided, and it is this schizoid affirmation of opposites which causes 
tragic culture to be characterised as the culture of tragic irony. To use the words of 
Sloterdijk, himself parodying Freud, ‘Where values are, there ironies shall be.’^^  ^
And with this return to irony we are brought back, too, to the thematics of distance 
and the feminine to which I have alluded in previous chapters. For what Nietzsche 
is pointing towards is a pathos of distance, of which the notion of woman as truth 
stands as a striking metaphor. Moreover the notion of distance perhaps even serves 
as a better term than irony, since the common-sense understanding of irony denotes 
saying something one does not b e l i e v e .  Yet Nietzsche is demanding something 
far more difficult. Namely that one both believe in what one is saying and at the 
same time withhold belief in it, inasmuch as its truth is recognised as a matter of 
mere grammar.
In the light of this analysis, how are we to understand rapture ? Thus far 
rapture has been somewhat forgotten in the course of the discussion, yet as 
Heidegger stressed in his lectures, the notion of rapture is the cornerstone of 
Nietzsche’s thought on art and the aesthetic state. Of course Heidegger’s 
understanding of rapture is permeated through and through by metaphysics, which 
parallels his understanding of beauty I have outlined earlier. He notes, for example, 
that “Rapture is feeling, an embodying attunement, an embodied being that is 
contained in attunement, attunement woven into embodiment . . .  the embodying, 
attuned stance toward beings as a whole.’ In other words we are back to the 
sense of art as somehow a disclosure of Being or beings, an understanding 
conveyed by Heidegger’s use of the notion of attunement [Stimmung, 
Gestimmtheit]. Earlier in the same chapter Heidegger writes that rapture ‘is that 
basic mode of our Dasein by force of which and in accordance with which we are
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always already lifted beyond ourselves into being as a w h o l e . N o w  although 
Heidegger’s post-metaphysical credentials might be established by the last passage, 
where quite clearly we have discarded the Cartesian subject, his talk of being, 
beings as a whole, as if they were always already present, must remind us of the 
distance between his understanding of art and that of Nietzsche. Heidegger’s 
observation that ‘rapture and beauty designate with an identical breadth the entire 
aesthetic state, what is opened up in it and what pervades’ can nevertheless serve 
as a useful starting point. For on the basis of my prior discussion of the importance 
of art as the counter-movement to (reactive) Nihilism, I would claim simply that 
rapture designates the sense of exhilaration which accompanies the Dionysian 
‘tragic* insight into the limitations of symbolic activity, an insight which at the same 
time acts as a spur to interpretative will to power to lay down better, more potent 
interpretative horizons. Hence Nietzsche’s aesthetic rapture is the result of a 
complex process of reflection, negation and affirmation. Its lineage is quite clear, 
for it is formulated on the basis of a generalisation of the sublime, as taken up in the 
Birth of Tragedy, as the basic aesthetic state. Aesthetic because the symbolic repre­
sentation of the tragic understanding is only properly executed in the authentic work 
of art.
This rapturous state becomes more comprehensible if we recall Nietzsche’s 
claim that all aesthetics is applied physiology (KSA 6 p. 418). For one of the 
functions of the physiology of art was, I argued, to secure the relation between art 
and will to power, inasmuch as the former represents a specific manifestation of the 
latter. Now as I have shown, this sense of limitation (coupled with ambiguity and 
the pathos of distance) is both central to art and also obstructive to will to power. 
Yet far from being incompatible, the two are intimately connected, for will to power 
as will to more power requires negativity. Negativity, in the sense of resistance to 
its goals, is what spurs will to power into activity and provides the measure against 
which any increase in power can be assessed. From this one would then conclude 
that aesthetic rapture connotes that state where will to power is stretched to the limit, 
by virtue of the fact that art both contradicts will to power and affirms it thereby, 
constituting the only cultural activity where this double operation truly occurs.
Nietzsche and the Post-modern
On the basis of the above discussion we can see that Nietzsche is in fact formulating 
a restrictive view of what is to count as art, or more specifically, what is to count as 
‘authentic’ or truly aesthetic art. Now of course at this point one may well feel 
entitled to object that the notion of authenticity, which I have been freely using is an 
idea which ill suits Nietzsche’s discourse, most especially given my remarks in the
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previous chapter concerning the complicity of the authentic with the metaphysical 
ethic of appropriation. This objection would be perfectly valid if  I were claiming 
that Nietzsche is investing the word with the same sort of significance we find in, 
say, Sartre or Heidegger. This is not, however, what I take the term ‘eigentlich’, on 
the few occasions it appears in Nietzsche’s œuvre, to be signifying. Rather we 
must set it against the notion of ideology, with all the connotations which that idea 
has. The latter, as Mark Warren has suggested,!^ does have a place in Nietzsche’s 
thinking, even though one might feel uneasy about its presence in any study of 
Nietzsche. For if the ideological denotes in Nietzsche that semiotic process which |
refuses to accept its status as such (and the amnesia of metaphysics would be one 
such ideology), the authentic would be taken as that which inverts the ideological, 
i.e. which thematises its own status as representation, as an arbitrary ‘language of 
signs’ [Zeichensprache]. Following on from this, albeit cursory, discussion, the 
work of tragic art would have to be seen as the authentic phenomenon par  
excellence, since what characterises the tragic qua tragic is its foregrounding of its 
own discursivity, the pathos of distance which it preserves towards itself.
If it can therefore be said that the notion of an authentic artistic practice in 4
Nietzsche does not lead us into incoherence, how might we characterise the relation 
between this post-Modem phenomenon and the various activities which have come 
to be seen as characteristic of the Post-modern. Is Nietzsche’s overcoming of 
Modernity assimilable to the Post-modernism which is so hotly debated at present ?
Or does it represent something of a different order ?
The terms within which the debate over the post-modern is usually couched 
tend to see the modern and the post-modern as chronologically successive states, 
indeed the very use of the word ‘post’ compels the issue to be seen in this manner.
In the space available one cannot hope to do full justice to the breadth of writers 
who have dealt with the issue, ranging from Daniel Bell to Jean Baudrillard and 
Paul Virilio. If we take the work of Lyotard as representative of a widely accepted 
view of the post-modem^o, we see this notion of temporal succession very much in 
evidence. Lyotard sees the post-modem as arising from a crisis of legitimacy of the 
grand or meta-narratives of the Enlightenment. Following Adorno’s concern with 
the meaning of Auschwitz he writes that ‘The “philosophies of history” that 
inspired the nineteenth and twentieth centuries claim to assure passages over the 
abyss of heterogeneity or the event. The names which are those of “our history” 
oppose counterexamples to their claim . . . “Auschwitz” refutes speculative 
doctrine . . . The passages promised by the great doctrinal syntheses end in 
bloody impasses. Whence the chagrin of the spectators at this end of the twentieth 
century.’21 Lyotard is here giving expression to the common feeling that 
Enlightenment, both in its liberal bourgeois form and in its manifestation as Marxist
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revolution, has singularly failed, both as a project, and as a basis for interpreting 
the movement of human history, a failure which leads him to conclude that ‘We no 
longer have recourse to the grand narratives - we can resort neither to the dialectic 
of Spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity’.22 Given this crisis in the 
legitimacy of rational narratives, Lyotard turns to the aesthetic, most notably to the 
sublime, as a means to constructing a post-modern political and social theory.
If we turn to Nietzsche, however, we see a certain degree of discord 
between Lyotard’s account of the Post-modern and the type of post-Modern culture 
of active Nihilism for which Nietzsche is calling. The Post-modern disposition 
which Lyotard, for one, is proposing, represents less a departure from the 
‘exhausted’ modem than a perpetuation of the aestheticist modemism of late nine­
teenth century France. Most notably, Lyotard’s turn to the sublime, as ‘presenting 
the unpresentable’23 can be equated with Symbolist theories of figuration, a 
perpetuation of France’s modernist heritage which, as Andreas Huyssen has noted, 
finds parallels in the work of Derrida, Kristeva and Baudrillard.24 This retreat into 
the realm of the aesthetic, and I think it can be termed a retreat, giving up, as it 
were, on the Enlightenment inheritance, can be seen either as mere defeatism, or 
more significantly as a cynical abandonment of the critic’s political and cultural 
responsibilities, a view taken up by Christopher Norris in his more recent work.25 
Viewed from a Nietzschean perspective, it would amount to a capitulation, giving in 
to the temptations of reactive Nihilism, which in its rejection of rational 
Enlightenment and the normativity of tradition has recoiled to the opposite extreme, 
where the question of interpretative frameworks, of evaluation per se is seen to be 
redundant.
What I am therefore arguing is that in Nietzsche we need not see the 
dialectic of modern and post-modern as necessarily temporally successive states, 
but rather as alternative responses to the self-exhaustion of the rational, of 
metaphysics, of tradition. As such, the turn to the aesthetic which Lyotard notes 
and commends merely perpetuates the problem as a reactive response, and is one 
which must be carefully distinguished from the ‘aesthetic turn’ in Nietzsche’s 
work.
Yet if Nietzsche is not occupying a position assimilable to that of Lyotard he 
is nevertheless calling for some sort of artistic practice which should supplant the 
decadent, ‘inauthentic’ practices of Modernism, one which will thereby reassert its 
right to occupy the centre stage of any post-Modern culture. Does post-modern art 
bear any resemblance to the practices Nietzsche is pointing towards ? The 
suggestion that Nietzsche’s idea of tragic art might bear some affinities to Post­
modernism is powerful given the extent of his antipathy towards Modernism. I 
have already mapped out Nietzsche’s criticisms of his contemporaries, but the
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nature of his opposition to Modemism (as an answer to Modernity) becomes even 
clearer when we set his aesthetics against the arch-theorist of Modemism, Theodor 
Adorno.
If we turn to a work such as Philosophy o f Modern Music 26 we see 
Adorno grappling with the problem of defining the proper artistic response to the 
crisis of the legitimacy of the inherited musical language. It represents an analogue 
to the more general sense of crisis which he, in common with Nietzsche, sees as 
characteristic of Modernity. Permeating Adorno’s approach to the issue is the 
conviction that the dialectic of musical change cannot be turned back, i.e. that the 
musical language inherited from Classicism is not some timeless entity, but itself 
the product of a specific set of forces which has now been superseded within 
history. He notes, ‘the dynamic conception of tonality as a whole lends the chord 
its specific weight. The historical process, however, whereby it has lost it [i.e. its 
weight] is irreversible. As extinct, the chord represents, in its very dispersal, the 
position of that technique as a whole, which contradicts the present one’ (p. 38). 
For Adorno the only truly authentic response is therefore to pursue the dissolution 
of tonality to its logical conclusion, since atonality is ‘the completed purification of 
music from tradition’ (p. 42 n.).
Seen in these terms, Schoenberg’s twelve-tone music represents a liberation 
of the subjectivity of the composer from the objectivity of musical form, i.e. the 
musical tradition, and Adorno sees the history of music as gaining its momentum 
from the tension between these two poles, the specificity of the artist’s style and the 
generality of the musical vocabulary. As Adorno says, music ‘had to come to terms 
with always meeting the specific by means of constellations of the general, which 
paradoxically present it as being identical to the unique. Beethoven’s entire oeuvre 
is the exegesis of this paradox’ (p. 51). One of the aspects of musical form which 
mirrors this dichotomy is that opposition between melody, as the subjective, and 
harmony, as the objective musical grammar, or homophony and polyphony, and 
twelve-tone music represents a sublation of this opposition (p. 53) inasmuch as the 
polyphonic is sublated into the purely subjective disposition over the grammar of 
musical form. Adorno writes, ‘The cognitive power of modern music obtains its 
legitimacy from the fact that it does not reach back to the “great bourgeois past”, to 
the heroic classicism of the period of the Revolution, but rather sublates the 
Romantic technique of differentiation, and hence its material, into itself. The 
subject of modern music . . .  is the emancipated, isolated real subject of the late- 
bourgeois phase’ (p. 55).
Thus in Adorno’s reading, Schoenberg’s invention of twelve-tone music 
with its concomitant rejection of tradition represents a compete subjectification of 
musical form. The subject remains sovereign over the work, and the work is truly
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modem, i.e. as owing nothing to the past. The Hegelian influence at work here is 
all too apparent, since Adorno’s account hardly deviates from the former’s 
interpretation of Romantic art. Now while Nietzsche and Adorno may well be in 
agreement as regards the fact of subjectification in Modemism, their evaluation of 
the phenomenon is antithetical. As we have seen, for Nietzsche the preoccupation 
with the self is a feature of the decadence of modem society, where reactive 4;
Nihilism leads to an annihilation of the external order and a retreat into the private 
sphere of neurotic self-absorption. It is a comment which of course is paralleled by 
Nietzsche’s critical remarks I noted in chapter two concerning democratic culture, I gt
noted before how Nietzsche’s ideal of the self-creating Übermensch is very 
different from the democratic ideal of human emancipation, inasmuch as for 
Nietzsche autonomy, freedom are to be achieved on the basis of an agonistic 
politics, not to be granted without any effort. As Nietzsche observes, ‘The value of 
a thing lies not in what one can achieve with it, but in what one has paid for it, - 
what it costs us. I shall give an example. Liberal institutions.. .  undermine the will 
to power, they are the levelling of mountain and valley given moral legitimacy.. .  
with them the herd animal always triumphs’ (KSA 6 p. 139-40). Criticising the un­
fought for freedom of Modernity Nietzsche writes, in his early essay on Homer,
‘The modern human is in contrast everywhere crossed by infinity, like swift-footed 
Achilles in the similes of Zeno the Eleate, infinity restricts him, he doesn't even 
catch up with the tortoise’ (KSA 1 p. 790).
In Twilight o f the Idols Nietzsche comments similarly in an aphorism 
entitled ‘Freedom I do not intend’ (KSA 6 p. 143) that ‘the demand for 
independence, for free development . . . this is the case in politicis , this is the 
case in art [my emphasis]. But that is a symptom of decadence: our modern 
concept of “freedom” is one more indication of the degradation of the instincts’
(ibid.). It is a criticism which represents a specific application of Nietzsche’s more 
general argument that will to power, as that which underlies politics, knowledge, 
and, more importantly, art requires resistance. Will to power is always will to more 
power.
Given such a perspective on Nietzsche, we can see more clearly the depth of 
his anti-Modernist stance. His hostility toward the subjectivism of Modernist art 
stems from both a political antagonism toward the democratic motivation of such 
art, and also from his more general underlying conception of the dialectic of 
interpretative will to power. His stance is not so much a reactionary stance against 
innovation per se as against the melancholic self-absorption which accompanies it, 
an understanding which is confirmed by Adorno’s own interpretation of the :|
significance of modern music.
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Now if Nietzsche is hostile to the kind of art which Adorno sees and 
commends as being authentically modern, is he any more sympathetic to the Post­
modern ? Well, if we turn back to Adorno’s Philosophy o f Modern Music we can 
gain some sense of his possible response by following through Adorno’s essay on 
Stravinsky. Stravinsky is widely seen as the precursor of Post-modernism, most 
especially in his neo-classical work, and moreover one might go further as has 
David Roberts27 by suggesting that the Post-modern is already there in all its 
essentials in Stravinsky’s work. It is a claim I shall develop further.
In contrast to his reading of Schoenberg Adorno sees Stravinsky as a 
reactionary, trying to turn back the clock by the restitution of obsolete forms. He 
begins his essay on Stravinsky by quoting a passage from Hegel’s Aesthetics ; Tt is j
no good materially appropriating, as it were, past world views . . . like, for I
example, becoming Catholic [sic !]’ (p. 121). This serves as the guiding principle 
in his interpretation of Stravinsky and other composers such as Webern and 
Hindemith, whom he sees as all reactionary in comparison with the authentic 
modernism of Schoenberg. He claims, for example, that ‘In Stravinsky the desire 
of an adolescent to become a Classic remains stubbornly at work’ (p. 122), adding 
that ‘Even the most perfect song by Webern remains far behind the most simple 
piece of the Winterreise in authenticity’ (ibid.).
The work above all of Stravinsky has resolved the dialectic of innovation 
and tradition, which he also sees as one between the subjective autonomy of the 
artist and the objectivity of the musical grammar, in favour of the latter, and in 
consequence Adorno sees a parallel, quite striking in light of Nietzsche’s own 
remarks, between Stravinsky, Positivism and Flaubert. Stravinsky’s music 
executes a negation of the subject by passing over into the objective, a process 
symbolised above all in The Rite o f Spring . Adorno writes, ‘In Stravinsky 
subjectivity takes on the character of sacrifice, but - and here he is mocking the 
tradition of humanistic art - music does not identify itself with the sacrificial victim, 
but rather with the moment of annihilation. Through the liquidation of the sacrificial 
victim it divests itself of intention, of its own subjectivity’ (p. 127). As such it is a 
musical parallel to Flaubert; ‘The music says immediately: “so it was”, and adopts 
perspective just as little as does Flaubert in Madame Bovary. Horror is looked on 
with some pleasure, but it is not transfigured’ (p. 130). Adorno comments later,
‘According to his implicit philosophy, he [Stravinsky] belongs to Machian 
Positivism: “the ego is beyond rescue”. According to his method he belongs to a sj
Western art whose highest achievement is the work of Baudelaire, where the 
individual enjoys his own annihilation through the power of sensation’ (p. 147).
This last comment, on the method of Stravinsky refers to the composer’s use of 
rhythmical shock, as a means of conjuring up the collective pre-conscious, pre-
- ■*
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individual, a goal which betrays the influence of Jung (p. 143). It is an art, which, 
in its annihilation of the subjective simultaneously annihilates all expression, ‘The 
“indifference to the world” leads to the derivation of all affects from the non-ego, to 
a narcissistic indifference towards the lot of humans . . .  his rhythmical method 
comes close to the scheme of catatonic states’ (p. 156).
The consequence of this elimination of the subject in Stravinsky is a 
releasing of the tension between individual and style on the one hand, and universal 
musical form on the other, which we have earlier seen as the fundamental paradox 
of Western music. In place of the individual artist is the self-less pastiche of quota­
tions of other works, spontaneity gives to way to reproduction; ‘the subject . . . 
ceases actually to “produce”, and satisfies itself with the hollow echo of the 
objective musical language, which is no longer its own’ (p. 160). Later Adorno 
adds, Histoire du Soldat permits a second, dreamlike regressive musical 
language to form from the shattered ruins of abandoned musical language’ (p. 161).
Against the Modernist idea of a progressive dialectic of ever renewed artistic forms,
Stravinsky’s music ‘encompasses the basic demand of traditional art: that I
something should sound as if it had been there from the beginning of time signifies 
that it repeats what had already been there at all times’ (p. 189), an inclusion which 
almost inevitably will lead to the development of Neo-classicism. Stravinsky’s 
music thus foreshadows the wider characteristics of the Post-modern, as a rejection 
of the grand narrative of human emancipation through rational autonomy. It is a %
rejection of the Enlightenment spirit of progress which inverts the development of 
musical form and merely parrots the broken fragments of the tradition J
indiscriminately, since the annihilation of the subject means the loss of any 
organising principle.
Following Adorno’s account, and initially leaving aside his negative 
evaluation of Stravinsky’s work, it does appear that Nietzsche’s adoption of the 
tragic and of Dionysian Classicism places him close to Stravinsky. After all, is not 
Stravinsky’s prurient delight in the annihilation of the subject akin to Nietzsche’s 4
account of the tragic, where the death of the tragic hero serves less as a form of 
therapeutic catharsis than as a risk to be affirmed to for its own sake ? And does not 
Nietzsche’s Dionysian Classicism tie in both Stravinsky’s appropriation of past 
forms (and here we see the figure of Eternal Recurrence looming on the horizon) 
and also the ritual sacrifice of the autonomous ego of metaphysics ? Phrasing the 
question in this way, the grounds for assuming a high level of congruence become 
superficially quite convincing. Despite surface similarity, however, I would 
nevertheless argue that Nietzsche’s post-Modernism is similar to neither the 
embryonic Post-modernism in Stravinsky nor the Post-modernism of contemporary 
culture. The contemporary post-modern culture of Jameson’s famous analysis^^.
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with its emphasis on the ‘deconstruction of expression’, on the loss of affectivity, 
self-annihilation and nostalgia replicates many of the insights of Adorno’s analysis 
of Stravinsky, though without being restrained by the terms of Adorno’s dialectic. 
By driving a wedge between the neo-classicism of Stravinsky and the Dionysian 
Classicism of Nietzsche I am ultimately implying that the term post-modern is 
perhaps an inappropriate designation for Nietzsche’s own overcoming of the 
modern.
The apparent similarities between Stravinsky and Nietzsche are compelling. 
After all, is not Stravinsky’s ritual sacrifice of the subject in The Rite o f Spring 
close to the annihilation of the tragic hero in Greek drama ? Are not Stravinsky’s 
use of rhythm, his primitivism and infantilism with their parallel in the work of 
Jung similar to Nietzsche’s insistence on reducing so much of human conscious 
activity to the working of the instincts ? Is not Stravinsky’s playing with the detritus 
of the tradition similar to Nietzsche’s ironic playing with forms ?
In one sense this is true. On the basis of my reading of Nietzsche, however, 
it is an understanding which needs a certain amount of correction. First, as Adorno 
notes, in the work of both Schoenberg and Stravinsky an ‘objectivity is posited 
subjectively’ (p. 67). In the case of Schoenberg it is the autonomous subjectivity of 
the artist, to whom all material and technique are made subordinate, whereas in 
Stravinsky it is the collective, the unconscious, the tradition. Naturally such notions 
of ‘objectivity’ have no place in Nietzsche’s project - and hence Adorno’s comment 
on the similarity of Stravinsky to Flaubert accords well with Nietzsche’s critique of 
Realism and of the mimetic view of art per se. There can be no artistic form pro­
duced in the name of some higher objectivity which transcends the subjectivity, the 
perspective, of the artist.
Hence we come to the second area of divergence. The annihilation of the 
subject. In Stravinsky, as well as in such post-modern works as Lyotard’s 
Economie Libidinale 9^ or Deleuze and Guattari’s two-volume study of capitalism 
and schizophrenia^^ the elimination of the subject by the workings of the libidinal 
machine is absolute and echoes Adorno’s comment that in the music of Stravinsky 
‘the individual becomes immediately aware of his nullity in the face of the gigantic 
machine of the whole system’ (p. 138). As I have argued previously, however, 
Nietzsche’s critique of the subject is a critique of a particular conception of the 
subject, namely the Cartesian atomic, self-certain individual. Additionally, in The 
Birth o f Tragedy I have shown that the ritual annihilation of the hero is a strategic 
move, one which is not final inasmuch as the dialectic of the Dionysian and the 
Apollinian always remains unresolved. With this I am of course bringing us back to 
the question of interpretation, and the necessity of maintaining both a horizon of 
interpretative values and the possibility of their imminent extinction. In the realm of
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the subject, its annihilation must be accompanied by the acceptance of its fictive 
necessity. It is this insight which somehow preserves the possibility of individual 
style in the face of Jameson’s apocalyptic remarks that ‘The disappearance of the 
individual subject, along with its formal consequence, the increasing unavailability 
of the personal style , engender the well-nigh universal practice today of what may 
be called pastiche . . .  the producers of culture have nowhere to turn but to the 
past: the imitation of dead styles, speech through all the masks and voices stored up 
in the imaginary museum of a now global culture,’^ ! even though in Nietzsche the 
individual is deprived of the rational autonomy granted it by metaphysics. It is this, 
too, which is the basis of the meaning of tragic irony. For irony in the sense of 
dissimulation, feigned belief in something can only have any meaning in a culture 
of ‘as-if’, to borrow Vaihinger’s phrase^^, in other words, a culture that must feign 
to believe in the permanence and necessity of its own contingent perspectives^^. If 
it fails to preserve an ironic stance towards value, towards interpretative 
perspectives, then it falls into the abyss of cynical relativism. Indeed one might say 
that for Nietzsche the crisis of Nihilism is brought about by a lack of irony.
In the terms of the discussion, then, one could say that the post-modern has 
lost any sense of irony precisely through its inability to recognise the necessity of 
some interpretative horizon. If Jameson’s diagnosis quoted above constitutes an 
accurate reflection of the state of current artistic production, then this stems from the 
complete absence of perspective, an absence which leads to a paralysis of action, 
one which leaves us pointlessly playing with the fragments of tradition in an 
entirely indiscriminate way.
Nietzsche’s early analysis in the second of the Untimely Meditations of the 
problem of time turns out to offer a pertinent criticism of the condition of post- 
modemity. If the crisis in the legitimacy of the narrative of Enlightenment has led to 
a change in the understanding of time, as Habermas assumes^^, then it is a 
transformation which has led to post-modern culture being overburdened by the 
past, a culture unable to establish a horizon of atemporality to facilitate any further 
action. Jameson’s understanding of pastiche accords well with Nietzsche’s own 
interpretation, inasmuch as artistic production is left with nothing but the blank 
imitation of dead forms, and moreover without the sense of irony or parody, which 
Jameson sets against it.
At this stage in the discussion we come to the third and final point of 
divergence between Nietzsche and the post-modem, namely the difference between 
the Dionysian Classicism of the Nietzschean aesthetic and the neo-Classicism of 
Stravinsky or the pastiche of the post-modern. The post-modern break with the idea 
of progress culminates in a full absorption into the past (what Nietzsche might term 
‘Antiquarian’ history) since any sense of the present, of the new is conspicuously
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absent. It is an inability to gain any critical distance to the past, to the inherited 
grammar of forms which Nietzsche had already criticised in modern culture in § 23 
oîThe Birth o f Tragedy (KSA 1 p. 147-8).
In contrast, however, Dionysian Classicism, as the fullest expression of art 
as will to power, engages in the dialectic of the new with the old. Much as in 
tragedy the symbolic order is simultaneously negated and re-affirmed, so will to 
power, Dionysian Classicism, simultaneously affirms the new (will to power is 
always will to more power, to better perspectives) and selectively preserves those 
past perspectives which can serve as a resource for the furtherance of will to power.
It is a non-cumulative dialectic which both discards useless perspectives and 
preserves those which have some use value/or present purposes .
Once again we need only remind ourselves of Nietzsche’s admiration for the 
Renaissance precisely because it was not characterised for him as an insipid 
replication of Classical Antiquity, but rather an appropriation of the past under a 
certain perspective, one which accords well with his own anti-Platonic polemic. i
Nietzsche writes, for example, ‘My recovery, my preference, my cure from all 
Platonism was Thucydides every time. Thucydides and perhaps the Principe of 
Macchiavelli are most closely related to me by their unconditional will not to fool 
themselves’ (KSA 6 p. 156), an attitude we see repeated in his confession of a 
‘yearning for . . . virtu, for “the strong human” ’ KSA 12: 10 [2] p. 454). In this 
light, one could view the post-modern as a latter-day Renaissance gone awry, with 
no critical perspective and no critical distance from that which has gone before.
Nietzsche’s interpretation of the Renaissance parallels, of course, his rethinking of 
time under the sign of eternal recurrence, as that which facilitates the execution of 
the monumental, unmarked by a feeling of resentment against the past and against 
temporality per se.
We can conclude, then, that at the heart of Nietzsche’s conception of 
authentic art there lies irony. Irony is not to be understood as merely a cynical 
disposition towards form, content or value, but rather an irresolvable tension 
between the opposing demands for negation and affirmation. As such irony 
involves a feeling of pleasure at such a lack of resolution, a commitment to all that 
is questionable, a ‘preference for questionable and terrible things,’ which Nietzsche 
interprets as ‘a symptom of strength: while the taste for the pretty and the dainty 
belongs to the weak, the delicate’ (KSA 12: 10 [168] p. 556). Neither Modernism 
as manifest in Romanticism or in the work of Schoenberg, nor the Post-modernism 
diagnosed by Adorno or Jameson have the sense of the ironic. Instead they are 
concerned either with establishing a new objective order in the wake of the collapse 
of the traditional order or with playing with the fragments of the tradition, devoid of 
any real purpose. In the case of Modernism we see a turn to the subjectivity of the
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artist, to expressivity, as the new principle which determines all production. 
Nietzsche and Adorno are merely analysing different manifestations of the same 
phenomenon, a reading which reminds us of the close links between Adorno and 
Romanticism. In the case of the post-modern, the new principle lies in the 
objectivity of the inherited vocabulary of forms, where the subjective claim to self- 
assertion, and as Blumenberg notes, this concern lies at the core of the Modernist 
project^^, is extinguished by immersion in the symbolic order, an extinction loudly 
proclaimed by the death of the author thesis of Foucault and others. As movements, 
these do not manage to break out of the grasp of metaphysics, and as such, can be 
counted as varying manifestations of the same reactive Nihilism, modern 
counterparts to the Romantic and realist movements of Nietzsche’s own day.
Art contra Science
So far I have deliberately avoided the question which is perhaps begging to be 
asked, and it concerns the relation of art to science. The theme follows quite easily 
on from the last inasmuch as the Post-modern represents a collapsing of the three 
autonomous spheres of aesthetics, epistemology and ethics into each another. Now 
although Nietzsche does not occupy a position which can be easily identified with 
the Post-modern, he nevertheless does seem to bear some common interest in the 
fate of this Enlightenment division of culture. This is not least the case, of course, 
with The Birth o f Tragedy , which stands as a provocation to the traditionally 
accepted norms of scholarly discourse. It is also true of, say, his concern with the 
marginalisation of art in Modernity, a phenomenon which surely can be possible 
only subsequently to the identification of an autonomous sphere of the aesthetic.
Yet if this is the case, does this not present problems for my entire thesis ? 4
For the manner in which I have presented my argument has made it quite clear that 
for Nietzsche the possibility of overcoming metaphysical and modern culture is 
built on the retrieval of an authentic artistic praxis from the margins where Socratic 
culture has relegated it. I have been assuming, therefore, that we can talk in a 
meaningful way about the difference between art and science, or to put it in more I
contemporary terms, literature and philosophy, and furthermore I have been 
assuming that Nietzsche supports a distinction of this kind too. The assumption, 
however, can be put into question for a number of reasons.
First, Nietzsche is important as one of the first thinkers to have cast doubt 
on the inherited belief in a difference between conceptual and metaphorical 
language. His early essay of 1873 ‘On Truth and Falsehood in the Extra-moral 
Sense’ has been seminal in this regard shaping his contemporary reception by
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commentators such as Derrida^b, DeMan, Kofman, and so forth, and it is of course 
a claim central to that essay that language is metaphorical before anything else. Not 
only does it sustain a metaphorical relation to the extra-linguistic (and also to other 
semiotic systems, of course) but also the very possibility of a conceptual scheme is 
founded on the metaphorical extension of identical terms to the non-identical.
The second objection to a distinction between art and science stems from 
Nietzsche’s observation that all forms of interpretation are will to power, a claim 
which would surely place art on a level with science, philosophy, morality and 
religion. As manifestations of will to power all represent an interpretative shaping 
of the environment in accordance with the furtherance of life. Metaphysics and the 
ascetic ideal are just as much expressions of will to power as is art and tragic 
culture, even though they may seem superficially to be different.
The first defence against this objection would be that despite the apparent 
undermining of any distinction between the two in Nietzsche’s text, he nevertheless 
continues to speak of them as different cultural phenomena. Most especially in the 
later writings the artist is seen as a particular kind of individual, as a latter-day free 
spirit who will supplant the atrophied types of Socratic culture, namely the 
scientist, the moralist. It is a result of this distinction between the artist and the 
moralist or the scientist that Nietzsche can talk of art as ‘the great facilitator of life, 
the great seductress towards life, the great stimulus to life’ (KSA 13: 11 [415] p.
194). Evidently, there is a perceived difference between the two cultural formations 
in Nietzsche’s texts, even though at present it is not quite clear what that might be, 
and despite the apparent tendency in Nietzsche’s texts to level the distinction.
The second defence against the premature dissolution of these spheres 
would have to consist of a way of formulating a new type of distinction, one which 
did not rely on the now questionable opposition of literal and metaphorical. The 
point is important inasmuch as post-structuralist thinkers have assumed that the 
demonstration that language in philosophical texts is permeated by figurality also 
goes to show that any real distinction between the two genres is untenable. As a 
counter-claim I would argue that this merely shows the inadequacy of any 
distinction based on the criterion of language type. It does not, however, entitle us 
to dissolve the one into the another. In order to suggest other ways in which a 
distinction can be made I shall draw on the Interpretationsphilosophie of Gunter 
Abel, itself deeply indebted to the work of Nietzsche.^^ In so doing I shall begin by 
focusing on the issue of interpretative horizons.
Abel adopts Nietzsche’s emphasis on philosophy as philology, his use of 
the paradigm of interpretation in place of that of knowing, to turn interpretation, 4
.___ .   r____ '
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interpretativity into a quasi-transcendental principle. Indeed the interpreting subject 
in Abel becomes a function of the interpretative process, echoing Nietzsche’s own 
comments that the question of who is interpreting is eclipsed by the process of 
interpretation itself (KSA 12: 2 [151] p. 140). As such Abel sees the word 
‘interpretation’ as denoting a complex process, inasmuch as he observes three 
levels of interpretative activity, each of which involves the positing of a separate 
interpretative horizon.
The first level of interpretation, which Abel denotes as ‘interpretation 
consists in that fundamental horizon which informs and precedes experience. This 
would correspond to Kant’s ideas concerning the role of space and time as forms of 
intuition, i.e. as the sine qua non of sensuous experience. In Nietzsche we would 
have to include the constitutive function of language and human physiology in 
determining the general structure of experience, whence Nietzsche’s exclamation 
that ‘I fear we shall never be rid of God because we believe in grammar’ (KSA 6 p.
78), or his claim that ‘the development of language and the development of con­
sciousness . . .  go hand in hand* (KSA 3 p. 592). In this regard I have indicated in j
my second chapter the extent to which belief in the atomic Cartesian subject is a i
function of certain linguistic phenomena, including a reification of the grammatical 4
subject of the verb, which leads to a tendency to posit for every action an agent. As i
I suggested in previous chapters, too, the metaphysical denigration of Becoming 
and of contingency in general can be seen, too, as a result of the temporal structure 
built into the system of iterable signs of language.
The second level of interpretation, which, perhaps predictably, Abel |
denotes as ‘interpretation2’ would consist in those culturally informed horizons, I
more specific than the generalised horizons set by human physiology and the 4
structure of the language, but nonetheless informing the interpretative 
understanding of the members of any one community.
The third level of interpretation, ‘interpretations’ would consist in those 
specific interpretations which the term ‘interpretation’ is normally used to signify.
They consist of propositions about the world as constituted by the horizon opened 
up by ‘interpretations! +2% to use Abel’s rather inelegant designation. As Abel ■
notes, those quotidian judgements we make about the world, those prepositional 
interpretations we make about our world are nothing else than interpretations of %
interpretations, a conclusion which reminds us of Nietzsche’s claim that all our 
interpretations are of signs, and not of originary phenomena. By this definition 
tmth would be a matter of agreement between those individual interpretations] and 
the world as constituted by a primary process of world-constitutive ‘interpretation!
+ 2’; Abel claims, for example that ‘Interpretation is not dependent on tmth but tmth 
on interpretation.’^8 Hence one can criticise the metaphysical, or Platonic,
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understanding of truth without descent into the abyss of complete relativism, as 
Abel notes For replacing the paradigm of knowing as unconcealment of the 
‘facts’ with one of knowledge as interpretation does not open the door to an 
arbitrary choice of perspectives; the horizon opened up by ‘interpretations! + 2’ 
determines which interpretations] are true and which false by laying down the 
criteria for any judgement. Even the correspondence theory of truth, where truth is 
seen as a matter of ‘being true to the facts’ can be accommodated by this view, 
since, as Abel notes, ‘That there are facts cannot be a fact, but rather an 
interpretation,’^ ® in other words, it is the process of interpretation which determines 
what is to count as ‘fact’ at all.
This brief excursus regarding levels of interpretation, far from being 
irrelevant to the question of art and science or literature and philosophy as 
interpretative practices actually serves to delimit a criterion for distinguishing 
between the two. Regardless of the nature of the results achieved, i.e. whether they 
are to be seen as true in some Platonic sense, or merely projected onto the world 
according to the model inherited from Kant, the arguments of philosophical texts 
consist of propositions about the world. Although Plato’s dialogues are different in 
many fundamental ways from the works of Nietzsche, or Derrida, to take a 
contemporary example, they nevertheless have in common with them the feature of 
making certain assertions about the world, experience, knowledge, and so forth. 
Derrida’s elucidation of the operation of différance in language, or Nietzsche’s 
claim that ‘all truth is a lie’, is as much an assertion about a certain state of affairs 
as is Plato’s that virtue is knowledge or that knowledge is recollection, even if that 
assertion is accompanied by a parallel acknowledgement of the interpretative status 
of such assertion.
I would claim that against this universal prepositional character of 
philosophy, however, literature or art does not constitute interpretation at this level, 
i.e. propositions concerning the world as already constituted by the process of 
interpretation! + 2, interpretations whose validity can be disputed or asserted, and it 
is this which makes art the key to the overcoming of Nihilism for Nietzsche. 
Moreover the opposition should not be that between art and philosophy, but rather 
between art and those interpretative horizons which make philosophy (or 
metaphysics, since the two are identical in Nietzsche’s writings) possible. 
Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, though it focuses on what he considers to be 
the errors of the philosophers, is ultimately concerned with the presuppositions of 
the philosophers, i.e. those world-constitutive interpretations! + 2 which create the 
space within which philosophy operates. I have indicated in earlier chapters how 
Nietzsche coins a new set of terms, such as Becoming, philology, physiology, 
Eternal Recurrence and will to power as part of a strategy to move away from the
presuppositions which sustain the philosophical project. Ultimately, though, this 
strategy is bound to fail unless a transformation of those deeper world-constitutive 
interpretations is also enacted, and it is art which will facilitate this.
Art does not consist in a series of propositions about the world, the self, 
knowledge or morality. Even an analysis of the ideological underpinning of a 
particular work of art, or of a particular artist does not amount to an elucidation of 
the prepositional content of that work. This is most apparent in the case of musical 
compositions. It may seem a trivial point, but it is nevertheless important to stress 
the difference between the two. Adorno interprets the work of Schoenberg as the 
culmination of modern bourgeois consciousness and as a defence of bourgeois 
ideology against the threat to modem subjectivity. Despite this view, however, one 
cannot talk in meaningful terms of the prepositional content of Verklarte Nacht or 
the Gurrelieder.
At the same time as making such a claim, however, it has to be admitted that 
art, for Nietzsche does bring forth a particular world, as interpreted by will to 
power, a reading I have argued for in earlier chapters. The notion of bringing forth, 
of course, does indicate the sense in which art is an interpretation; for it suggests 
that art belongs to that level of interpretation which is world-constitutive, i.e. art 
produces a world, interpretations] of which can be subsequently made. Here we are 
reminded of the importance of Nietzsche’s critique of any view that art is somehow 
world-disclosive, a critique which would, of course, apply equally to later thinkers 
such as Heidegger or Dufrenne and to Nietzsche’s predecessors, most notably 
Schopenhauer or the early German Romantics. Art does not disclose an already 
determinate world, or even pure Being, rather it sets the interpretative horizon 
within which the world is understood, within which it is interpreted as world.
Herein lies its importance: art, and in particular tragedy, produces a world 
permeated by the contingent, by ambiguity, by the Here-and-now, a world which 
establishes a set of interpretative horizons fundamentally different from those which 
have made meaningful the propositions of metaphysics and philosophy. To 
overcome the errors of metaphysicians, and in short to overcome reactive Nihilism, 
one has to overcome the world which makes questions of philosophy meaningful 
and relevant, which makes reactive Nihilism a very real response to the self- 
disclosing flaws of the Western tradition. In this context, then, it is no surprise that 
Socratic culture has either been completely hostile to art, has alienated it, or 
contrived to persuade artists to produce the trivial, inauthentic art of opera. 
Romanticism or Realism, to name those types that recur in Nietzsche’s work most 
frequently. For the continued existence of an authentic artistic practice would be 
inimical to the declared goals of Socratic culture, which is sustained by a 
fundamentally different world horizon.
■i
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Ironist that he is, Nietzsche is pointing toward the dissolution of his own 
project, for he is making assertions about that which precedes his assertions, and 
ultimately indicating its inadequacy. Apart from his foray into the artistic in Thus 
Spake Zarathustra Nietzsche’s work, despite its avowed distance from the 
tradition, is in fact caught up in it, and is forced to argue about those same issues 
which have been regarded as important by the metaphysicians. In arguing for the 
adoption of a tragic cultural horizon he can at most point toward that which cannot 
be articulated within the linguistic resources available to him. For the adoption of 
interpretative horizons, although determined by the general structure of language, is 
something which occurs beyond language. To borrow Wittgenstein’s distinction, it 
is a matter of showing which precedes and makes possible any act of saying. This 
is not to commit oneself to seeing interpretations! + 2 as consisting in an ostensive 
relation to the empirical world. Rather it is merely to claim that originary 
interpretation, the artwork, shows the world it has constructed according to will to 
power. It is for other discourses to say what has to be shown, and what can be said 4
is shaped by what art has chosen to show. We see here, too, how important the 
physiology of art is in Nietzsche, for it binds art to that originary level of 
interpretation! + 2, including the body, which constitutes the limits of each 
interpretative act.
Perhaps from this perspective, too, we can see the full implication of the 
‘raging discordance’ between art and truth in Nietzsche, to which Heidegger has 
attached so much importance. The discordance does not arise from Nietzsche’s 
claim that art is mendacious; as I have argued before this claim can be seen as a 
strategic move designed to counter the Romantic equation of art with truth. The 
discordance arises from the fact that art precedes truth. Truth as a function of 
grammar and human physiology, to name but two interpretative constituents, arises 
from a comparison of individual interpretations] with the horizons set by world- 
constitutive interpretation! +2; these latter determine the truth criteria of the former.
If we maintain that artistic practice actually constitutes a world, in the sense of the 
latter type of interpretation, then it is difficult to see how one can regard a work of 
art as either true or false. The work of art represents a setting-into-work-of-truth as 
I have claimed earlier, but this does not entitle us to judge the truth content of that 
process itself. One might claim, in parallel to Heidegger’s assertion that ‘Being is 
not a being’, that the setting-into-work-of-truth is neither true nor false; it is not a 
proposition which could be judged according to some external set of criteria of 
correctness, since it constitutes, indeed is that set of criteria.
'à
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Conclusion
During the course of this thesis I have assembled Nietzsche’s heterogeneous 
writings on art to forge a coherent theory of art. Without seeking to reduce their 
multiplicity, the key to Nietzsche’s thoughts lies in the consideration of how art can 
hold in check necessity and contingency in the dialectic of interpretation. This 
holding in check is deemed necessary by Nietzsche inasmuch as it constitutes the 
only credible basis for evaluation after the overcoming of metaphysics. The dialectic 
of interpretation which is only truly effected in art combines a recognition of the 
contingency of values with a continued belief in their necessity. We have seen how 
Nietzsche’s concern stems from a reaction to a particularly modern problem, since 
Modernity for Nietzsche is that period when the paradoxes of metaphysics finally 
becomes apparent, when ‘the highest values devalue themselves’.
Nietzsche’s recognition of this theme and the concomitant crisis of Nihilism 
sets him apart from Modernist artists and writers, who seek to replace the 
foundational discourse of metaphysics with an alternative one. This is especially 4
apparent in the obsession from Rousseau onwards with primitive humanity. This 
obsession leads to attempts to reconstitute the state of pre-modem humanity as a 
way out of its fallen state, whether it be in Rousseau’s political programme, early |
twentieth century Primitivism or modern anthropology’s interest in ‘primitive’ 
tribes. While Nietzsche does contend that philosophy is atavism there can be no 
hankering after imaginary pre-lapsarian states. For these hopes bear the mark of f
metaphysics just as much as does modern science and industrial society, for they 
are foundational discourses. Against this we have seen that Nietzsche is seeking a 
non-foundational type of thinking, and it is his contention that art can best make 
meaning in a world devoid of any anchor point.
We have seen how art achieves this in a number of ways. It begins with 
Nietzsche’s recognition of the tragic annihilation and restitution of meaning, and 
becomes most explicit in the relation of art to will to power and Eternal Recurrence.
As has become apparent, certain forms of art act as the locus where interpretative 
will to power and Eternal Recurrence come together through their denial of the 
transcendent. We have seen that transcendence is based on a particular 
understanding of time and the cognitive process, an understanding which cannot be 
accommodated by the work of art. Art thus functions as the site of immanence, 
producing a world denuded of any suggestion of a beyond, in both temporal and #
ontological terms. Implicit in Nietzsche’s account is a distinction between 
‘authentic’ art, which he sees as marginalised by theoretical culture, and 
‘inauthentic’, or simply ‘unaesthetic’ art. This latter could be seen as the usurpation |
.. .‘Î
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of artistic forms by metaphysics, and in Chapter four I discussed how the genuine 
art form of tragedy has been usurped for Nietzsche by the metaphysical disposition 
of Florentine opera and the Wagnerian ‘Gesamtkunstwerk*. Indeed the young 
Nietzsche was himself fooled by such works, pinning false hopes on Wagner 
before recognising the latter’s concern with the familiar theme of transcendence and 
redemption. Yet Nietzsche still sees aesthetic education as the key to cultural 
renewal, hoping that some time in the future the notion of artistic forms being used 
to promote metaphysical values will become a laughable curiosity of the past.
I considered, finally, the relation between Nietzsche’s ‘aesthetic attitude’ 
and that of Post-modernism. Both share a suspicion towards the Enlightenment 
discourse of redemption through reason, and as I have suggested, Nietzsche has 
little time for Modernism, which while denying the tyranny of reason seeks 
redemption through its other, for example the unconscious, the primitive, artistic 
form, or the consciousness of the working classes. Despite this shared refusal of 
such naive optimism, however, I have argued that Nietzsche nevertheless differs 4
considerably from the stance of such Post-modern theorists as Lyotard or Stanley 
Fish. These latter have, in the terms of the Nietzschean discourse, accomplished the 
first stage of the overturning of metaphysics, namely the discrediting of its claims to 
knowledge. They have not, however become ‘accomplished Nihilists’. In other 
words they have not gone on to form a critical discourse for which anything 
matters, yet which does not share the delusions of metaphysics. This is most 
apparent in Fish’s rhetoric of assent and Lyotard’s (mis-)application of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of language games. For Fish critical discourse has no 
function other than to affirm those beliefs which sustain the culture of which it is a 
product. That this clashes with Nietzsche’s conception of interpretation as will to 
power hardly needs arguing. Similarly, Lyotard, for whom language is comprised 
of a multiplicity of heterogeneous language games, contends that the task of critique 
is thereby surpassed. In his haste to discredit the totalitarian discourse of reason,
Lyotard has embraced its opposite, i.e. the absolute heterogeneity of all types of 
discourse, a conclusion which shares with Fish a renunciation of critical discourse.
This critical paralysis is shared by Post-modern art and literature, which have 
departed both from the tradition and from any notion of a progressive Modernist 
aesthetic praxis, yet without offering in its place. The end result would thus be seen 
as an extended toying with the fragments of past artistic forms, devoid of any 
critical concern. To this extent, then, Nietzsche would have to be seen as closer to 
the project of Enlightenment, for his constant goal is the production of a higher 
culture, a goal which has no sense for the discourse of the Post-modern. Where 
Nietzsche does depart from Enlightenment is in his renunciation of any final state.
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This stems from his privileging of interpretation. Interpretation, engaged on an 
infinite dialectic of perspectival expansion, can never has as its goal some final 
point of absolute knowledge. It can, though, have a goal of more power. This leads 
to an affirmation of the process of Enlightenment without an affirmation of its 
utopian telos. The Übermensch is not some final state for humanity to aim for, but 
rather the embodiment of an attitude of active Nihilism, an attitude which is 
expressed in art. And this is Nietzsche’s lesson for us. We can talk about 
metaphysics. We can rehearse all the arguments against its delusions, but we cannot 
thereby escape its grasp. For theoretical discourse is by its very nature 
metaphysical. The logic of conceptual language has to mask its origins. The only 
way to properly renounce metaphysics is to renounce theory and become artists. To 
do this is, of course, to renounce everything for which humanity has been taken to 
stand, since Aristotle’s definition of the human as a rational being, and this is what 
Nietzsche is perhaps indicating in his call for the Übermensch.
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